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Introduction 
 
Central question !
This Ph.D. thesis investigates the association between the impairment of goodwill 
and corporate governance. The thesis is the result of a deep study on which I worked 
during my three-year Ph.D. research period. My interest arises from the will to 
examine whether and how different corporate governance subjects influence an 
important accounting decision as the goodwill write-off. Indeed, the impairment of 
goodwill involves across-the-board most firm functions. The procedures needed to 
carry out the impairment test cannot be limited only to the accounting domain, being 
instead necessary merging the competences in the strategic and operational 
management, in organization and finance with the accounting-related ones. 
Underlying the impairment of goodwill there are indeed assumptions that are used 
for both the ordinary and the strategic decisions. Hence, the valuations underlying 
goodwill impairments are meaningful, revealing about internal politics and they are 
portentous of the management past (because goodwill originates from business 
combinations) and future (because goodwill is the expression of the expected 
benefits deriving from the synergies created or from the invisible intangibles of the 
acquired entity) strategy. The result of the periodic impairment test constitutes a 
signal of the future strategy of the firm or of the effectiveness of past strategies. As a 
matter of fact, the maintenance of the value of goodwill implies that suitable 
strategies to preserve its value are in place while a reduction in the value of goodwill 
might suggest a change in the strategy of the firm, either triggered by external or 
internal indicators. Also, the assumptions underlying the impairment procedure 
derive from the forecasts, which are predicted at different levels within the firm.  
The development of my research takes into account a conceptual, historical and 
doctrinal analysis of the goodwill write-offs, mainly in the Italian accounting 
literature and with a brief overview on the International accounting literature. The 
reason to explore the evolution of the goodwill notion and treatment through the 
accounting history moves from the dense and puzzling debate that since the 
nineteenth century characterised the accounting panorama, leading the goodwill to be 
one of the most controversial assets.  
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By common consent the process underlying the valuation of goodwill is associated to 
the entire process to determine the company economic value.  
From the introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 
(SFAS 142) in the United States and of International Accounting Standard 36 (IAS 
36) in the International Accounting Standards adopter countries, follows several 
critiques and reservations from academics, practitioners, standard setters and 
regulators. As far afield as that in recent years both the US Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
questioned whether prior amortisation process was more relevant and reliable.  
The amortization of goodwill was convenient for under-performing companies 
leading them to charge lower expenses (amortization charge) and resulting in higher 
earnings, but it was inconvenient for over-performing companies. Indeed, even 
though the goodwill acquired was maintained or even strengthened through an 
effective and favourable management the company had to record the established 
amortization charge, leading to lower earnings and moving away from the underlying 
economic value of the company.  
Overall, at the very beginning the switch from the systematic amortization to the 
impairment test of goodwill led companies to more satisfactory earnings and higher 
assets, but since 2008 with the crisis outbreak the companies’ financial statements 
have begun to suffer large and unexpected impairment losses. The companies’ assets 
became too high to overcome the impairment test, thus, according to the international 
accounting standards the goodwill allocated to the cash generating units (called 
reporting unit according to the US GAAP) was the first to be impaired.  
One of the main critiques raised to the impairment of goodwill is the fluctuation of 
the results. Nonetheless, the primary problem that has been highlighted is the 
everlasting trade-off between relevance and reliability of the financial information. 
The aim of both SFAS 142 and IAS 36 was to produce more relevant information for 
investors and financial users in general. Both academic literature and financial press 
criticized the new accounting principles tied to fair value measurements, suggesting 
their likely “irrelevance” for investment decisions (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; 
Watts, 2003; Benston, 2008). 
My own opinion is that it is hard, if not impossible, to get relevance without 
reliability. Investors, and financial users in general, are well aware of the subjectivity 
underlying the write-off or non-write-off decisions. The corporate governance 
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system may moderate the use of discretionary accounting choices, enforcing the 
overall reliability of financial reporting. Hence, my research objective is to 
investigate the role of corporate governance in constraining (or exacerbating) the 
manipulation of goodwill write-offs.  
On the one hand I investigate the impact that the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms have on the impairment test. On the other hand I verify whether the 
external corporate governance mechanisms are able to affect the decision of 
impairment.  
Within the internal corporate governance mechanisms I explore the board of 
directors, the managerial incentives, the insider ownership and the chief financial 
officer perception on the impairment of goodwill.  
Within the external corporate governance mechanisms I explore the institutional 
ownership, state ownership, external auditor and the analysts forecasts likely 
associations with discretional impairment of goodwill. Ownership structures (i.e. 
investors) are in and between internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms, they are the primary beneficiaries of the financial information and at 
the same time they may guide the same financial information. 
 
Theoretical background !
Academic literature suggests that writing off goodwill is a key accounting choice 
with a direct effect on the quality of financial reporting. Unlike other accruals, the 
write-offs disclose to the outside the private expectations of managers concerning the 
firm’s future profitability and perspectives. Thus, goodwill write-offs can imply 
several financial consequences, including drops in stock prices, a more in-depth 
scrutiny of asset values by minority investors and lenders and a re-assessment of the 
firm’s financial health (Zucca & Campbell, 1992; Alciatore et al., 1998; Ramanna 
and Watts, 2012).   
Prior research maintains that the management exploits the discretion allowed by 
accounting rules and uses write-offs as an earnings management tool for agency-
related reasons, such as maximizing their remuneration, saving their acknowledged 
reputation as skilled and capable manager, beating the market earnings forecasts or 
to send a signal to financial markets (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). Manipulated 
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goodwill write-off causes biased earnings, unreliable goodwill value and non-
transparent future prospects of the firm.  
This study is mainly grounded on the positivist agency theory, supposing that the 
agent, whether is the management, or the external auditor or different types of 
shareholders acts in its own interests which usually may not correspond to the best 
interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Well aware of the limits and critiques provided by several scholars on the individual 
view of agency theory, the research question could be further investigated also from 
different perspectives. A major criticism of the agency theory is its entrenchment in 
the neoclassical assumption of rational behaviour, which maximises the principal and 
agent’s different utilities without considering the social and institutional contexts 
(Wiseman et al., 2012). Accounting information should not be abstracted from the 
social, economic and cultural environments in which the companies operate 
(Carruthers, 1995).  
I also use the political theory to explain how politicians may exploit the control over 
companies and banks to obtain votes, contributions and bribes in return of 
employment, subsidies and other benefits to supporters and cronies (North, 1990; 
Olson, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; La Porta et al., 2002; Bushman and 
Piotroski, 2006). State-owned companies may be interested in obfuscating the firm 
transparency in order to easier engage in expropriation activities. Politicians 
interested in concealing the firms’ economic and financial performance may be 
interested in obfuscating the actual value of goodwill, avoiding or exacerbating the 
impairment losses. At the same time a benevolent view of the state suggests that 
government control over companies may play a development role being a guarantee 
of a general welfare and reducing market imperfections (Gerschenkorn, 1962; 
Shleifer, 1998). However, also this benevolent view of the state-ownership may 
create incentive to manipulate the impairment of assets to avoid economic and 
market drawbacks, which could have severe consequences on the employment (Ding 
et al., 2007; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). 
The institutional theory could constitute a supplementary perspective to further 
develop the study, since it is not centred on the individual rational behaviour, but on 
an organisation’s determination to achieve legitimacy in compliance with the 
external expectations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In this 
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sense, the “fair” use of the accounting information as well as external auditing may 
be viewed as devices formally established within an organisation in response to 
institutional pressures to, respectively, conform to the required information and 
formalise the expected control practices (Gupta et al., 1994). Also the stream of 
institutional theory discussing the “decoupling” may be suitable to analyse how both 
managers and auditors formally use their general accepted, respectively accounting 
and auditing, standards to accomplish legitimacy but how the actual practices depart 
them to serve their interests (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). 
The empirical analysis carried out in chapter three allows also to interpret the results 
using even other theories from those above-mentioned, as different corporate 
governance subjects are involved. For instance, in the analysis of the influence of the 
external auditor on the reliability of the goodwill write-offs the game theory may be 
explanatory of auditor behaviour. According to the game theory there is at least a 
rational and self-interested player with a strategy purposely built to reach the 
equilibrium, that is the best result among the players (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 1951, 1953; Rasmussen, 1989). In a two-person 
cooperative game the auditor and the auditee (client) can both obtain benefits. It is a 
sort of negotiation game; the client might threaten the auditor with the replacement 
of a new and more lenient auditor, the auditor, on the other side, by disclosing 
misstatements increases its reputation. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances the 
auditor and the manager interests may converge and both of them reach the 
equilibrium to the detriment of fair financial information; a case in point is the 
overstatement manipulation of the goodwill write-off (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991; 
Hatherly et al., 1996).  
 
Main contributions !
This thesis provides a threefold theoretical contribution, contributing to the studies 
on accounting history, on accounting and on corporate governance. 
First, it develops a path within the Italian accounting tradition that might be 
considered as trailblazing of the modern accounting standards. I retrace different 
approaches on the evaluation issues and on the concept of goodwill that some of the 
most influential Italian “Economisti Aziendali” emphasised in their writings. From 
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the specific attention devoted to the long-lived assets financial evaluations one can 
appreciate the multidimensionality of our “Economia Aziendale”, including 
operations, management and control. As a matter of fact, the impairment of assets 
constitutes the trait d’union between various functions within the firm, involving 
beyond accounting also strategy, finance, operation, internal and external control. I 
thus carefully explore the past accounting literature on the goodwill-related issues, 
employing a constructive and historical method that led me to build a personal 
interpretation. 
Second, as underlined by prior literature, the manipulation of goodwill write-offs 
makes allocating financial resources highly inefficient, both at the firm and at market 
levels, and compromises the role of financial reporting as an external control system 
(Beatty & Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Given the important economic 
and market implications, managers, directors, chief financial officers, shareholders 
and external auditors carefully assess the estimates underlying the goodwill write-
offs (Gu and Lev, 2011; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Despite this, prior research has 
not yet systematically investigated whether the corporate governance mechanism 
influences the write-offs decisions. As a matter of fact, in literature there are 
conflicting findings on managerial incentives in manipulating the earnings through 
specific accruals and in detail through assets write-offs.  
Third, as far as I know there are still unexplored areas of corporate governance’s 
influence on impairment of goodwill. I attempt to fill this literature gap.  
 
Chapter overview !
Four chapters make up my thesis. Following I briefly sum up the structure of the 
thesis delineating the main issues faced in each chapter.  
In chapter one I analyse the historical studies on goodwill and on write-offs, how 
goodwill has been defined and measured over years, in the Italian academic literature 
and introducing some hints to the historical International studies. I also discuss the 
main trends that theoretically proved to be prodromal for the preparation of the 
current financial statements pervaded by the fair value logic.  
In chapter two I present the research design referring to both the theoretical 
framework on which is based the study and the research methods used. I introduce 
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the research question that is the potential association between (1) the impairment of 
goodwill and its weaknesses and (2) the corporate governance mechanisms. I focus 
on the role played by the corporate governance system on the reliability of the 
financial information. Therefore, I briefly illustrate what I include in the concept of 
corporate governance, distinguishing between internal and external corporate 
governance devices.  
The link between accounting principles and corporate governance offers an 
interesting area that can be considered from different theoretical frameworks. The 
dominant theory in both corporate governance and accounting studies, mostly used in 
this thesis, is the neoclassic economic agency theory with its declination in moral 
hazard, risk aversion, information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour. 
Notwithstanding the discussions of each empirical essay might be extended to a 
broader view of theories, explaining the results from different lens including more 
interpretive paradigms spacing up to the theories used by the critical accounting 
studies.  
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the representation of the methods used 
to explore my research question, including the historical method, the archival 
research and the survey research.  
Chapter three discusses the empirical research and findings. In detail, I articulate 
the findings in sub-paragraphs. In the first one (§ 3.1), I examine the impairment of 
goodwill and earnings management behaviours, taking into account reporting 
incentives to use discretionary write-offs (e.g. leverage, big bath, income smoothing, 
CEO changes, CEO tenure, bonus, etc.). I investigate how different ownership 
structures affect the impairment decision in three different contexts (Italy, United 
Kingdom and Germany); specifically, I consider managerial, state and institutional 
ownerships. The ownership structures constitute the joining link between the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and the external corporate governance 
mechanisms. In the same paragraph I study also the association between the 
discretionary use of goodwill write-off and the corporate governance in terms of 
independent directors within the board, the separation of Chairman and CEO 
positions and the board and audit committee meeting frequency. 
The successive paragraph (§ 3.2) still concerns with the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. In detail, I questioned to CFOs their perceptions about the 
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use of the impairment test especially focusing on their perceptions of the driver of 
manipulated goodwill write-offs.  
Subsequently (§ 3.3), I move the attention to the investigation of the external 
mechanisms of corporate governance. The external auditor features might moderate 
the manipulation of goodwill write-offs. In this part I exclusively discuss some 
possible associations between goodwill write-offs and auditor size, tenure, fees and 
non-audit-fees and expertise. 
A further development of the general research question (§ 3.5) is the exploration of 
the analysts’ earnings forecasts and the association to goodwill write-offs.  
In chapter four I draw the conclusions and I review the contribution of my study to 
the field of knowledge. Particularly, the thesis mainly contributes to the accounting 
literature and to the corporate governance literature. To conclude, I discuss the 
relevance of the findings, the limitations of the thesis and potential future research 
avenues. 
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1. The concepts of goodwill and of impairment throughout 
the accounting history !
(…) It is said, in other words, that even in the 
accounting systems we sometimes have to proceed to 
general or particular “revaluations”, providing 
renewed foundation to the incomes determination 
for the period.  
(...) It almost seems that not in the short-run, the net 
assets should find in the equity economic value the 
touchstone that allows the appropriate evaluation. 
Zappa, 1950, translated  
 
Goodwill, when it appears in the balance sheet at 
all, is but a master valuation account – a catch-all 
into which is thrown both an unenumerated series of 
items that have the economic, though not necessarily 
the legal, properties of assets, and an undistributed 
list of undervaluations of those items listed as assets. 
It is the valuation account par excellence. 
Canning, 1929 
 
 
 
1.1. The concepts of goodwill and of impairment: an introduction 
 
The introduction of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 
142) and of the International Accounting Standards No. 36 (IAS 36) replaced the 
systematic amortization of goodwill with a procedure called impairment test. Both 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) consider the goodwill as an asset with indefinite useful life, 
not subjected, therefore, to the systematic allocation of the cost along its useful life, 
but subjected at least once a year to the impairment test.  
The impairment approach, respectively introduced by the FASB and IASB in 2001 
and in 2004, actually seems to have much more ancient origins.  
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This first part of the thesis, mainly descriptive, introduces a historical perspective 
aimed at discussing some of the main ideas developed in the tradition of the Italian 
accounting and management discipline, known as “Economia Aziendale”, with some 
hints to the International arguments that have led to the delineation of the concept of 
goodwill and of impairment. More specifically, I focus on the post-acquisition 
accounting for goodwill, studying the evolution in the history of the accounting 
theoretical discussions that might have been at the base of the modern international 
approach that requires the impairment test. Even though the concept of goodwill and 
the impairment approach are mainly attributed to the contribution of the Anglo-
Saxon accounting history, several studies accentuate how, actually, less known non-
English works might have pioneered or advanced certain accounting practices 
(Mattessich, 2003; Guarini et al., 2013). 
The concept of goodwill has raised an increasing interest only from the nineteenth 
century; nonetheless, far away in the past we encounter cases that may recall to the 
concept. In literature we do not find a unique and shared definition or interpretation 
of the concept of goodwill. Bianchi Martini (1996) suggests that the idea of goodwill 
emerged already in the ancient Rome with the jurist Papiniano on the occasion of the 
inheritance of a banker, while the first regulatory reference to the so-called “jus 
entraturae” (right to entry)1 is in Tuscany in the Middle Ages. In detail, the “jus 
entraturae” conferred to the trader who «with his active and intelligent work 
increased the value of a company» (Ferrero, 1912, translated) the right to the 
recognition of this higher value. Leake (1948: 1-2) instead suggests that the first 
usage of the goodwill term was in the year 1571 while the first legal 
acknowledgement was with the case of Crutwell v Lye (1810, 17 Ves. 335) when 
Lord Eldon commented as follows: «The goodwill which has been the subject of sale 
is nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old 
place»2. 
Initially the notion of goodwill was tied to specific causal factors such as the 
customers loyalty, the public esteem and credit, the company site, the ability and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The “jus entraturae” may be considered the historical antecedent of goodwill. It has often been 
mentioned in medieval texts and it arises in the statutes of the Florentine arts. See Fierli G. in “Del 
diritto dell'entratura secondo i nostri statuti delle arti” (Firenze 1798; 2nd ed., 1805), which takes into 
consideration the privilege (called "entratura") granted by the arts statutes to manufactorers and 
merchants, except in certain cases, of not being expelled from the rented workshops to practice their 
craft. See also S. Bianchi Martini (1996: 16) in “Interpretazione del concetto di avviamento. Analisi 
dei principali orientamenti della dottrina italiana”. 
2!This reference is cited also by Courtis (1983: 12) and Bloom (2008: 21).!
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experiences of the people managing the business, the products quality and the 
reputation (Villa, 1870; Giocoli, 1905). 
Since its origin, however, the concept of goodwill postulates the uniqueness 
generated by the combination of all productive factors of a company system that 
allows the same company to obtain a higher value than the simple sum of the 
equivalent analytical elements considered individually. 
Nonetheless, due to the difficulties to measure the value of goodwill, it has always 
been prohibited its recognition as an asset in the financial statement unless it was 
acquired. This empiricist approach based on the induction – that is goodwill can be 
recognized only after the payment of a higher value – is still today applied for the 
publication of the annual report under the US GAAP, the IAS/IFRS and the Italian 
GAAP as well. These standards, indeed, are anchored to the acquisition cost and to 
the goodwill premium. Both the FASB and the IASB set out the requirements for the 
recognition and the measurement of an asset in the statement of financial position. 
The IASB requires for the recognition of an asset the probability that its future 
economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity and that its cost can be measured 
reliably. Similarly, the FASB defines assets as the probable future economic benefits 
obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or events. 
Once the entity has recognized the goodwill in the statement of financial position, it 
has to assess at least annually if the carrying amount of the cash generating unit3 or 
reporting unit (henceforth CGU), respectively in IAS 36 or SFAS 142, to which the 
goodwill is allocated exceeds or not the recoverable amount of the same unit. If the 
carrying amount exceeds the recoverable amount of the unit than the entity has to 
recognize an impairment loss. The amount of the impairment loss is the difference 
between the recoverable amount and the carrying amount of the entity. This 
impairment loss firstly reduces the value of the goodwill and then pro-rata the other 
assets allocated to the unit.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 IAS 36 at paragraph 6 defines a cash generating unit as: «The smallest identifiable group of assets 
that generates cash inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows from other assets or 
groups of assets». SFAS 142 defines a reporting unit as: «A reporting unit is an operating segment or 
one level below an operating segment (referred to as a component). A component of an operating 
segment is a reporting unit if the component constitutes a business for which discrete financial 
information is available and segment management regularly reviews the operating results of that 
component. However, two or more components of an operating segment shall be aggregated and 
deemed a single reporting unit if the components have similar economic characteristics. An operating 
segment shall be deemed to be a reporting unit if all of its components are similar, if none of its 
components is a reporting unit, or if it comprises only a single component». 
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From this short summary of the current accounting principles, we can easily observe 
that, now as then, the cost/price paid by the acquirer has always been the yardstick 
for the recognition of goodwill. However, the cost is just the expression of a value, 
thus it immediately arises the problems underlying the recognition, measurement and 
maintenance of the cost/value of goodwill.  
The assessment of the goodwill value involves the process of evaluation of the equity 
economic value of the entire entity. The goodwill, indeed, can be defined as the 
expression of a set of multiple intangible conditions that allows the entity to obtain 
from the business a profitability higher than the average-profitability obtained from 
the entities operating in the same industry and in similar conditions. 
Several Authors argue that the financial accounting valuations, and more precisely, 
the criteria of these valuations, can change according to the aims for which the 
financial statement is drawn up, or, in other words, according to the knowledge that 
we pursue to gain4 (Alfieri, 1915; Ghidiglia, 1921; Onida, 1951; Ceccherelli, 1956; 
D’Ippolito, 1963; Capaldo, 1971). Several reasons induce to determine the capital 
value (e.g. determination of: the income for the period, the outcome of the firm 
liquidation, the value of the firm, the price to which the firm might be exchanged and 
so on). To different reasons correspond different capital definitions: equity or net 
assets, liquidation capital and “equity economic value” (called “capitale economico” 
by the Italian scholars). It can be deduced that each different capital evaluation 
conveys to a different income configuration. The determination of the value of the 
total assets of a “running entity” (“entità in funzionamento”) is a means to attain to 
the knowledge of another amount, the income of the period5. Thus, the equity value 
has not an independent connotation but it is instrumental in relation to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Alfieri (1915: 64, translated) observes that: «The evaluation can take place for different aims and 
may vary from aim to aim. Hence, the plurality of financial statements and recording systems from 
which the financial statements should be deduced». Alike, Ghidiglia (1921, translated) notes that: 
«The estimation criteria must be chosen according to the estimation aim». Also, Ceccherelli (1956: 
193) denotes how the evaluation criteria depend on the evaluation aims. Please, see note I at the end 
of this chapter. 5!Ceccherelli (1961: 194, translated) highlights how in the financial valuations it is necessary «(…) to 
attribute to the firm equity a value not as it would have to or might be liquidated or transferred, and 
with reference to the liquidation or transfer moment, but as it represents the disposal of a “running” 
firm and of a firm that have to run in the future. Hence, the corresponding valuation is called 
“valutazione di funzionamento”». For a thorough distinction between “valutazione di funzionamento” 
and liquidation or transfer valuations see amongst others Giannessi (1960: 594) and Caramiello (1968: 
165). 
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determination of that income6. Capaldo (1998: 42-45) observes that income is a 
conventional amount, since it can be determined using different criteria. The Author 
notes that the basic problem lies in the choice of the valuation criteria used to 
determine the value of the investments still existing at the end of the period (e.g. 
long-lived assets). Further, Allegrini (2001) highlights the interdependence between 
capital and income supporting that the capital valuation logic and criteria affect also 
the income determination.  
The following paragraphs deepen how the different equity configurations proposed 
by some Italian accounting scholars could have, in a certain sense, inspired or at least 
anticipated the current position of the accounting standards regarding goodwill 
measurements and valuations. More specifically, this chapter provides a review of 
the thought of some of the main historical accounting Schools regarding to goodwill 
and impairment test. While discussing these issues it is unavoidable to present also 
some of the logic underlying the equity assessment proposed in the past, 
demonstrating to be still central for the assets valuation criteria currently adopted.  
 
1.2. Goodwill through the Italian accounting history: From the 
“Precursors” to the origin of “Economia Aziendale” 
 
The primitive notion of goodwill has antique and empirical origin. This primitive 
notion develops following the functional needs of the business pushing the academic 
literature to define the goodwill concept. At the very beginning the notion of 
goodwill was associated with some specific causal factors (e.g. customers loyalty, 
public esteem, credit, company site, entrepreneurs’ ability, cumulated experiences, 
brand name notoriety, etc.).  
Giovanni Massa (1898) analyses the goodwill in close relation with the installation 
costs, considering both of them as “special assets” and “fictitious capital”. In these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Nelson (1942: 141) concludes a discussion on “The relation between the balance sheet and the 
profit-and-loss statement” as follows: «The balance sheet and the profit and loss statement are 
complementary: each completes the picture by presenting a different aspect of enterprise receipts and 
disbursements». In the same vein, Zeff (1964: 31) concludes his contribute by highlighting that both 
statements merit regards and stating that: «The financial statements are analytically coordinate». On 
the relationship between equity and income amongst the Italian scholars see also Ceccherelli (1961), 
Superti Furga (1979), Capaldo (1998) and Allegrini (2001). 
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first definitions we perceive the effort to attribute to the goodwill the characteristics 
of incurred costs in order to reduce, in a certain sense, its fleeing and evasive nature7.   
Nonetheless, already from the first definitions, the goodwill value was entangled to 
the same concept of firm value and of economic-profitable potentialities 
(“potenzialità economico-reddituali”). Indeed, once passed the overlapping between 
the notion of goodwill and some specific causal factors existing in the Italian 
literature until the end of the nineteenth century, the doctrine begins to conceive 
goodwill as a “sui generis” (i.e. with very special characteristics) asset able to 
generate income (Rossi, 1906).  
With Giovanni Rossi (1906) surfaces the idea that goodwill should be considered as 
an economic potentiality able to generate income, though within this perception, the 
value of the goodwill is still knowledgeable only in the hypothesis of firm transfer8. 
Specifically, Rossi (1906) suggests an example to determine the economic value of 
goodwill in the hypotheses of disposal of the firm and he proposes the formula of the 
perpetual rents (partially approaching to the contemporary income approach to firm 
valuation). Despite the remarkable intuitions, Bianchi Martini (1996: 30-31) raises 
doubts about Rossi’s simplistic approach since the Author (1906) relies on the shares 
market prices, oversimplifies the problem of estimating the future income and the 
capitalization interest rate and does not distinguish properly the theoretical value 
from the price effectively paid to acquire the firm. Also Borrè (2008) highlights that 
the conceptualization of the goodwill notion for all the nineteenth century is 
anchored to a predominant phenomenal approach. Indeed, as above suggested, the 
first attempts of goodwill definition derive from the frequent observation of firm 
disposals at prices exceeding the sum of the transferred equity.   
It is only from the early twentieth century and later with the emerging concept of 
“Azienda” that the Italian academics become conscious of the possibility that 
goodwill might exist even without the necessary empirical evidence of the exceeding 
price over the equity transferred. Hence, the higher value of the “complex” compared 
to the simple “sum of its parts”, although not recorded in the financial statement, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Massa (1898) is scrupulous in clarifying that the goodwill can be recorded!in the inventory only after 
a disposal of the company. The Author explains that one could consider the installation costs as 
goodwill but in this case a low (prudent) valuation is highly suggested. 
8 Rossi (1906) is amongst the Authors maintaining that the goodwill has to be subjected to taxation as 
an income, because even if it is a capital, it does not origin as capital but it is an income that grows 
gradually and emerges financially with the company transfer.  
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may exist even out of the firm transfer cases; the goodwill finally is identifiable as a 
stand-alone value.  
Besta’s theoretic represents the first discontinuity from prior theoretical systems, 
followed by another discontinuity introduced by Zappa’s (r)evolution.  
Fabio Besta follows a positivist approach adopting an empirical-inductive method. 
Empirical as the theoretical development is based on the observation of what 
happened and happens in the firm’s real life. Inductive as it arises the necessity to 
introduce an a-priori perspective in order to scientifically translate the observation 
into inference. More specifically, Besta focuses his perspective on the firm equity 
and on its modifications. The Author then introduces the concept of value within the 
accounting field, even though it is still influenced by the economic studies9. Indeed, 
the value and the wealth measurement, in terms of asset measurement, are anchored 
to the replacement or exchange value (D’Amico and Palumbo, 2011; Sargiacomo et 
al., 2012). Nevertheless, the Author determination is to provide a value theory aimed 
at controlling the firm equity. Particularly, Besta perceives the necessity to determine 
that value, not only on the basis of a transfer operation inclusive of the “real” 
determination of the value (price), but also in the absence of a transfer, developing in 
this case the concept of estimation (D’Amico and Palumbo, 2011). Since it is not 
always possible to have the evidence of the “real” exchange values, to perform the 
economic control it is necessary to resort to applicable estimations (e.g. replacement 
cost, normal cost, etc.)10.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Economists like Ricardo, Cossa, Carey and other have always tried to determine the origin of value. 
They generally derive value from the lack of resources available, their usefulness, the need to 
remunerate the factors of production, including the capital, and considering his remuneration. The 
profit has been identified as the reward for the investor, who renounces to consume in order to use 
their wealth productively. Besta (1922: vol. I p. 225, translated) is well aware of Ricardo’s value 
theory when he maintains that the economist «was far from truth…when he supported that the goods 
value is equal to the cost or expenses for their production». Besta (1880: 32, translated) is convinced 
that: «Economics investigates the wealth world in relation to the universal society… Accounting 
studies in a given aspect that same world in relation to the single Firm, but it cannot differ from that 
(from Economics)». 
10 Besta (1922: vol. I p. 215, translated) explains the differences between “valuation” (translated from 
the Italian “estimo”) and accounting maintaining that: «(…) the “valuation”, as it has been done so 
far, does not cover all kinds of wealth; mostly, it is restricted to rural goods and to buildings… and in 
addition it considers only the commercial or exchange values. Instead, the economic control, in order 
to be performed in its entire action, have to valuate wealth of any form and matter, and not only the 
wealths existing at a given moment, but also the changes that these wealths have experienced and will 
experience; and more, not being always able to hold out the real exchange values, it must compensate 
using appropriate expedients». 
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Fabio Besta in his writings assumes an atomistic-reductionist perspective 11 , 
measuring the single phenomenon (i.e. increase or decrease in wealth), which finds a 
place in the statement of financial position, while the income statement assumes 
relevance only as an aggregation of the partial results deriving from the 
modifications in the value of the individual assets over a certain period of time 
(Catturi, 1989; Zan, 1994; Viganò, 1994). To this scope, Besta distinguishes between 
active and passive items, whose values depend on the utilities producing (expensing) 
potentialities12.  
D’Amico and Palumbo (2011) argue how according to Besta the application of 
current values is usable only for the replaceable assets, but it is convenient to give up 
to the estimation of the “real” value in the financial statements’ valuations, applying 
the cost value. The cost value is still grounded on real (i.e. objective) data and should 
follow the prudence principle. In other words, Besta tries to limit the financial 
statements preparers’ manipulation avoiding valuing the assets at costs higher than 
their exchange values (Besta, 1922: 238). The ideal or “real” value is bound to the 
legalistic-prudential paradigm, expecting that the statement of financial position 
represents the items at the minor value between the historical cost and the market 
values (D’Amico and Palumbo, 2011: 55). 
Besta (1922) specifies that the valuation of the individual items is different in 
relation to their classification. The items belonging to the working capital or the 
long-lived assets should be valued at their normal price (current purchasing price), 
which tends to coincide with their exchange value. Rents, credits and debits should 
be valued at their actual values taking into account the degree of probability they will 
be received or paid in the determined time. Finally, he advances the existence of 
other particular elements of the equities, amongst which there is the determination of 
the goodwill value13.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11!Reading Besta’s (1920: 263, translated) words we can easily interpret this atomistic perspective: 
«(…) every change in value, even temporarily, of an asset or liability is actually a profit or loss, 
because it is profit any increase in the value of the enterprise equity deriving from its management 
(gestione), loss any reduction: future changes will increase, diminish or remove that profit or that loss, 
but they cannot exclude that what was taken place, has not taken place». See note IV at the end of this 
chapter. 
12 As suggest Perrone (1997: 344-345) and D’Amico and Palumbo (2011: 50) since the value of the 
items depends on their potentialities to produce utilities (i.e. future benefits using the IAS/IFRS 
expressions), Besta’s theoretic is framed within the future-perspective paradigm.  
13 These elements are not stand-alone items but they might allow in the future obtaining “real” assets. 
With Besta’s (1922: vol. I p. 67, translated) words: «The receivables, the goodwill, the factory secrets, 
the monopolies, are not, if carefully analysed, assets per se, but (they are) only conditions or means 
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More specifically, Besta (1922, translated) classifies the goodwill amongst the 
“complementary active assets” (elementi complementari)14, arguing that:  
«The goodwill exists and is measured as the sum of the resources that the company 
hopes to achieve in the future, as a result of its capital (investments), higher than the 
normal profits that are used to be produced by the investments of similar 
companies».  
Thus, the atomistic and equity-based view of the entity, as conceived by Besta and 
his School, considers goodwill as a premium-profit.  
As observed by Catturi (1989), Besta’s doctrine can be defined “equity-atomistic” 
(patrimoniale-atomistica, see note III at the end of this chapter) as he grounds the 
basis of the company on its assets and liabilities obtaining the net equity from a mere 
algebraic sum of them. In this way, each asset and liability loses its autonomy and its 
original acquisition cost as the sum of each item composes a whole15. Each asset and 
liability participates in the value of the coordination of the net assets, forming a 
systematic and unitary set of resources available for the business16.  
This theoretical approach of the Author is still today somewhat alive17 although it 
takes form in various declinations. Indeed, the IASB and FASB approaches used to 
identify the goodwill value very often retrieve to the coordination and combination 
concepts advanced by Besta. For instance, both the FASB’s Exposure Drafts (1999, 
2001) and the IASB’s Exposure Draft 3 list the six components that arise from a 
business combination, of which only two relate to goodwill18. Precisely, following !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
for the purchase of assets; and these “real” assets, not yet owed, but on which you can entrust for the 
future, are the “real” elements of the firm’s equity». 
14 Purposely, the Author specifies that the complementary assets (elementi complementari), mainly, 
are the goodwill and the instalments of sum prepaid to obtain higher wealth (e.g. buildings rents) 
(Besta, 1922: vol. I pp. 83-85). 
15 Perrone (1986: 130) notes that the same word “sum” used by Besta matches with the word 
“system”, advancing the future Zappian systemic-approach. On the theory of the system see for 
example, Sciarelli in “Il sistema d’impresa: problemi di organizzazione e di gestione” (Cedam, 
1977), Amaduzzi in “L’azienda nel suo sistema e nell’ordine delle sue rilevazioni” (Utet, 1978), 
Ferrero in “Impresa e management” (Giuffrè, 1980) and Bertini in “Il sistema d'azienda: schema di 
analisi” (Giappichelli, 1990). 
16 Besta (1922: vol. II p. 14, translated) supports the following: «When a firm lives or prospers, its 
individual assets with capital nature, that is aimed at the production scope, should be considered in 
relation to the firm and not in relation to third party acquirers, that is according to the profit that they 
can produce keeping their current destination, and remaining combined with all the other assets that 
make up the equity, and not according to the profit that others might draw from their separate use». 
17 Cf. Canziani (2007: 23, translated) where the Author comments how «the patrimonialistic logic was 
highly innovative for the time and still predominant in the Anglo-Saxon countries (…)». Also, 
D’Amico and Palumbo (2011: 53) recognise elements of commonalities between the IAS/IFRS and 
the reference to the destination and combination mentioned by Besta.  
18 As we read in the Basis For Conclusion (B313) to SFAS 141 (revised 2007): «The components and 
their descriptions, taken from the FASB’s Exposure Drafts were: 
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the above-mentioned Drafts configuration, the “core” goodwill resulting from a 
business combination is made up (1) by the fair value of the going concern element 
of the acquiree’s existing business and (2) by the fair value of the expected synergies 
or other benefits deriving from the combination of the acquirer’s and acquiree’s net 
assets. In other words, the fair value of the going concern element represents the 
ability to obtain from the acquired net assets a rate of return higher than that 
expected by the management whether it have had acquired these assets and liabilities 
separately. This form of goodwill is representative of the value of the synergies 
detected within the acquired business, which was already recognised as goodwill in 
the acquiree’s statement of financial position or was latent as internally generated 
goodwill (IFRS 3 BC 313). The second component of goodwill often referred to as 
“combination goodwill” takes form only after the business combination and is 
uniquely derived from the synergies expected by that combination (Johnson and 
Petrone, 1998; Henning et al., 2000).  
Besta’s goodwill conception as premium-profit is still nowadays largely used in the 
firm valuation methods that apply a mixed approach between the static valuation of 
the firm’s equity and the independent estimation of the value that the firm will create 
in the future (i.e. goodwill). This method is called mixed since it starts by valuing the 
firm’s assets and liabilities and then it adds a capital gain obtained from the value of 
its future earnings. It is undeniable, anyway, the intuition of Besta, who with the 
concept of goodwill in a certain sense overcomes his strong tie to the assets-
liabilities system (sistema patrimonialistico). The “Azienda” value is not only the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
• Component 1 – The excess of the fair values over the book values of the acquiree’s net assets at the 
date of acquisition. 
• Component 2 – The fair values of other net assets that the acquiree had not previously recognized 
(…). 
• Component 3 – The fair value of the going-concern element of the acquiree’s existing business. The 
going-concern element represents the ability of the established business to earn a higher rate of return 
on an assembled collection of net assets than would be expected if those net assets had to be acquired 
separately. That value stems from the synergies of the net assets of the business, as well as from other 
benefits (such as factors related to market imperfections, including the ability to earn monopoly 
profits and barriers to market entry – either legal or because of transaction costs – by potential 
competitors). 
• Component 4 – The fair value of the expected synergies and other benefits from combining the 
acquirer’s and acquiree’s net assets and businesses. Those synergies and other benefits are unique to 
each combination, and different combinations would produce different synergies and, hence, different 
values. 
• Component 5 – Overvaluation of the consideration paid by the acquirer stemming from errors in 
valuing the consideration tendered. Although the purchase price in an all-cash transaction would not 
be subject to measurement error, the same may not necessarily be said of a transaction involving the 
acquirer’s equity interests (…). 
• Component 6 – Overpayment or underpayment by the acquirer (…)».  
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reflection of its assets and liabilities, but it has to reflect also its ability to generate 
income19 (“capacità reddituale”). To sum up, Besta actually disentangles the value 
of the firm in two parts. The first derives from the replacement values of the assets 
combined within the firm that generate a normal income and the second is the 
premium-profit that will allow in the future the acquisition of new resources (Borrè, 
2008). From Besta’s (1920) approach we derive that the “equity economic value” 
might be condensed with the following equation: !!" = !! −!!!! ! !! + !"!!!!  
Where:  
− EEV stands for “Equity Economic Value” 
− A corresponds to the book value of the single assets reported in the balance sheet 
− L corresponds to the book value of the single liabilities reported in the balance 
sheet 
− GW is the value attributed to the goodwill 
 
Amongst Besta’s scholars Carlo Ghidiglia assumes a relevant role. Ghidiglia (1913) 
acknowledges the importance of the coordination amongst the various productive 
factors. The Author suggests that each element is combined with the others and is 
part of a whole; this is the reason why its value is higher than compared to the 
individual evaluation. The goodwill, according to Ghidiglia, arises from the sum of 
these surplus values and it is called a “sui generis” asset or complementary element 
recognisable only after a change in the economic subject. According to this still 
primal approach, the complementary assets must be depreciated over their useful 
lives, which in this case cannot exceed the company life20. 
Francesco De Gobbis (1939), in a similar manner to his “Maestro” Besta, defines the 
goodwill a “special element” arising when the price paid to acquire a company is 
higher than its equity. The Author also contributes to the financial valuation matter. 
He was a strong supporter of the equity integrity, maintaining (1926: 198, translated) 
that «[it] has to be the prerequisite in the determination of the income and 
consequently, the concept that should be followed in the financial valuations (…)». !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Differently, Zappa (1937) refers to the “global” income determining directly the firm value. The 
firms value determined through the algebraic sum of the goodwill and the values by abstraction 
attributed to the single equity elements “tangible or intangible”, is always different from the complex 
value, which tend to be higher (Zappa, 1937: 99). 
20 Amprino (1989: 94-95), commenting the work of Ghidiglia, recognises how actually the current 
accounting principles were already rigorously professed by the Italian doctrine. 
 21 
In the same piece of work (1926: 292) he suggests that some of the complementary 
elements do not have an autonomous value but a value conditioned to the company’s 
situation and to its going-concern ability. This last thought, perhaps, subtends the 
relevance of the goodwill as a complementary element and that its evaluation should 
reflect the company’s overall conditions always in accordance with the prudence and 
integrity principles. 
Pietro D’Alvise, as indicated by Giannessi (1965: 214) is one of Besta’s favourite 
scholars. D’Alvise (1938), convinced of the goodwill relevance in accounting, lists 
and comments the thought of various Authors around the goodwill concept. 
Mentioning Francesco Villa, the Author questions whether we can still speak of 
goodwill when the credit, reputation and estimation claimed do not allow earning 
beyond the normality. D’Alvise then wittily criticises Giovanni Massa when he 
refers to the possibility to capitalize goodwill only in case of incurred expenses21. It 
is interesting the comment on the perpetual rent proposed by Giovanni Rossi where 
D’Alvise arises the problem of possible reductions in the goodwill value. Another 
remarkable observation is the one on the amortization of the goodwill as proposed by 
Vincenzo Vianello. D’Alvise implies that it is illogical to believe that the goodwill 
depreciates through a straight-line amortization process and that it should be 
“written-off” in case of reiterated losses. As I see it, the above statements constitute a 
substantial anticipation of what the current international accounting standards for 
goodwill require, i.e. amortization process substituted by the impairment test. It is 
relevant the comment on the conception of goodwill proposed by Francesco De 
Gobbis. D’Alvise underlines again the fact that the value of goodwill should follow 
the “extra-profit” independently of the cost of it. The Author further raises doubt on 
the issue of the distinction between acquired goodwill and internally generated 
goodwill. He explicitly asks why two firms with the same value of goodwill should 
record it respectively as asset or expense it because the first has acquired it while the 
second developed it internally. D’Alvise reviews many other notorious academics 
amongst which there are Zappa, Ceccherelli, Onida, Masi, Della Penna and 
D’Ippolito and concludes that the differentiations amongst the various ideas requires 
further constructive analysis including also the views proposed abroad. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 D’Alvise (1938: 2, translated) expresses as follows: «Let’s see that if an American uncle gives us a 
company with goodwill, we cannot measure goodwill, because it did not cost us anything! Once 
evaluated, it does not seem logical to entirely exclude it from the inventory». It almost seems that 
D’Alvise covertly alludes to the internally generated goodwill. 
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Vittorio Alfieri (1921) in the conception of goodwill might represent the missing link 
between Besta and Zappa22. Alfieri follows Besta’s doctrine and the method based 
on the independent estimation of goodwill but his representation of goodwill 
approaches more closely Zappa’s ideas (Bianchi Martini, 1996: 45). Indeed, Alfieri 
perceives goodwill as a value in continuous formation that cannot be avoided if the 
purpose is to estimate the equity as a complex destined to last with the aim of income 
determination (Cinquini, 1991). The Author underlines that the subjective goodwill 
can decrease when it depends on the acquiree’s energies. Alfieri sees a teleological 
constraint linking each assets together, including the goodwill, thus the equity can be 
determined only unitarily (Palumbo, 1999: 316). One of the major contributions of 
Alfieri is surely on the estimates subject. In his work (1925: 394-395) he primarily 
distinguishes the “true and real” estimates and the “pseudo-estimates”  (pseudostime) 
or “apparent” estimates. While the first directly refers to the market values (prices), 
the second ideally substitutes the value of an asset to the value of another complying 
with certain rules. Secondly, he distinguishes between the “composition” and 
“decomposition” estimates, where the first considers the complex in its entirety while 
the second evaluates each element composing the complex separately, hence, only 
the “decomposition” estimates can lead to the “true and real” value as it disregards 
the assets complementarity. Thirdly, he distinguishes between the “permanence” 
estimate, aimed at determining the income of the period, and the “liquidation” 
estimate, aimed at determining the money obtainable from dismissing the company. 
Taking back the estimates issues on the goodwill valuation we understand that the 
first step is to establish whether the estimate concerns with the identification of the 
company disposal value or not. Only in case of disposal we can determine the “true 
and real” estimate of the goodwill through the exchange value. Conversely, in case 
of “permanence” estimate the value of goodwill can be determined through a 
“pseudo-estimate” of the company. Specifically, the value of goodwill emerges as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Giannessi (1965: 171, translated) points out that: «Alfieri’s observations on the estimates and on the 
different purposes to which they can be attributed are very important because they foreshadows the 
successive study address of the author and fits directly into the modern evaluations theory, linked to 
the dynamic interpretation – prospective and probabilistic - of the financial statements». In a similar 
vein Anselmi (1984: 75, translated) states: «Already Besta, unlike previous authors, had recognized 
the complementary significance of the assets, it is however Alfieri’s merit that have given full 
prominence to their complementary features, opening the way for a study of the dynamics of the 
company assets that has pioneered, for some aspects, the systematic logic». Cf. also Palumbo (1999: 
303 et seq.) where Alfieri’s contribution is interpreted as a progressive transition of the equity-asset 
approach towards the income-based approach. 
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the difference between the “composition” value of the company, comprising the 
coordination amongst the elements, and the value of the same company considered 
as an agglomerate of elements whose values derives from the “decomposition” 
estimate (Alfieri, 1925: 395). In this context it seems to me that the goodwill 
evaluation for a functioning company is for certain aspects comparable to the 
goodwill evaluation as required by the accounting standards (IAS 36 and SFAS 142). 
The goodwill, indeed, is measured by the difference between the equity economic 
value of the company, proxied by the price paid to acquire the “composition” of the 
company, and the values of the assets and liabilities transferred, considering their 
“decomposition” status23. As observes Giannessi (1965: 182), Alfieri with the 
considerations on the estimates recognises the importance of the going-concern of 
the firm. Particularly, Alfieri (1908: 168, translated) accentuates that:  
«When we cannot use the fundamental roman rule: res valet tanti quanti vendi 
potest, the goodwill estimation cannot be certain and it is often arbitrary».  
Thus, he lucidly perceives the subjectivity underlying the goodwill estimation24. To 
conclude, Alfieri with the introduction of the “pseudo-estimates” and the departure 
from Besta’s “true and real value” introduces some concepts like e.g. the 
coordination amongst factors further re-elaborated by Zappa in its systemic and 
income-based approach. 
Indeed, it is only with Gino Zappa that our discipline definitely assumes its holistic 
and polyhedral nature. Zappa (1926/1927) introduces a systemic perspective of the 
firm, shifting the viewpoint from Besta’s static spotlight on the change in wealth to a 
dynamic interpretation of the firm, whose primary focus is on the income (Allegrini, 
2001; Alexander and Servalli, 2011).  
However, in its first studies Zappa interprets the goodwill as the expression of a set 
of subjective and objective factors (e.g. intelligence and cleverness of the 
management, quality and uniqueness of the products, customers fidelity and habits, 
start-up expenses, location and so on) able to generate a “premium-profit” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Also D’Amico and Palumbo (2011: 63) suggest that: «[Alfieri] lays the basis for the definition of 
goodwill as the difference between systemic evaluation and the atomistic evaluation of the company». 
24 Alfieri (1925: 403) concludes his piece of work by saying that: «The pseudo-estimates must be 
accepted as gimmicks or second-best and without the prejudice of being able to replace or compare 
with the true estimate. Their results are not intelligible to those who ignore the rules that they obey. 
But the rules necessity is the best requirement of the pseudo-estimates. As the rules become more 
specific as they approach to the concrete case, that they never reach [the same case] and for which it is 
necessary, this is a rule again, going out of the rule, the more the pseudo-estimates become coercible 
and verifiable». 
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(sovrareddito) (Zappa, 1927: 167). Even though this first interpretation of the Author 
is tied to specific factors, Zappa departs from the definition of goodwill as “fictitious 
capital” (capitale fittizio) or as  “non-real capital” as meant by Massa (1898) and 
Rossi (1906). Further, Zappa criticizes Rossi that capitalises at the normal interest 
rate the past annual extra-profit to determine the exchange value of the goodwill. 
Indeed, still aligned with Besta he suggests that the value of goodwill is the present 
value of the extra-profits that we can hope to obtain in normal conditions. As a 
consequence, the goodwill value can be derived from the difference between the 
profits the firm generates in normal conditions and the profits generated by other 
similar firms in common and not favoured conditions25.  At that time it was usual to 
write in the statutes of the companies that the expenses recorded had to be amortized 
in the shortest possible time and Zappa agrees with this arrangement. However, he 
reminds how actually the goodwill value does not decline over time as its exchange 
value might even progressively increase. Thus, already in that historical period it was 
suggested not to amortise goodwill. In turn of the goodwill amortization he proposes 
to leave amongst the assets the goodwill value and at the same time to constitute a 
corresponding reserve in the equity able to «remedy the consequences of any 
possible depreciation» (Zappa, 1927: 173, translated).  
As soon as the Author changes perspective, he changes also the way to determine the 
firm value and as a consequence also its conception of goodwill changes. Indeed, 
considering the firm as a system, leads to value its transfer price as a unique and 
synthetic amount, the so-called equity “economic” value (or economic capital, called 
“capitale economico” by Italian scholars)26. The idea that surfaced from this renewed 
thought is that the atomistic or analytical valuations whose values are aggregated in 
subsequent phases do not consider the complementary or interdependent 
relationships amongst the resources27. From this moment Zappa recognises that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Cf. Zappa (1927: 170 et seq.). 
26 In this sense see Borrè (2008) who suggests two different phases in the thought of Zappa. A first, 
influenced by the thought of his Maestro Besta, and a second period, in which Zappa developed his 
independent thinking and incidental to the innovative point of view on the “Azienda”. See note II at 
the end of this chapter. 
27 Already in Zappa (1937: 100, translated) we find the idea that the value of the whole is different 
from the sum of all its components: «If in the complex firm equity, we still want to identify, in the 
economic aspect, the assets and liabilities items, however these [items] cannot never be perceived as 
elementary items, from which for algebraic sum we might derive the measure of the equity economic 
value of the complex. In the firm with goodwill the algebraic sum of the value abstractly attributed to 
the single “tangible and intangible” items, is always different from the complex value, often it is 
considerably lower than that value».  See also Zappa (1950: 117, translated) where we read: «Assets 
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aggregation of the different values abstractly associated to the individual assets and 
liabilities cannot constitute the value of the whole, of the complex, as that sum does 
not contemplate the value of the coordination. This indifference to likely synergies 
and interactions produces a biased value relative to the actual transfer value, as it 
would represent only the book value of the entity. This assertion does not imply that 
the two notions of capital (or value), book and economic, are totally independent; as 
Zappa (1937: 110, translated) observes:  
«…the notions of book value and economic value of the company even though tend 
to be in sharp contrast, in a certain sense they balance, intertwine and integrate each 
other...».  
In the wake of these considerations, unlike the capitalization of the only premium-
profit as required in the mixed method for the firm valuation, he descends the 
income-based valuation method. According to the income-based valuation method 
the company’s value is estimated through the size of its future earnings or other 
income indices. Hence, the firm value is estimated through the size of its future 
earnings28. In algebraic terms the “equity economic value” following Zappa’s 
thought and assuming a definite life of the firm may be condensed by the temporary 
annuity formula29: 
 !!" = !(1+ !)+ ! !(1+ !)! +⋯+ !(1+ !)!! 
Where:  
− EEV stands for “Equity Economic Value” 
− I corresponds to the expected average income 
− i is the interest rate  
 
The goodwill, in the context of the income-based valuation method, is no more 
considered as an asset, but as Zappa (1929: 583, translated) notes:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and liabilities, in the economic point, must be considered as components of a given capital, as 
interdependent: they are complementary or coordinated assets/liabilities, because joint each other, 
showing a correlative utility». !
28 Zappa (1937: 96, translated) delineates the economic value of the equity as a «unique value 
resulting from the “capitalization” of future income».  29!In order to sum up through a mathematic formula the EEV conception of Zappa I used the 
temporary annuity as with reference to the premium-profits Zappa (1927: 179, translated) states that 
their life: «cannot be for easily understandable reasons supposed unlimited».  
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«…the value of the goodwill of a going-concern firm, that is the most concise 
manifestation of profitability, cannot be derived by the mere composition of the 
assets values since an economic complex (system) cannot be broken down 
quantitatively into constituent portions30».  
In the following pages he specifies that an “exchange value” (price) can be 
determined for the firm with goodwill and for its capital considered as an economic 
complex, but not for the “intangible capital attributable to the goodwill” (Zappa, 
1929: 670). He further explains that the cost of goodwill is a mere portion, higher or 
lower, of the price paid for an economic complex. 
We understand that instead of considering the goodwill as standing alone, the 
attention should be paid on the entire going-concern entity and only subsequently we 
can determine the “value goodwill” as the difference between the economic value 
and the book value (as the algebraic sum of the single assets and liabilities)31. 
De Dominicis (1950: 39, translated) asserts that: «While in Besta’s School the values 
composing the capital (as the fund of values) are always attributed to goods and 
services, according to Zappa, instead, between the one and the other capital there is 
not a direct correlation». Allegrini (2001: 29) further stresses how the income-based 
approach leads to a dynamic perspective of the capital, which is not anymore a mere 
aggregation of values attributed to goods and services; the capital derives from a list 
of monetary changes recorded and estimated depending on the income 
determination. As a consequence, with Zappa the statement of financial position 
assumes a secondary role and it becomes the tool necessary to determine the income 
(Galassi and Mattessich, 2004). In successive years, other eminent Authors following 
Zappa’s approach emphasize how the determination of the values composing the 
equity is instrumental to the determination of the income, in other words the capital !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30!In this sense Ceccherelli (1967)!argues that goodwill cannot be thought as an asset, which stands 
alone from the firm complex. The goodwill is part of the firm complex and is not an element that can 
be added in the capital as much as one likes. Hence, the goodwill has a spontaneous origin in the firm 
complex and in the vital power of the same firm complex that is able to generate it. More recently, 
Catturi (2012) maintains that the company’s equity is a system so it is relevant the combinatorial 
design that is at the base of the single choices and the modalities followed to aggregate the items that 
compose the equity, the effectiveness in the acquisition of some resources instead of others, the 
efficiency in the use of the resources, but also the climate that is established within the firm. That way 
the single item (asset) loses its autonomy and constitutes part of a unitary system, whose value is 
based on the book value, but it, more or less, moves away from it according to the relevance that is 
attributed to the intangible resources. 
31 Zappa (1946: 670, translated) pointedly argues that: «The effortless strength of the experts would 
also be able to determine in autonomous manner the value of many of the main goodwill conditions, 
especially of the customers and of the location of the venues where the exercise takes place» letting 
implying the unreliability of similar analytical estimations. 
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measurement becomes the means to determine the income (Ceccherelli, 1961; Onida, 
1971; Superti Furga, 1979).  
Comparing Besta’s with Zappa’s theoretic we see that the first has been mainly 
associated with Hick’s definition of income, while Zappa’s theoretic mainly reflects 
Fisher’s definition (Cinquini and Marelli, 2007; Fiume, 2007; Viganò and 
Mattessich, 2007; Alexander and Servalli, 2011; Guarini et al., 2013). Hicks (1950: 
172) defines a man’s income (in business terms, a firm’s income) as: «The maximum 
value which he can consume during a week and still expect to be as well off at the 
end of the week as he was at the beginning». Fisher (1906: 101) defines income of an 
individual as «the total flow of services yielded to him from his property» besides the 
economist (1930: 14) asserts that «it would seem then that income must be derived 
from capital; and, in a sense, this is true. Income is derived from capital goods. But 
the value of the income is not derived from the value of the capital goods. On the 
contrary, the value of the capital is derived from the value of the income». From the 
above definitions we can perceive some differences. The main difference consists in 
the conception of the time considered to determine the equity value. While Hicks 
(and Besta’s assets-liabilities approach) demonstrates a future oriented perspective as 
the capital maintenance aim is verified in terms of benefits expected from each 
element of the capital, Fisher (hence, Zappa) has a past oriented perspective as the 
income is measured by the difference between realised revenues and allocated costs, 
in this way, it is determined a capital expressing past outflows (Perrone, 1997; 
Allegrini, 2001). Basically, in the income-based approach, assets are conceived as 
suspended costs awaiting future matching with revenues (Paton and Littleton, 1940).  
In stable economies the two definitions lead to similar results, as the benefits 
expected from each asset according to the hicksian approach approximate the 
historical cost. Yet, in case of inflation (or deflation) entry values may diverge 
consistently from the end-period values, leading to higher (lower) values of the 
capital at the end of the period. The notion of income as difference between 
beginning and end period net assets becomes no more representative of the real flow 
of income produced. It is in the wake of these and other observations that Canziani 
(2014) links Zappa’s revolution to the historical period in which the father of our 
“Economia Aziendale” lived. As a matter of fact, the First World War generated 
prices instability and uncertainty in the income flows, the relation capital-income had 
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to be reversed32 and the «value-attribution process (had to be) centred upon the flow 
values (income) instead of stock values (capital)» (Canziani, 2014: 152).  
Entering into the details of the financial valuations we can identify other divergences 
between Besta’s and Zappa’s theoretic. Indeed, even though Besta for the equity 
evaluation refers to the “true and real” value of each element expressed by the 
exchange values33, actually he goes back to the historical or production cost. It 
prevails than the will to objectify the evaluation process, as the cost value mitigates 
any sort of management manipulation. Further, the Besta’s resolute focus on the 
control makes it prevail the objectivity over the complementarity amongst the 
elements. Besta, indeed, even though is aware of the “value” of the elements’ 
interdependence and destination within the company34, continues to determine the 
equity as the algebraic sum of all the assets and liabilities, essentially, moving away 
from the economic value (Palumbo, 1999). Zappa (1950) criticises the exchange 
value so professed by Besta, as it supposes that all the elements can be disposed 
without considering their destination within the firm. Also, the exchange value 
cannot be representative of the capital value as it ignores the complementarity 
amongst the elements. The productive factors should be valued systematically in 
relation to their ability to jointly generate income in the future35.  
Commenting the ideas expressed by Besta and later by Zappa, Catturi (1989) 
highlights that more than opposing accounting theories, the two Authors express two 
different concepts of firm and of its equity and of business and its dependent 
economic results36. It is remarkable that Besta  (1920) conceives the company as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 See Zappa (1950: 77, translated) where the Author explicitly specifies that: «In an economic sense, 
therefore, the capital is produced by the income, if we may say; not the income [produced] by the 
capital. The firm investments have economically capital value only as they produce income. A firm, 
or its capital, according to what it is used to say, has economic value as a whole, not because 
manufactures and sells products, not because it renders services, but because the production carried 
out is, or rather, will be a source of profits». 
33 After all, this approach is in line with the economic approach of the period, when under the 
conditions of the market functioning, the equilibrium prices were considered a good proxy for the 
“true and real” values. 
34 Besta (1922: Vol. II p. 13, translated) points out that: «[An estimate based on exchange values] 
would not even be rational because it would assume the company forced to immediate liquidation, i.e. 
in a not actual condition». 35!Viganò (1998: 397) explicitly maintains that: «The “capital economic value” (valore economico del 
capitale) is the present value of future income and it is the global value of the enterprise». He 
continues saying that: «The “economic value” of capital is obtained as a total value (not separating 
individual assets and liabilities). This is an extreme, nearly closed, application of the system concept 
of firm (azienda)». 
36 Some other Authors have been inclined in seeing continuity and evolution rather than discontinuity 
of thought that led to the development of the income based-approach at the expense of the assets-
liabilities perspective. To this purpose see e.g. Giannessi in “I precursori” (Pisa, 1965 Vol. V); 
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sum of deals, or contracts or agreements to run, we derive that the income is 
conceived as the realization of the gross results attributable to the single activities 
considered. On the contrary, with Zappa (1927) there is the affirmation of a new kind 
of firm defined as the “on-going economic coordination” (coordinazione economica 
in atto) whose income is the synthetic expression of all the management operations 
(operazioni di gestione) realized by the whole business entity. 
 
1.3. The equity economic value as “precautionary limit”  
 
Typically the reasons that lead to the determination of the economic value are 
attributed to the determination of an exchange theoretical value of the firm or of a 
branch (e.g. business unit, division, segment, sector, etc.) economically separable 
from the rest of the firm. However, several Authors point out that the assessment of 
the economic value produces several outcomes also in the valuations of the equity. 
Memorable in this regard are the words of Zappa that already in 1937 states that in 
the long run the net assets (“capitale di funzionamento netto”) find in the equity 
economic value the touchstone allowing the appropriate valuation. With this 
abridged thought it seems that Zappa roughly foresees the need to revise the book 
values depending on the economic values, or more precisely, it is certainly foreseen 
the importance of comparing the two values, book value and economic value37. The 
fair value logic that permeates the IAS/IFRS and the US GAAP annual reports has 
some similarities with the above-summarised thoughts. Also, the switch from the 
systematic amortization process to the annual impairment test of goodwill and other 
intangible assets with indefinite useful life is not far from the pioneer thought of 
Zappa and of other authors as e.g. Onida and Ferrero who develop innovative ideas 
on this issue. These authors indeed deal with the systematic-analytical valuations and 
their theoretical bases are key for the assessment of the equity value in the current 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Amodeo in “Di alcune posizioni limite nel campo di una teoria generale dei sistemi” (Rivista Italiana 
di Ragioneria, 1943) and Palumbo in “Spunti di riflessione sul decadimento del paradigma bestano a 
vantaggio di quello zappiano: il contributo di Vittorio Alfieri” (Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria e di 
Economia Aziendale, 1999).!
37 Zappa even though recognises the importance of the economic value as a touchstone with the book 
value, expresses doubts about the prediction of the future income and about the identification of an 
appropriate discount rate, so that the Author does not consider the company economic evaluation 
possible in any case. 
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accounting principles. Purposely, it is significant to cite the words of Zappa (1950: 
580) where he clarifies that:  
«Any decreases in the net goodwill value occurred in subsequent years should be 
reflected in the financial statements assessment either by adjustment of the equity 
value, thus reducing the goodwill value, or through the determination of 
extraordinary depreciations». 
IAS 36 and SFAS 142 through the impairment test of goodwill, de facto, impose an 
implicit control over the whole process of valuation of the total economic value of 
the entity. As a matter of fact, the impairment test of goodwill includes the check of 
the recoverability of the CGU (or reporting unit) to which the goodwill is allocated. 
When the entity has only one operating segment, which constitutes the minimum 
level at which the goodwill can be verified, the impairment test of goodwill exactly 
corresponds to the valuation of the economic value of the entire company38. 
Correspondingly, IAS 36 and SFAS 142 specify that the management in order to 
monitor the goodwill value has to allocate it to each of the acquirer’s CGUs or 
groups of CGUs that are expected to benefit from the synergies of the business 
combination, implying even in this case the allocation of goodwill at the corporate 
level. Hence, the impairment test involves a laborious valuation procedure. First, 
direct and preliminary, it involves the assessment of the recoverable amount of the 
identifiable tangible and intangible assets; second, it concerns the indirect assessment 
of the fair value of goodwill comparing the carrying amount of the CGU (or group of 
CGUs) to which it was allocated with the recoverable amount of the same CGU (or 
group of CGUs). The following stage allows the adjustments of the amounts 
resulting from the impairment test, considering the dynamic connections of 
complementarity and interdependence 39  existing amongst the assets comprised 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 In detail, IAS 36 paragraph 80 determines what follows: «For the purpose of impairment testing, 
goodwill acquired in a business combination shall, from the acquisition date, be allocated to each of 
the acquirer’s cash-generating units, or groups of cash-generating units, that is expected to benefit 
from the synergies of the combination, irrespective of whether other assets or liabilities of the 
acquiree are assigned to those units or groups of units. Each unit or group of units to which the 
goodwill is so allocated shall:  
(a) represent the lowest level within the entity at which the goodwill is monitored for internal 
management purposes; and  
(b) not be larger than an operating segment as defined by paragraph 5 of IFRS 8 Operating Segments 
before aggregation».  
39 As Ferrero (1988, translated) observes: «It is necessary an “adjustment process” in which are 
considered and weighted these relations of complementarity: “Process” to be realised through the 
economic reasoning that puts forward a “synthetic evaluation” which is aimed at correcting the 
conceptual error underlying the preliminary “atomistic evaluation”. With this “synthetic evaluation”, 
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within the tested unit and, in extenso, within the company itself. These connections 
are the expression of the “economic” value, resulting from indirect and mediated 
evaluations in which the value is an “unicum” (i.e. a unique ensemble) that has no 
longer to be split into other components.  
As is known with reference to the valuations, both for assets revaluations and 
depreciations (known also as write-down or impairment), it has always been applied 
the general condition of not inflating the net assets and the income40.  
In the thesis I do not consider the upward capital assessments (revaluations), while I 
focus exclusively on the goodwill impairment losses recognised in order to represent 
an equity that can be defined as “intact”41 (or integral), as well as to safeguard the 
business continuity and to avoid the distribution of dividends not actually realised.  
The problem of capital maintenance – proved that there is a realised profit only if the 
end period net assets exceed the initial net assets – is intimately intertwined with the 
correct determination of the periodic income. This statement is the specification of 
what already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter where I recalled how the 
Italian scholars highlight the link between income and capital42.  
It is important to note that although the criteria alternation that gradually have taken 
place in the Italian accounting history for the capital valuation, all of these criteria 
were almost in unison pervaded by a conservative (precautionary) inspiration, 
usually defined as the prudence (or conservative) criteria43. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the assets and liabilities at the end of the year are reconsidered in their ensemble, as elements 
composing an “asset complex”, i.e. a “unitary ensemble” consisting of complementary elements».  
40 Amodeo (1965, translated) maintains that in the case of capital dilution (inflating): «The value of 
the share shown by the accounts and financial statements is greater than the economic value, either by 
passive acquiescence of the assessor to actual overcome historical situations, or - more frequently - to 
deliberate, but malicious, alteration». 
41 According to Allegrini (2001: 56-57, translated): «There is the capital (i.e. equity) integrity if it is 
maintained, in respect to the beginning of the period considered, the same capacity to generate income 
in the future or if this capacity is increased; hence, there is the economic integrity of capital». 
42 According to Zappa (1950, translated): «[…] If we carefully consider the accounting formation of 
income and capital, we perceive that these items are not used to designate distinct connected 
phenomena, and correlative concepts, but rather, as the concrete economy teaches, [they are] two 
ways of appearing of the same phenomenon or rather two phases in which the company values can be 
considered». Equally, Ceccherelli (1961, translated) observes that: «The capital and income, the 
“value fund” (i.e. the equity), that is invested in the company, and the flow of new wealth it produces, 
does not represent the manifestation of two distinct phenomena but rather two consecutive stages of 
the same process of economic production». 
43 As De Gobbis (1925, translated) states: «The value attributions should be made in a way to avoid a 
dividend distribution that may be or become, in fact, an impairment of capital and legal reserves or 
statutory pre-established reserves...». Also Onida (1935, translated) has a similar thought, sustaining 
that: «In its typical and ideal configuration – but for this reason far from the common reality – the 
income that we would like to determine, would represent – if it were possible to make predictions and 
assumptions so perfect – the highest value which, when there is a positive income, you might... 
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The notion of equity economic integrity seems therefore embracing the valuation 
theories that consider the equity economic value as a “test” for the net assets, judging 
the non-exceeded limit to the economic value useful to assure the company future 
capability of generating income44. The idea of this first chapter is to retrace the main 
trends proved to be prodromal in the light of the underlying valuation criteria for the 
statement of financial position, focusing the analysis on the impairment losses of 
goodwill. 
The next sub-paragraphs analyse more in depth, first the thought of Pietro Onida, 
then the Neapolitan School and the opposed theory of the revaluations “fuori 
bilancio” (the term does not find a fitting translation in English but see § 1.3.3 for the 
details of this latter theory). After that, I examine the interpretation proposed by 
Giovanni Ferrero and finally, the “functional evaluation” briefly reviewing some of 
the works of Alberto Ceccherelli and Egidio Giannessi. 
 
1.3.1. Pietro Onida’s contribution to the financial evaluations 
 
The notion of consumable or distributable income 45  (reddito consumabile or 
distribuibile) postulated by Pietro Onida, essentially, involves the pursuit of two 
principles: 1) the estimated values referring to in-progress transactions at the end of 
the year are not economically overvalued and, compatibly with this first condition, 2) 
the financial valuations contribute to the stability of the income periodically 
distributable. Consistently with these conditions, the financial valuations are divided 
into two consecutive stages.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
distribute or take dividends for the entrepreneur needs, without putting at risk or damage – as has links 
with the last financial valuations – the subsequent results. Or, in the case of loss (negative income), 
the value above-mentioned should reduce the initial net assets, to adjust it to the size of the final net 
assets remaining after all expenses or “losses” related to operations (in broad sense) started and not 
yet exhausted with the previous management, and revenue or “profits” pertaining to this, have entirely 
engraved on it».!De Minico (1935: 291, translated) develops these thoughts as follows: «The needs of 
caution and prudence, relating to the maintenance of at least one normal future income flow, direct 
and inspire the evaluation criteria of the equity at the end of the period and, therefore, the allocation of 
income to the same period». 
44 D’Ippolito (1958, translated) underlines that: «The measure of income reported is correct when it is 
presumably ensured the integrity of the existing capital, in the light of the predictions that can arise at 
the time of the financial statement on the future occurrence of the business operations in progress». 
45  According to Onida (1951, translated): «The practical purpose of the financial statement 
(determination of the results in order to make any withdrawals or distribution of profits) suggests – 
even though does not strictly delimits in every details – the notion of income that better and 
reasonably can be accepted». 
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First, we consider each single assets and liabilities component. Concerning the 
assets, these should not overcome the corresponding presumed effective future 
realisable values, both direct and indirect; while, the liabilities should tend to their 
presumable costs or settlement values.  
In the successive stage, the analytical valuations carried out separately on the equity 
items are merged and compared with the economic value of the equity. Essentially, it 
is a two-stage valuation process, firstly analytical and successively systemic (or 
synthetic). Onida (1951: 62, translated) states that:  
«When we consider the financial statement as a value system, a conclusive 
judgement on the convenience, or not, to accept the estimated value attributed to 
certain income or capital components, cannot be given, as long as these components 
are isolated and individually examined, out of the system to which they belong».  
As a matter of fact, only through the transition from the analytical to the synthetic 
valuation it is possible to judge whether the net assets do not result overvalued in 
relation to the future earnings perspectives46. The assets recognition at their historical 
cost47 cannot be maintained unless in the future they produce an adequate stream of 
revenues. Further, the objectivity of the same historical cost falls away in front of the 
unitary firm perspective (Giannetti, 2013).  
The capital overvaluation problem is relevant as it might result in the distribution of 
“imaginary” profits, making necessary, perhaps, in subsequent years, massive 
extraordinary write-downs and capital reductions. Onida (1951) concludes that the 
financial valuation theory should study the individual components but considering 
them within the more complex “value system”48 and their interdependences.  
A closely related aspect to this theory is that the statement of financial position, 
whose values are determined according to the principles just outlined, should tend to 
ensure a determined income stability to distribute steady dividends. Hence, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Onida (1951, translated) notes that: «Especially when the capital is largely made up of long-lived 
assets, whose book values necessarily and more closely relate to the economic perspectives of the 
company, in the long run, and to the related exploitation conditions of the same long-lived assets, 
there is no denying that even in the ordinary financial statement for the year we usefully do similar 
conjectures». 
47 On the historical cost as the basis for the financial valuations cf. the contribution of, amongst other, 
Besta (1922), Zappa (1937), Amodeo (1965) and Ferrero (1976). In the USA for a contribution on the 
historical cost see e.g. Paton (1934). 
48 On the system concept Bertini (1990: 29, translated) writes: «The company systematic nature 
depends on the nature of the management operations which are intimately linked each other by a 
relationship of the type “from cause to effect”. Taken together all the events of the company world are 
a single body of phenomena governed by identical laws and oriented toward common ends. There is 
therefore a higher order structure, which may be called system. This structure is dynamic, in the sense 
that it is constantly renewed due to the change of internal constraints and environmental conditions». 
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financial statement gives way to a sort of equilibrium (balance) of the different 
income produced over a span of time, in order to mitigate the effect of favourable or 
adverse trend and ensuring a constant return on equity. With the aim of income 
stability and the consequent pursuit of a determined “dividend policy”, the 
management may lever on the assessment (evaluation) of the estimated income items 
and on the provisions49. 
Comparably to the current accounting standards on the impairment test, Onida (1935: 
74) highlights how the valuation of the long-lived assets is often uncertain as it is 
necessarily connected to the future economic trend of the firm50. Hence, the 
evaluation of these assets should be grounded on the future economic perspectives of 
the firm. For this reason the Author (1935: 78) warns that the financial statement 
reliability is very limited, especially in firms with high investments in fixed assets. 
Relatedly to this aspect about the future perspectives, the IAS 36, as well as the 
SFAS 142, specify that in assessing the recoverability of the assets value the 
management shall use the most recent financial budgets and forecasts (e.g. see IAS 
36 paragraph 33). The constant propensity to the correlation between the equity 
elements and the stream of revenues they will produce in the future leads to 
introduce the criteria of the “economic time”.  
The theoretical construct underlying the above criteria is the unitary generation of the 
income in terms of time and space. The asset valuation should overcome the 
conventional twelve months period and the resulting income is the global and unitary 
income produced during the whole life of the firm. Thus, the “economic time” 
criterion advances Onida (1935) to the current accounting standards viewpoint in 
estimating the recoverable amount of the assets, which considers management’s 
future business plans. Hence, the adequacy of the equity book value should be 
judged in relation to the future income perspectives that are expressed in the equity 
economic value. The main difference between the equity economic value and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 As Onida (1951, translated) observes: «Depending on this dividend policy in the financial statement 
we record stabilization reserves of distributable income or we draw from reserves formed in the past, 
but both the creation of profit reserves and the profit withdrawals, are carried out in a concealed 
manner, managing the period estimated income elements or including liabilities (provisions) in so far 
as to make the income resulting in the amount equal to that required to attribute to the shares the 
dividend that is judged convenient to distribute». 
50 Onida (1937: 217, translated) notices that: «Certain financial values may assume, at the same time, 
very different measures, depending on the forecasts that can be done on the firm economic situation, 
on its hoped profitability». 
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equity book value derives from the concept of time: forward-looking the first, 
backward (and current)-looking the second51.  
The long-lived assets should respect the upper limit represented by the future 
realizable value (directly or indirectly) of the historical cost; moreover, that value is 
highly dependent on the earnings management policies that are functional to the 
income stability. If the long-lived assets carrying amount is not recoverable, even 
though only partially, then it would imply the recognition of “losses to be amortized” 
against the prudence principle which denies the postponement of expected losses and 
a fortiori of realised losses. The upper limit of the long-lived assets carrying amount 
should be represented by the sum of the presumed revenues obtainable during the 
useful life of the long-lived assets and the presumed elimination value of the same 
assets.  If the presumed revenues are not sufficient to cover the presumed costs 
(depreciations and other costs of the period, including the costs for an adequate 
return on equity) then it is necessary to adjust these carrying amounts with a write-
down of the long-lived assets involved52.  
Amongst the ideas of Onida (1935: 397-398) stands out even a sort of anticipation of 
the triggering events53 similarly listed by way of example also by both SFAS 142 and 
IAS 36. The Author presents some typical cases in which it is possible to take an 
extraordinary write-down, in detail, amongst these we can find the following 
hypotheses: 
− When we can consider that in prior years there have not been recognized 
sufficient depreciations; 
− When profound changes in the company economic situations intervened in 
relations to the environmental economic changes; 
− When regardless of the changes dependent on the general economic changes, 
there have been overvaluations of the long-lived assets with regard to their useful 
life and to profitability of the company they belong to; 
− When there have been profound changes in the currency economic value.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 For a deep analysis on the possibility to admit the economic value in the financial statements see 
Viganò (1967: 104-140). 
52 The valuation of the individual assets being analytical implies a write-down on the single item 
involved. The situation is different when there has been the transition to the systemic valuation, in this 
latter case, the excess of the book value on the economic value would be a signal of deteriorated 
overall conditions of the company entirely considered. 
53 The triggering events can be defined as those events that the company must evaluate to verify 
whether an asset may have suffered an impairment loss. 
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Correspondingly, Onida identifies opposing circumstances for any extraordinary 
revaluations. 
It might almost seem that the FASB and IASB before listing some sources of 
information symptomatic of any impairment losses had read the pages written more 
than fifty years earlier by Onida, as a matter of fact, for instance, in paragraph 12 of 
IAS 36, we read that: «In assessing whether there is any indication that an asset may 
be impaired, an entity shall consider, as a minimum, the following indications: (a) 
during the period, an asset’s market value has declined significantly more than would 
be expected as a result of the passage of time or normal use; (b) significant changes 
with an adverse effect on the entity have taken place during the period, or will take 
place in the near future, in the technological, market, economic or legal environment 
in which the entity operates or in the market to which an asset is dedicated; (c) 
market interest rates or other market rates of return on investments have increased 
during the period, and those increases are likely to affect the discount rate used in 
calculating an asset’s value in use and decrease the asset’s recoverable amount 
materially; (d) the carrying amount of the net assets of the entity is more than its 
market capitalisation; (e) evidence is available of obsolescence or physical damage 
of an asset; (f) significant changes with an adverse effect on the entity have taken 
place during the period, or are expected to take place in the near future, in the extent 
to which, or manner in which, an asset is used or is expected to be used. These 
changes include the asset becoming idle, plans to discontinue or restructure the 
operation to which an asset belongs, plans to dispose of an asset before the 
previously expected date, and reassessing the useful life of an asset as finite rather 
than indefinite; (g) evidence is available from internal reporting that indicates that 
the economic performance of an asset is, or will be, worse than expected». 
 
1.3.2. The Neapolitan School 
 
The Neapolitan School has provided a great contribution to these issues; in 
particular, I refer to Amodeo, De Minico, Salzano and Viganò. These Authors fly 
even higher than Onida on the concept of equity economic value, to the extent that 
they state that the value to attribute to the net assets should be equal to the equity 
economic value of the company. They believe that the equity economic value should 
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not be evaluated in two consequent stages since it represents a unique and indivisible 
value measurable through the capitalization of the future annual income. 
The valorisation procedure of the capital is opposed to the precedent one. In this 
perspective, it is the economic value that should be allocated amongst the various 
assets or liabilities item of the statement of financial position so that their algebraic 
sum is equal to the future income capitalisation. The analytical-synthetic evaluation, 
in this model, becomes a successive issue, as the value that has to be assigned to the 
individual assets and liabilities items of the statement of financial position is the 
result of the allocation of the entire economic value. This conception of the economic 
equity to split into the different financial items in my opinion come closer to the 
basis laying in IFRS 3 Business Combination. In this regard it is sufficient here to 
directly refer to paragraph 18 of IFRS 3 that states as follows: «The acquirer shall 
measure the identifiable assets acquired and the liabilities assumed at their 
acquisition-date fair values». This standard allows the only application of the 
acquisition method requiring the purchase price allocation on the identifiable firm’s 
(or business unit’s) assets and liabilities and the recognition and measurement of 
goodwill (positive or negative)54.  
The above-mentioned Authors confer a fundamental position to the equity economic 
value, not only for the measurement of goodwill, but it assumes an even greater 
importance in relation to the income distribution. As a matter of fact, according to De 
Minico’s and Amodeo’s thoughts, the comparison between the equity economic 
value and the net assets (capitale di funzionamento) is functional to assess that the 
equity is not overvalued and therefore that are not distributed unrealised profits, in 
other words to avoid capital distribution.  
De Minico (1935) is the first Author to introduce the concept of “normal” income55 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 In paragraph 32 of IFRS 3 we read: «The acquirer shall recognise goodwill as of the acquisition 
date measured as the excess of (a) over (b) below:  
(a) the aggregate of: 
(i) the consideration transferred measured in accordance with this IFRS, which generally requires 
acquisition-date fair value (see paragraph 37);  
(ii) the amount of any non-controlling interest in the acquiree measured in accordance with this IFRS; 
and  
(iii) in a business combination achieved in stages (see paragraphs 41 and 42), the acquisition-date fair 
value of the acquirer’s previously held equity interest in the acquiree. 
(b) the net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets acquired and the liabilities 
assumed measured in accordance with this IFRS». 
55 It is interesting to read the chapter dedicated to the “relations deriving from the costs arising from 
the typical cautions carried out to maintain normality for the further income flow”, where De Minico 
(1935: 291, translated) notes that: «The needs of caution and prudence, relating to the maintenance of 
 38 
(reddito normale), which is useful especially to value the deferred costs, deferred 
revenues and provisions. The long-lived assets value in this context is represented by 
a portion of the equity economic value determined in such a way that does not create 
“disturbance” to the “normality” of the future income flows. Indeed, according to De 
Minico (1935: 291, translated):  
«The deferred costs and revenues, identified in the measures of the values assigned 
to the non-numerary zones (zone non numerarie) of the assets and liabilities, being 
elements - fully or as residual - of future income, for the needs arising from these 
same income, are determined in such a way to constitute an economic basis for the 
continuity of the normal lucrative flow or, at least, are determined in such a way that 
would not disturb the normality of that further flow». 
For some aspects, the concept of “normal income” might have some points in 
common with the concept of “variable income” as proposed by Solomons (1961) and 
Alexander (1950), since both concepts are forward-looking oriented and are basically 
stable in the long run (see paragraph 1.4)56. 
Domenico Amodeo in his works confirms that the economic value of the firm is the 
synthetic expression of the normal return and that it is a worthy tool for testing the 
actual assessments. Although in expressing these concepts, Amodeo (1965) 
distinguishes between two situations, namely, if the net assets (book value of the 
equity) are lower or higher than the equity economic value. In the first case, the firm 
health condition cannot be negatively judged, as the positive difference between the 
equity economic value and the equity book value constitutes a kind of “safety 
margin” indicating the presence of hidden reserves or goodwill. Amodeo (1965: 764, 
translated) maintains that:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
at least one normal future income flow, direct and inspire the evaluation criteria of the equity at the 
end of the period and, therefore, the allocation of income to the same period». Salzano (1961: 90, 
translated) defines the concept of normal income as follows: «As normal income should not be 
considered the income that the company normally, in normal business operations, achieves, but we 
should interpret that income which in future periods should be achieved, on average, to maintain 
unchanged the economic potential of the company». 
56 According to De Minico (1946: 242, translated): «The concept of normal income comprises: 1) the 
future return on equity; 2) the future firm risk; 3) the future remuneration for the shareholders». For 
similar ideas see also Salzano (1938: 73 et seq.) and Amodeo (1960: 38). Looking at the Internaltional 
literature see Alexander (1950: 30) where we read «[…] income in any period will represent a yield 
on a principal still invested just equal to the rate of interest». Within this framework cf. also the “net 
present value” theory (Penman, 1970; Barton, 1974; Bromwich, 1977; Mattessich, 1970) that 
consistently applies Hicks’ definition of income that considers the standard of “being as well off” as 
maintaining capital intact in terms of the discounted value of the expected future net receipts. For the 
economic income and variable income concepts see: Hicks (1939), Alexander (1950), Solomons 
(1961), Penman (1970) and Staubus (1971). 
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«(…) Since the excess of the economic value over the book value declares the 
existence of a safety margin, the precautionary limit can be considered represented 
by the economic value of the capital, in the sense that the economic health of the 
firm is evermore ensured when the result of the financial valuations is expressed in a 
measure of capital that is lower than that represented by the economic value». 
On the contrary, when the book value is higher than the economic value, this is 
“significant” only in part, indeed, the excess would represent only a meaningless 
number as it is not reflected in the future firm’s income perspectives. In this sense 
Amodeo (1965: 763, translated) observes that:  
«If a firm equity is valued beyond the measure constituted by its economic value it 
will have meaning only for a part of its extension. Because the reasonable 
expectations of income open to it can justify only that part of it which corresponds to 
the economic value: the excess amount is a meaningless amount, a pure number, 
because it does not reserve the future income perspectives». 
Amedeo Salzano in some of his works deepens the evaluation stages that the 
financial statement preparers should follow in order to «raise on a field of higher 
rigour» 57 . The precautionary limit of the equity economic value represents a 
constraint that guides in the successive financial valuations. The first level of 
evaluation consists, as already said, in the determination of the economic value; the 
second level of evaluation, instead, consists in the allocation of that value on the 
equity components. In this regard, according to Amodeo (1938, translated) the 
unitary valuation of the equity constitutes «the prius from which the identification of 
the partial values follow as a posterius, but never vice versa».  
This allocation or “atomization58” of the equity amongst the different items should 
follow a well-defined iter. At first, the value has to be distributed on the certain 
“numerary” values (cash and cash equivalents), which will be recorded at their 
nominal value. Then, gradually, on the less certain values, the “numerary” credits 
will be recorded at their presumable realisable value (thanks to the allocation to 
specific allowance accounts for credit losses), while the “numerary” payables, the 
“non-numerary” payables (deferred costs) and the “non-numerary” receivables 
(deferred revenues) are recorded at their nominal values. For the inventories (goods, 
raw materials, semi-finished products, products and similar goods) the reference was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 See De Minico (1944) and Salzano (1938, 1939 and 1961). 
58 The term “polverizzazione” translated here in English with “atomization” was coined by Salzano 
(1951) in Orientamenti per la determinazione dei risultati di esercizio e per la rilevazione sistematica 
nelle imprese, Ferri, Roma. 
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already to the prudential criteria of the lower between the cost and the net realisable 
value59. Other financial items not subject to estimates or for which the original cost 
(historical cost) does not differ significantly from the value attributed, are carried at 
the value so determined. Thus, until this first stage, the financial items certain or 
anyway not subject to estimates are analytically evaluated. At this point, it is 
determined the partial financial result (which is given by the difference between 
identified assets and liabilities) from which we deduce the share capital, the reserves, 
the retained earnings and we add the losses of the year and the losses of previous 
years. The value obtained through the above procedure should be compared with the 
economic value of the whole firm and the difference between the two values have to 
be attributed en mass  to the “more uncertain” identifiable items that correspond with 
the fixed assets60. It is undeniable the innovativeness of this approach, which implies, 
in the occurrence of a positive differential between net assets (excluding the fixed 
assets) and the economic value, a potential direct revaluation of the long-lived assets 
recorded in prior financial statements at their historical cost whether this positive 
differential results higher than the cost of the fixed assets inherited from previous 
years. On the contrary, when the positive differential is lower than the long-lived 
assets value recorded or is even negative, the situation would be exactly inverted and 
symmetrically, would arise the need to record extraordinary impairment losses61. As 
a matter of fact, the firm ability to generate profit would result weakened if the 
maximum theoretical value attributed to the fixed assets was exceeded without 
recording, when the firm particular situation is aggravated and repeated over the 
years, write-downs62. However, commenting this abstractions Amodeo (1955), urges 
to consider the equity value measured on the basis of the normal income as a mere 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 The same criterion is set out in article 2425 of the current Italian civil code and in the IAS 2 where 
inventories are required to be stated at the lower of cost and net realisable value.  
60 See Salzano, A. 1961. Metodologia contabile e determinazione del reddito, Edizioni dell’Ateneo. 
As Amodeo (1965: 772, translated) notes: «The value found in that way is compared to the economic 
value, obtaining a negative or positive difference. If the economic value exceeds on the partial equity 
found, the difference is attributed, fully, to the fixed assets of the firm. Actually, it will not be 
perfectly identified the value of the fixed assets but that of a mixtum compositum which, in addition to 
tangible fixed assets it includes the hidden gains or losses amongst which there will be also the 
intangible assets». 
61 Amodeo (1965: 772, translated) continues expressing the following: «If, conversely, the economic 
value is lower than the partial net assets found, then the practical solution looks less easy, even though 
not impossible. We could, for example (...) evaluate the fixed assets at the symbolic value of only 1 
Lyre, while absorbing in the meantime the profit eventually assigned to the exercise and reflecting a 
differential loss, or by increasing the loss already properly set in the previous financial statement». 
62 See (Salzano, 1964). 
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upper or test limit for the financial evaluations63. 
Enrico Viganò (1967) dedicates a whole chapter of “La natura del valore economico 
del capitale di impresa e le sue applicazioni” (which can be translated in English 
with “The nature of the equity economic value and its applications”) to the 
possibility of expressing the economic value of the equity in the financial statements. 
In that chapter, the Author briefly reviews the theories developed by Pietro Onida 
and by his “Maestro” Amodeo on the feasibility of expressing in the ordinary 
financial statement the maximum value assigned to the firm represented by the 
equity economic value. In a passage of that chapter, we read that, the contrast 
between Onida’s solution which denies the possibility to record the higher value in 
the financial statement and Amodeo’s solution, which on the contrary allows the 
possibility of recording higher values, derives from: «The different equity nature that 
is discussed, and more properly, the different problem vision of the income 
attribution» (Viganò, 1967: 107, translated). The contrast is not purely quantitative 
and essentially consists in the fact that the first doctrine considers the equity as a 
mere aggregate while the second one considers it as a unique value 64 . This 
perspective should be interpreted with caution as theoretically Onida does not 
deviate from the unitarity principle and the unique income concept introduced by 
Zappa. As I see it the difference between the two Schools is merely procedural, the 
economic value of the complex arise in the first stage for the Neapolitan School, 
while for Onida it arises from the second stage of the analysis. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 In this regard, Amodeo (1955, translated) confirms that: «Even if it is even conceivable a financial 
statement that expresses, in the traditional forms, an identification of the partial values (at least in 
some areas of the capital and, except for an indistinct residual to fixed assets) which is situated in the 
complex value of the capital determined as a function of the appreciation of the future normal income 
flow, such a financial statement would represent, in contrast to the concrete needs, an abstraction 
even, at times, dangerous. This meaning of the principle of the reference to the complex value of the 
capital determined on the basis of the normal income then was identified with a limit or testing value 
of the concrete evaluations, and purely on that. No criteria or precept, then, but only an indication of 
comparison, of reference, of asseveration or of denial of concrete evaluations». 
64 Viganò (1967: 107, translated) specifically states that: «Instead, if we consider the equity expressed 
in the financial statements as a sum, an aggregate – let’s even say fund - of values, then reaching the 
equity economic value – which is a unique value – is a simple accidental circumstance, it is not a 
logically derivable consequence. Therefore, the contrast is exactly this: that the first doctrine [Onida] 
does not consider the capital of the financial statements as a single value, as does the second doctrine 
[Amodeo]». 
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1.3.3. The so-called “rivalutazioni fuori bilancio” 
 
A part of the Italian literature instead argues that the “equity economic value” cannot 
constitute the basis for the comparison with the financial statement net assets, neither 
for the impairment of assets, and this even though the prudence principle represents a 
cornerstone for the financial reporting65.  
As Coda (1966: 73-74, translated) affirms:  
«The higher value of the equity economic value compared to the equity value 
determined with the analytical assessment can be correctly interpreted as formed by 
the future income exceeding the measure judged to be a satisfactory return on equity. 
But, nevertheless, such incomes are and remain “future”; that is, attributable to 
future years and they cannot therefore contribute to define the income generated by 
the management of the past exercises». 
This part of the doctrine proposes, in order to determine the “income produced” 
(reddito prodotto) in a measure considered adequate, the comparison with the 
“revaluated capital out of financial statement” (capitale di rivalutazione fuori 
bilancio). If the historical cost would lose importance consequently to price changes 
or to the change in the position of the productive factors within the firm system, than 
the management have to provide for a revision of the value66. In Superti Furga (1979: 
63, translated) we read that:  
«(The revaluation) is necessary in order to restructure the values system that 
represents the firm’s equity so that it can constitute a basis economically suitable to 
determine the future recognitions of the income for the period». 
The revision thus made allows adapting the financial statement values in such a way 
to ensure a higher adherence for the purpose of determining the income of the period, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 On this theme consult also: Masini (1957, 1963), Viganò (1979), Coda & Frattini (1986), Superti 
Furga (1991). 
66 Coda (1963: 22, translated) maintains that: «The equity revaluation for the formation of appreciable 
future years is periodically necessary, with varying frequency in times of slow and intense economic 
dynamics, due to the changes in the firm conditions and in the environment denying a significant 
correlation and in the economic values common to more than two years, recognized in different times 
and maintained “constant”, with the other system values formed in the changed conditions and in the 
equity with the period income recorded». On the technique of the revaluation Perotta (1983, 
translated) notes that the same: «(...) allows to achieve, through general revaluations out of the period, 
the determination of the revaluation capital that, included in the values system suitable for the 
determination of the economic results, is a set of initial values suitable for subsequent determinations 
of income and capital for the period. The need for a general revaluation of capital is not only 
manifested in strong instability of the currency economic values; whenever the firm internal 
conditions or environment externalities present changes that will demand new management 
guidelines, related to changed economic prospectives, it is then necessary to re-express the capital 
values so that they take on meaning in relation to the expected future economic developments».  
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since the utilization costs of the productive factors become again comparable with 
the current revenues. The revaluation deriving from this procedure would increase 
the equity and not the economic income. Acting in this direction the competence and 
prudence postulates are followed with a major rigour in their traditional sense67. The 
proposal of this doctrinal address acquires a greater significance if we interpret it 
also in the light of the International Accounting Standards No. 16 (IAS 16) dedicated 
to Property, Plant and Equipment. Under IAS 16, indeed, the financial statement 
preparers can decide, after the first recognition, to record the property, plant and 
equipment according alternatively to the cost model or the revaluation model68. 
However, it is important to highlight that these Italian scholars do not require a 
systematic revision of the value as the accounting standards do. The adoption of the 
revaluation model implies the assets evaluation in compliance with the principles 
conveyed by the doctrine cited in this paragraph. As a matter of fact, in this 
hypotheses, the redetermination process must be performed regularly and whenever 
it is necessary to ensure that there is not a significant difference between the amount 
recorded in the statement of financial position and the amount that would be 
determined using the fair value at the date of the financial statement, being the 
revaluations dependent on the assets market value fluctuations. The fair value 
fluctuations’ significance determines the frequency of the process that might be 
annual or multi-year and it must interest simultaneously the whole class of property, 
plant and equipment in order to avoid that in the financial statement are recorded a 
set of values selectively combined through evaluations on different dates.  
If as a result of this procedure the value of an asset is increased, the increase shall be 
accumulated in equity under the heading of a specific revaluation surplus reserve, but 
in the event that the revaluation is a reversal of prior impairment on the same asset, 
previously recorded in the income statement, the increase shall be recognised in 
profit or loss to the extent that it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset 
previously recognised in profit or loss. If, on the contrary, the appraisal (and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Santesso (1992: 27, translated) highlights that the application of the revaluation technique out of the 
period: «(...) results in a reasonable contribution to the application of the prudence principle and 
...favours a more consistent application of the competence principle». 
68 The same alternative is left to the discretion of the preparer for the intangible assets treated within 
International Accounting Standards No. 38 (IAS 38). However, this solution, although allowed by 
international accounting standards, results less frequently used compared to the cost model, since it 
presumes the existence of an active market of the asset expressed at the fair value, circumstance very 
rare for intangible assets, which often are so specific and unique to make them peerless and hardly 
comparable for different firms. 
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therefore, the evaluations out of the financial statement) would lead to the 
recognition of an impairment loss, the negative difference shall be recognised in the 
income statement, unless there is a revaluation reserve related to that specific asset 
whose carrying amount will be reduced by an amount corresponding to the 
impairment loss. 
For an international comparison with this school of thought see paragraph 1.4 where 
I briefly recall to some similarities and differences with Edwards and Bell’s (1961) 
concept of “current income”. 
 
1.3.4. The amortization “corrective criterion” 
 
A significant contribution on these issues is provided by the thought of Giovanni 
Ferrero who, further developing the ideas of his “Maestro” Pietro Onida, outlines the 
configuration of the “income produced” (reddito prodotto) in the period, which 
causes impacts on the entire equity evaluation process. Ferrero (1988) notes that the 
evaluations can be considered actually objective only for the recognitions of costs 
and revenues “ascertained” during the period and not also for the end-period 
adjustments recorded in compliance with the competence principle. This competence 
criterion, or of the “physical time”, should therefore be considered as a basically 
“indicative guide”, because according to Ferrero (1988, translated):  
«If this criterion were fully applied, the long-term costs anticipated and amortizable 
(costs of long-lived assets and amortizable costs of any kind) would distribute over 
time, at the expense of the single exercise period, in proportion of the same passing 
time and, therefore, pro quota that each year would express the same rata of the total 
cost to be amortized, in relation to the assumed duration of the amortization 
process».  
The full implementation of the competence would imply rigidity in the straight-line 
amortization schedule and, more generally, in all the allocations of multi-year costs 
and revenues. The financial statement preparers should be able to compound two 
distinct needs. The equity must not be “inflated”, neither “depressed” and at the same 
time, the income produced in the period must be determined reliably as net income. 
To this end, the rigid guiding criterion of the competence has to find a balance with a 
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weighted introduction of the “economic time” criterion69. Indeed, only through the 
criterion of the economic time the competence of the positive and negative elements 
of the income is included within a broader firm management conditioned by the 
economic situation and by its development in the future, considering the “economic 
solidarity” of the periods, alternatively favourable and adverse70. In Ferrero’s thought 
the prudential limit-values should guide both the analytical distinct capital 
assessment and the subsequent synthetic assessment that concludes the evaluation 
process (so-called analytical-systematic evaluation, in Italian “valutazione analitico-
sistematica”). The evaluations must be done according to the administrative 
prudence, that is the net income is not influenced by “wished profits” but must 
consider the losses (even if only) “presumed”. 
On the principle of cost valuation Ferrero (1988, translated) suggests that: «on the 
“rationality” of this estimating criterion, there would be nothing to object, if it was 
assumed the hypothesis of a static economy», therefore, it is necessary an analysis 
also on the “future presumed cost”, as “minimum limit” below which the valuation 
of the liabilities (debts) would result incorrect. Conversely, the cost can be recorded 
amongst the assets only within the “upper limit” identified in the presumable 
realisable value, direct or indirect, of the same assets71. However, in the fixed assets 
valuation, also the cost reduced by accumulated depreciation should be considered as 
a mere guiding criterion, the Author (1988), indeed, suggests proceeding in the 
evaluation of these assets “for successive approximation”. The cost should be split 
amongst several periods taking into account, with the passing of time, the remaining !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!69!Ferrero (1988, translated) writes: «If the “factor time” is conceived in a “physical” sense, these 
common costs - even if they are rigid costs partially or completely unused - are allocated to each 
period according to the extent of the time spent, “physically” measured, independent from the variable 
flow of revenues, which is connected to the unstable trend in production, sales and, in general, to the 
overall operating activities. Similarly, the revenues with a flow that tend to be inelastic, opposing to 
variable costs, are “charged” to each period regardless of the fluctuation of the same costs». 
Conversely, Ferrero (1988, translated) continues: «If the “factor time” is conceived in an “economic” 
sense, it can be variously “qualified” – at equal extent “physically” measured – from the different and 
unstable economic conditions, internal and external, that the management encounters in the succession 
of the periods».!70!See Ferrero (1988, translated) where he justifies the introduction of the economic time criterion as 
the firm management is «conditioned by the economic situation and by its development in a multi-
year span of time, taking into account the “economic solidarity” that the same management for its 
nature unitary in the time, establishes and continually renews, in the various interchanging of 
conditions, now favourable now adverse, of its various attitudes».!
71 Colombo (1987, translated) maintains that: «It is... basing on the perspectives of indirect realization 
through the contribution to the income production – or, in other words, according to the amortization 
charged on the periods during which will extend the useful life of the fixed assets – that we will have 
to establish if and how much to keep, in the recording, below the criterion-limit of the cost, and to 
what extent reduce this value in each subsequent year through the amortization». 
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useful life of the asset under scrutiny. With such a “corrective criterion” it is 
constantly performed a review72 that concerns not only the preliminary analytical 
distinct evaluations but also the conclusive synthetic assessment of the equity which, 
using Ferrero’s (1988, translated) words: «results prudentially balanced as the 
synthetic expression of the “services tank” available for the future firm continuity». 
Entering in the specific theme of the accounting valuation for goodwill Ferrero 
(1988) explicitly upholds the amortization of goodwill, in other words, the goodwill 
similarly to the other long-lived assets is intended with a definite useful life73. In this 
synthetic framework, it is evident the absence of an impairment loss not only 
ordinary, but also extraordinary, nor it is possible to configure the hypothesis of 
revaluations “fuori bilancio”. The consequences of the assets impairment losses are 
achieved in the model outlined by Ferrero through an increase and continuous 
adjustments of the amortization rate compared to the rate established in accordance 
with the amortization plan of the long-lived assets. 
 
1.3.5. The “functional evaluation” !
An interesting approach for the equity evaluation is the one introduced by the 
Tuscany School. Specifically, Alberto Ceccherelli and Egidio Giannessi propose the 
“functional evaluation” (valutazione di funzionamento). According to Ceccherelli 
(1956: 193, translated):  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Ferrero (1988, translated) notes that: «It is a proceeding “for successive approximations”, little by 
little that the “estimating horizon” provides significant review insights to change the route of the 
journey still ahead: review that affects not only the preliminary analytical distinct evaluation, but also 
that of the “final phase” in which it implies a weighted “compound judgement”, aimed at the 
determination of an “equity”». 73!Ferrero (1988: 95-96, translated) objects that: «It is unacceptable, the statement – not unusual – 
according to which it is neither necessary, nor opportune, to amortize the goodwill in the ordinary 
financial statements. In support of this argument, sometimes it is specified that the goodwill with the 
flow of time, rather than depreciate may increase in value, and that, therefore, in front of an 
unchanged goodwill value in the financial statements, we can suitably recognise, if at all, a “special 
reserve fund” against the risks of any possible impairments. Besides, even when this “special fund” is 
conceived as a “retained earnings reserve”, the periodic income, that during the destination phase, 
would increase this “reserve” could not be interpreted as a “net income”, as it would not being 
“purified” from all its negative components, including the amortization charge that we would exclude 
with the mentioned thesis: in these terms, the given “special fund” could not have, despite 
appearances, the actual content of a “true and real reserve”. Therefore, having actually the content of a 
“risk fund”, we do not understand why the increasing of such a “special fund” should be preferred to a 
weighted and monitored process of gradual depreciation of the value in question, articulated in the 
light of a “balanced administrative prudence” constantly kept in mind». 
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«Evaluating means determining the monetary measure of the net value fund that can 
be assigned, at the considered time, to the equity of a going concern firm».  
Ceccherelli following the reasoning explains that this definition extends the terms of 
the financial valuations to the complementary utilities that derives from the 
coordination and functioning of the assets. Thus the Author specifies that we have to 
distinguish at least amongst three situations to which correspond three different 
evaluation procedures. First, the atomistic valuation of each single asset is adequate 
in case of gradual liquidation. Second, the valuation of the assets as inseparable parts 
of a complex is adequate in case of an en mass liquidation of the complex. 
Nonetheless both these valuations differ from the financial accounting valuations as 
the latter are characterised by the main assumption of firm continuity (i.e. 
functioning). Basically, the fundamental of the financial valuations is the continuity 
of the actual and law conditions in which the company currently operates. In this 
sense, Ceccherelli (1956: 194, translated) clearly states that:  
«It is, in this particular case, (that is necessary) to assign a value to the firm equity 
not because it should or could be liquidated or disposed, and with reference to the 
liquidation or disposal time, but as it represents the endowment of a firm that 
functions and that has to!continue functioning. The corresponding evaluation for that 
very reason is called functional evaluation (valutazione di funzionamento)». 
The main idea of this approach is that all the productive factors should be considered 
systematically. We derive that the historical cost, the realizable value or the value in 
use, as well as, the market value in part loose significance, becoming relevant only as 
terms of reference within the wider functional judgement (Marasca, 1999: 58). Each 
component has a function (or destination) within the firm and its contribute to the 
income depends not only by the single factor but also by the role it assumes within 
the combination of all the other factors74.  
In the “functional evaluation” all the equity items assume within the firm a specific 
and essential function and for that precise intention (or function) they were 
purchased. Therefore, the cost paid was considered appropriate for their function, for 
their successive use and the consequent income generation (Ceccherelli, 1956: 194). 
The Author (1956: 195) continues explaining that as long as the productive factors !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!74!Ceccherelli (1956: 194, translated) highlights how: «(…) these components do not have within the 
firm equity an independent position: they usefully exist, as they concur together with the others to 
make it possible the occurrence of certain economic transformations, that is, as they constitute a 
complex destined to and dependent of the firm management (gestione dell’azienda)». 
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play a role within the complex they form typical “qualitative” and “quantitative” 
components of the same complex and their value find reference only in the cost 
originally paid, in every successive moments their value is represented by the 
“inventory cost” (i.e. residual cost, rimanenza di costo) 75 . In this sense, the 
productive factors are seen as “inventories of on-going operations” (rimanenze di 
operazioni in corso) and “liabilities of operating resources” (predisposizioni di mezzi 
operativi) for the future (Ceccherelli, 1956: 196). As a consequence, the evaluation 
takes as point of reference the cost, because it is “inventory evaluation” (valutazione 
di rimanenza)76, in few words all the investments are seen as anticipated costs. 
Summarily, the cost reveals not only the financial expense but also it is expressive of 
the functioning value that is attributed to each investment in relation to its convenient 
contribution in the system. The evaluation should consider the degree of 
functionality of the productive factors under assessment, as a matter of fact, the cost 
should be prudentially adjusted for the decreased functionality. The new cost 
(adjusted historical cost) must be expressive of the lower degree of functionality 
corresponding to the changed firm internal and external conditions77. Hence, we can 
consider an investment as functional or anti-functional if it respectively comes closer 
or far from the aim, modality and duration originally assigned (Ceccherelli, 1956: 
200). The Author then acknowledges that the financial valuations are based on 
forecasts, as the value attributed to a certain factor must take into account not only 
the cost but also the expected matching future revenue78. In different terms, all the 
functional evaluations procedures starting from the original cost actually modify the 
value of each investment according to their future profitability. It does not mean that 
the functional evaluation is an overall evaluation of the firm equity through the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!75!According to Ceccherelli (1956: 195, translated) assessing the equity with the functional evaluation: 
«(…) does not mean to attribute the values to the different groups or qualitative units that compose it 
[the equity], instead, it means to attribute a value to the inventories of the original and successive 
costs paid for the firm functioning». 76!The “inventory evaluation” is a thread of union through the time among the original costs, the other 
costs and the matching revenues, tying the equity to the income. The income becomes dependent on 
the equity value. Using Ceccherelli’s  (1956: 202, translated) words: «The functioning value is (…) a 
measure of correlation between original costs and future expected revenues». 77!On the contrary, Ceccherelli (1956: 201, translated) does not leaves any doubt on the impossibility 
to recognise any revaluations and clearly states that: «(…) The higher degree of functionality (…) 
cannot affect also with a super-valuation [revaluation] of the inventories, because the effects of their 
higher functionality reflect the future and cannot be part of an already realised income». 78!Relating to the indicative cost criterion Ceccherelli (1956: 202, translated) affirms that: «(…) it 
cannot become an evaluation rule: it might become rule and formula only in a static environment, that 
is hypothetical and unreal because only in that environment we might consider the revenue measure 
sure (…)». 
 49 
income capitalization; indeed, this evaluation is appropriate only in the firm transfer 
case. Whereas in the financial evaluations we should never depart from the cost 
criterion; the potential capability to generate income is subordinate to the cost 
criterion and it serves as control in the assumptions underlying the financial 
valuations that transform the costs in values (Ceccherelli, 1956: 209).  
The evaluation process behind this approach follows a three-stage iter (Giannessi, 
1979: 345; Marasca, 1999: 61; Giannetti, 2013: 98). Firstly, there is the identification 
of the nature of each productive factor considered individually. Secondly, each factor 
has to be contextualised within the firm system to which they belong. Thirdly, there 
is the exam of the equilibrium positions and of the features of the “firm motion” 
(moto aziendale). Each stage of the evaluation process leads to review the value of 
the productive factors, creating a sort of circular evaluation process.  
Drilling down through the concepts of this evaluation, Giannessi (1978: 462) notes 
that every change in a productive factor generates other not-proportionate changes in 
the residual «n – 1» productive factors. We derive as anticipated that the evaluation 
process is circular because as a variation in a productive factor occurs, the other 
factors shall be evaluated again considering the renewed functional relationships 
amongst the factors and the renewed equilibrium. This process aims at predicting the 
recoverable amounts of costs through the future revenues. The exam of the relations 
and interdependencies amongst the factors does not yet lead to the functional value. 
To determine the functional value it is necessary to assess also the equilibrium 
positions and the direction of the firm motion, which according to Giannessi (1979) 
can be evolutionary (moto evolutivo) or regressive (moto involutivo). When the firm 
is in an equilibrium position and the motion is evolutionary the productive factors 
value increase; while, when the firm is not in equilibrium and the motion is 
regressive the value of the productive factors tend to be lower than their original 
costs79. Giannessi (1979: 61-64) suggests that to determine the system equilibrium 
positions the aspects to take into account are for example: the favourable market 
trend, the firm financial situation, the existence of a constant liquidity condition, the 
positive nature of the economic and financial perspectives on the firm future life, the 
system of the environmental risks and the predicted evolution of these, the internal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!79!According to Giannessi (1979: 346, translated) the firm value is higher when the system is in 
equilibrium because «the productive factors can be fully used». If the system, instead, is not in 
equilibrium «the value is lower because the productive factors find a reduced utilisation, suffering a 
loss whose entity is proportional to the causes that have originated the disequilibrium».  
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constraints (capability of the existing functional assets to uphold the predicted 
programs), the changes in the economic politics, the firm image, etc.  
Besides, the third stage of this evaluation iter, should consider also the firm risks 
attributing specific provision or with the constitution of reserves80. Only with this 
final contemplation of the risks we get the functional value that a considered item 
assumes for the financial valuations purposes. 
Since the goodwill is largely defined as the excess of the cost paid over the equity 
acquired it is interesting within this perspective to introduce Giannessi’s (1937) 
study on the costs’ problem in the thought of Alberto Ceccherelli (“Il problema dei 
costi nel pensiero di Alberto Ceccherelli”)81 . In the above revision Giannessi 
displays the significance of Ceccherelli’s contribution for the studies on the so-called 
“Ragioneria” (accounting). In detail, Giannessi (1937: 7), firstly, highlights the 
introduction of the “perspective” concept, which is intended dynamically as a set of 
conditions periodically renewable to reconcile the differences between the firm and 
the external environment, harmoniously reflecting the nature of the firms as 
“operating coordinations” (coordinazioni operanti). At this point, we can already try 
to find the similarities with the current accounting procedures. Definitely, the 
impairment procedure is pervaded by the perspective concept as well as by the need 
to constantly reconcile the differences between the firm financial and economic 
conditions with the expectations extrapolated from both the internal and external 
environments82.  
The costs’ recording has different aims. It is necessary to determine the income and 
to resolve return and economical convenience judgements, where the first aim is 
directly linked with the preparation of the financial statements and the assets’ value 
attribution. In this sense, Giannessi (1937: 12) emphasizes how the cost problem is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Giannessi (1979: 400-413) considers three kinds of risks: the specific risks (rischi specifici), the 
common risks (rischi di comunanza) and the management risks (rischi di gestione). The specific risks 
relate to a single item, for instance to compensate an overvaluation of a machinery or of the 
inventories; the common risks relate to two or more items of the equity for instance the risk for theft 
or fire; finally, the management risks have a wide content and for this reason are faced through the 
allocation of reserves to the equity or through assets undervaluation and liabilities overvaluation, 
although as observes Giannessi the latter is formally less correct as it implies earnings management 
policies. 
81 Giannessi, specifically, in his writing (1937) “Il problema dei costi nel pensiero di Alberto 
Ceccherelli” addresses the attention on Ceccherelli’s study (1936) entitled “Il problema dei costi nelle 
prospettive economiche e finanziarie delle imprese”. 
82 By way of example see IAS 36 paragraph 33, where we read: «In measuring value in use an entity 
shall: (a) base cash flow projections on reasonable and supportable assumptions that represent 
management’s best estimate of the range of economic conditions that will exist over the remaining 
useful life of the asset. Greater weight shall be given to external evidence (…)». 
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not to establish which cost components are included either in a cost configuration or 
in another, but to establish which components may be recovered through the 
revenues and which components, on the contrary, are, according to the conditions of 
the period, not recoverable. In this last case, it is necessary also to determine the not-
recoverable amount. Thus, Giannessi (1937) in explaining Ceccherelli’s thought 
implicitly advances the connection between the recoverable amount and the cost 
recorded, which, as said, is the nucleus of the impairment test. 
Hence with the purpose to relatively contextualise the “functional evaluation” 
process to the current accounting standards, we can see that IAS 36 similarly adopts 
this evaluation criterion. Indeed, when it is not possible to apply the impairment test 
at the individual asset level, the management should review the asset as part of a 
group, identifying the CGUs (or groups of CGUs) to which that asset is allocated83. 
Evidently, many assets can generate cash inflows only when combined with other 
assets as part of larger CGUs. The Basis for Conclusions on IAS 36 (paragraph BCZ 
114) underlines how the «IASC believed that the concept of CGUs is a matter of 
fact: assets work together to generate cash flows». The same concept of CGUs 
underlies a systematic assessment for the assets and not an asset-by-asset method. 
Hence, the process of the impairment test for the assets that do not generate cash 
inflows, which are largely independent of those from other assets or group of assets, 
is comparable with the process underlying the “functional evaluation” proposed by 
the Tuscany tradition. Where, the first stage, i.e. the identification of the nature of 
each productive factor, corresponds to the determination of the scheme of the 
impairment review (as assets are reviewed individually or as part of a group). The 
second stage, that is the contextualisation of each factor within the firm system, 
corresponds to the identification and allocation of the CGU (or CGUs) to which the 
asset belongs. Finally, the exam of the equilibrium positions may be assimilated to 
the estimation of the recoverable amount at the CGU level and the possibility to 
allocate arbitrary the impairment loss of that unit when it is not practicable the 
individual-asset estimation of the recoverable amount as all assets of a CGU work 
together (see IAS 36 paragraph 106).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Namely, IAS 36 paragraph 22 specifies that: «Recoverable amount is determined for an individual 
asset, unless the asset does not generate cash inflows that are largely independent of those from other 
assets or groups of assets. If this is the case, recoverable amount is determined for the cash-generating 
unit to which the asset belongs (see paragraphs 65–103), unless either: a) the asset’s fair value less 
costs to sell is higher than its carrying amount; or b) the asset’s value in use can be estimated to be 
close to its fair value less costs to sell and fair value less costs to sell can be determined». 
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1.4. Overview of the Anglo-Saxon doctrine on goodwill  
 
As for Italy also in the Anglo-Saxon context we find several Authors in the past 
studying the relationship between income, capital and value (Bonbright, 1937; 
Edwards, 1938; Alexander, 1950; Edwards and Bell, 1961; Solomons, 1961; 
Chambers, 1966; Sterling, 1970; Barton, 1974).  
Entering more in the details, also in the International accounting literature we can 
read that the goodwill represents an asset implying several valuations issues  (e.g. see 
Canning, 1929; Hughes, 1982; Courtis, 1983)84.  
Accordingly also in the Anglo-Saxon setting we can find different definition, 
measurement and accounting for goodwill leading to the construction of differing 
accounting theories relating to the goodwill (Carlin and Finch, 2007; Bloom, 2008).  
One of the first Authors cited in the literature on the contribution to goodwill theories 
(Carsberg, 1966; Courtis, 1983) is More (1891: 282) who conceives the goodwill as 
an annuity and provides the following definition:  
«Goodwill is just another name to designate the patronage of the public».  
Few years later Dicksee (1897) warns to exclude goodwill from the accounts and 
when it cannot be excluded to write it off against the reserves as soon as possible. He 
(1897: 40) provides than a more thorough definition of goodwill as it represents: 
«The benefit arising from connection and reputation, the probability of the old 
customers going to the new firm which has acquired the business. The value of that 
reputation which a business has acquired during its continuance, which induces the 
confidence or expectation that the same, or an increasing patronage will continue to 
be extended so long as the business is conducted in the same place upon the same 
principles».  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 In this sense Canning (1929: 42-43) observes as follows: «Goodwill, when it appears in the balance 
sheet at all, is but a master valuation account – a catch-all into which is thrown both an unenumerated 
series of items that have the economic, though not necessarily the legal, properties of assets, and an 
undistributed list of undervaluations of those items listed as assets. It is the valuation account par 
excellence». Hughes (1982) goes even beyond the accounting-related valuation issues maintaining 
that: «The origin of goodwill can be revealed through history, but its nature is a matter of personal 
interpretation». Courtis (1983) observes that: «Goodwill, from being thought of as a set of 
inducements which attract persistent patronage, has become submerged by methods of valuation 
based upon superior earning power concepts and by the accounting notion of a residuum». According 
to Bonbright (1937, Vol. I, p. 80): «The goodwill account is really a kind of “valuation account” 
representing, not the value of a particular intangible asset, but rather the difference between the values 
that accounting practice arbitrarily assigns to the separately stated assets and the value that the 
management desires to assign to the enterprise as a whole». 
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Guthrie (1898) explains that the value of goodwill derives from the difference 
between the normal results of a business and the results that might be achieved with 
any similar business. The Author (1898: 425) then focuses on the nature of goodwill 
and suggests that:  
«[it] differs from other property, inasmuch, as, while other property is palpable, 
goodwill is impalpable. Other property can be handled, weighed, or measured, its 
nature ascertained by inspection, its quality tested by sight, smell, feeling or analysis, 
or the annual income receivable from it identified. But goodwill – how can its 
quality be ascertained? The difference between the two kinds of property is like that 
between matter and life, or between a man’s estate and a man’s character – one is 
ponderable, the other imponderable» (citation from Courtis, 1983).  
Similarly to the contemporaneous Italian scholars of that period, initially, the 
goodwill was associated to specific casual factors, for example reading Hunter 
(1901: 351) we find that:  
«Goodwill exists as a benefit or advantage accruing to the firm, in addition to the 
value of its property, derived from its reputation for promptness, fidelity and 
integrity in its transactions, from its mode of doing business, and other incidental 
circumstances, in consequence of which it acquires general patronage from constant 
and habitual customers».  
More (1891), Dicksee (1897), Guthrie (1898) might be considered the antecedents of 
the so-called “super-profit” theory whose father is considered P.D. Leake. Since the 
above-mentioned first notion of goodwill indeed resulted that the goodwill value was 
approximated by the excess profit. Hence, following these first perceptions of 
goodwill we come closer to the professed “super-profit” or “annuity” theory (Leake, 
1914; 1921; 1930; Walton, 1919; Yang, 1927; Seed, 1937; Emery, 1951; Walker, 
1953; Wright, 1955).  
Specifically, Leake (1914: 81) defines goodwill as:  
«The privilege, granted by the seller of a business to the purchaser, of trading as his 
recognised successor; the possession of a ready-formed “connexion” of customers, 
considered as an element in the saleable value of a business, additional to the value 
of the plant, stock-in-trade, book debts, etc. Goodwill, in its commercial sense, is the 
present value of the right to receive expected future super-profits, the term “super-
profits” meaning the amount by which future revenue, increase or advantage, to be 
received, is expected to exceed any and all expenditure incidental to its 
production»85.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Kester (1930, Vol. I, p. 301) succinctly claims that: «As stated above, the essence of good will is 
excess earning capacity». Similarly according to Seed (1936: 8): «Goodwill is the advantage which 
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It is essential to point out that even when there are some or all of the cited causal 
factors that are generally associated to the existence of the goodwill value, the 
business with goodwill shall be able to generate excess profits86. The Author argues 
that to determine the value of goodwill it is appropriate to use a diminishing annuity 
formula, as the super-profit hardly can be considered everlasting and highlights its 
wasting nature. The goodwill should be determined with the diminishing annuity 
because it gradually reduces due to the action of the market competition. 
The “super-profit” theory seems a refinement of previous formulation of goodwill, 
introducing the consideration of a diminishing annuity for its determination. 
However, Carsberg (1966: 15) criticizes Leake’s effective contribution to the 
goodwill theory, as even though it approximates reasonable result in certain 
circumstances theoretically it implies the existence of a perfect market actually 
inexistent. Also, it might happen that the competition action decreasing the goodwill 
value is compensated by the purchaser favourable action. Another weakness might 
be identified in determination of a normal rate of interest on the investments because 
he does not describe how to identify an appropriate discount rate. To sum up, Leake 
determines the value of the whole business as the sum of the individual balance sheet 
items comprising the goodwill as computed independently. We can appreciate that in 
contemporary times, from the first quarter of the twentieth century, Besta in Italy and 
Leake in the UK, propose similar accounting approaches and methods to determine 
the firm value.    
In the USA, although Paton and Littleton (1940) continue supporting the “super-
profit” theory hence agreeing with the rationale that the goodwill represents an 
advanced payment for future extra-profits, they partially divert from Leake’s 
goodwill determination method. Moving from Paton (1934) beyond the two classes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
arises from the good name, reputation and connection of a business; alternatively, the benefit which 
accrues to the owner of a business from the likelihood that such business will earn, in the future, 
profits in excess of those required to provide an economic rate of remuneration for the capital and 
labour employed therein. Goodwill represents the probability of the retention by a professional man of 
the confidence of his clients and their continued employment of his services and, in the case of a 
commercial undertaking, the likelihood of customers continuing to deal with it, with all the 
implications that such likelihood of continuance of profitable association carries with it». According 
to Yang (1927: 88) goodwill is: «The present worth or capitalized value of the estimated future 
earnings of an established enterprise in excess of the normal results that it might be reasonably 
assumed would be realized by a similar undertaking established new».  86!In this sense Kester (1930, Vol. I, p. 357) notes that: «Goodwill therefore includes every advantage 
connected with location premises, reputation, personality, name, etc. That all this elements of 
goodwill cannot be gainsaid, but unless an earning power or capacity larger than that of a newly 
established competing concern goes along with these elements, no one would be willing to pay 
anything for the goodwill of the old concern». 
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of assets of a typical enterprise, the “more or less liquid funds” and the 
“commitments in technical cost factors” there is also the class of the “intangibles 
values”. The Author (1934: 122) defines the “intangibles values” as:  
«The excess, if any, of the value of the entire enterprise as a going concern over the 
sum of the more specific and independent assets listed individually».  
Hence, Paton clearly implies the need to determine the value of the whole enterprise. 
He suggests the importance of considering the enterprise as an economic entity and 
as a consequence the importance of determining the return on the entire fund of 
capital (Stabler and Dressel, 1981). This approach is very clear in Paton and Littleton 
(1940) where we appreciate how for the Authors income determination constitutes 
the fundamental of accounting87.  
It is interesting to note that Paton in the same paper (1934) recognizes that the 
intangibles’ value arises from the difference between the sale value of the enterprise 
as a whole and the value that is assigned to the tangible factors. Paton’s concept of 
intangibles is very close to the concept above discussed introduced by Zappa (1950). 
Furthermore the similarities regarding the reference to a going-concern entity and to 
the composition of the assets as system that goes well beyond the mere sum of the 
assets are not the only similarities with the Zappanian thought. Indeed, Paton (1922) 
while defining the concept of goodwill makes specific reference to the income and 
profitability of the enterprise88. Regardless these similarities, it is critical to remind 
that Paton and Littleton (1940) theoretically support the historical cost as the basis 
for measuring the assets and liabilities89. Instead, Zappa believes that the income 
measurement is not simply based on the deferral of the historical cost awaiting for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!87!See Paton and Littleton (1940: 10) where they express on the importance of the income statement: 
«The details of the process of measuring the rate of income are unsettled but there is no question as to 
the importance of this factor. Earning power – not cost price, not replacement price, not sale or 
liquidation price – is the significant basis of enterprise value. The income statement therefore is the 
most important accounting report». Obviously, even from this income-statement view, the Authors do 
not deny how the assets valuation issue and the related equity value are matters of significant 
relevance as they impact the income statement through e.g. the effect of asset consumption. 88!Paton (1922: 313) defines goodwill as: «The capitalized value of the excess income which a 
particular enterprise is able to earn over the income of a representative competitor – a “normal” 
business – having the same capital investment, the rate used in capitalizing being the rate realized by 
the representative concern». 
89 See also Littleton (1952: 168) where we read: «Is not the primary function of accounting to furnish 
to management data about past transactions (invested cost) so that management can benefit from the 
knowledge of past experience when considering the next future commitments? Management must be 
able to review its prior efforts; and no better measure of these exists than invested cost».  
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the matching with the related revenues but it may imply the allocation of the 
maturing incomes over the periods in which the operations are carried out.  
Leake as well as Paton and Littleton propose to write-off the goodwill against the 
future earnings for the determined period of time that the goodwill is expected to 
produce earnings. This solution is somewhat similar to the accounting approach often 
used to depreciate goodwill over a definite period of time90. Leake motivates the 
goodwill depreciation also in relation to the denial of recognising internally 
generated goodwill. Indeed, when the purchased price of goodwill was maintained at 
cost amongst the assets its value would be, with the passing of the time, inevitably 
confused with the internally generated goodwill91. Hence, goodwill was considered a 
wasting asset whose value was subjected to the amortization process. For many 
Authors the need to charge depreciations and not retain the goodwill cost goes hand 
in hand with the prudence principle (Bourne, 1988; More, 1891; Guthrie, 1898; 
Leake, 1912)92. Graham and Mcgolrick (1964: 34) states that:  
«The writing down of goodwill does not mean that it is actually worth less than 
before, but only that management has decided to be more conservative in its 
accounting policy. This point illustrates one of the many contradictions in corporate 
accounting. In most cases the writing off of good will takes place after the 
company’s position has improved. But this means that the good will is, in fact, 
considerably more valuable than it was at the beginning». 
In subsequent years appeared differing conflicting theories to the “annuity” or 
“super-profit” theory. Kaner (1938) in its book entitled “A New Theory of 
Goodwill” asserts that the accountants often confuses the goodwill with the formulas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!90!Explicitly Leake (1930: 80) notes that: «If it be granted that, in computing the fair present value of 
goodwill, interest at a minimum rate of 10 per cent per annum on the cost must be allowed for, it is 
obvious that the accounting value of purchased goodwill must diminish, and, in fact, it diminishes 
rapidly year by year, and consequently it should be gradually written off». 91!In this sense Leake (1912: 166) argues that: «Exchangeable value arising from unexpected 
developments taking place subsequently, and which was, therefore, not included in the original capital 
outlay, cannot properly be substituted for that which has expired. Otherwise, by parity of reasoning, 
any undertaking would be entitled to add to revenue, and charge to capital outlay sums purporting to 
represent the exchangeable value of self-created goodwill». 92 !As cites Cooper (2007) the following extrapolations of thought (with emphasis added) are 
particularly interesting. Bourne (1988: 604) notes that: «A successful business will be able 
comfortably to depreciate the amount, and it is the prudent course to adopt, not knowing what may 
happen in futurity». Similarly More (1891: 286): «Prudent traders feel that goodwill is not an item 
which ought to appear in a balance sheet» and Guthrie (1898: 430): «Accountants are mainly in the 
hands of those who are concerned in the undertaking in question as to whether any goodwill is written 
down or not. They can only advise, and, I think, the general practice of all of us is to advise, on the 
prudential side, and make some provision, however small it may be». Finally, Leake (1912: 169) 
notes that: «It is undoubtedly sound financial policy to appropriate the largest possible sums out of 
surplus profits to write down the book value of goodwill». 
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to calculate its value as a matter of fact according to Kaner the “super-profit” theory 
is just a method to value goodwill. According to the Author (1938: 17):  
«Goodwill is that asset possessed by a commercial undertaking which, by embracing 
that undertaking’s reputation, attracts from a portion of the public special 
preferences, and results in an added value in excess of the surplus tangible assets of 
the undertaking». 
With humorous spirit Norris (1946: 100) writes: 
«If X is a live pedigree dog, and Y a dead one, then perhaps X – Y = Z. But Z means 
nothing itself. The label “goodwill” in business accounts closely resembles Z; its use 
is as sensible as trying to find what makes the dog tick by dissecting it». 
To these critics the super-profit theorist opposed. Amongst others Walker (1953) 
reacts by highlighting that the monetary value of goodwill is strictly tied to the 
expected creation of super-profits93.  
Kester (1930) although supporting the super-profit theory sometimes in a certain 
sense misperceives the goodwill concept with the advertising expenditures, indeed, 
he (1930, Vol. I, p. 358) maintains that:  
«Creating a demand for a product by means of extensive advertising is one of the 
quickest ways of building up goodwill. The difference between the cost of 
advertising necessary to retain a given increased volume of trade, which we may call 
the normal advertising expenditure, and the cost of publicity required to secure that 
increase may be looked upon as the expenditure on account of goodwill». 
According to Kester (1930) to determine the value of goodwill it is necessary to use 
a discount rate that is given by the difference between the average rate of profit and 
the return on the investment achieved by the business94. Kester (1930) recognises !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Walker (1953: 213) words are indeed clear in this sense: «By definition, goodwill has no accounting 
significance except in terms of an earning capacity which is estimated to be above normal. A price is 
paid for goodwill – a price above the value placed on the other assets – because profits in excess of a 
normal return on investment are anticipated. In other words, an enterprise is purchased, not primarily 
as a means of securing a group of assets, but as a means of securing a stream of income in the future. 
If the expected stream of income is a normal amount or at a normal rate, all factors considered, no 
payment is likely to be made for goodwill. If the expected income stream is in excess of normal 
earnings, a payment will be probably have to be made for goodwill. Then, it may be said that the 
payment for the expected stream of income in excess of a normal return is a payment for goodwill, 
and that the payment for the expected stream of income equal to a normal return is a payment for the 
other assets». 
94 Kester (1930, Vol. I, p. 301) indeed sustains that: «The valuation of good will rests, therefore, upon 
the profit making ability of the business. If the average rate of profit in an industry is, say, 9% on the 
total capital invested and a given business under consideration is earning 12%, its excess earning 
capacity is 3%. This 3% is a measure or serves as a basis for measuring the value of goodwill». The 
Author (1930, Vol. I, p. 303) continues saying: «However, the business is worth $ 10,000 more than 
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also the importance of estimating the following elements: the measure of the equity 
that contribute to achieve the “super-profit”, the normal return on that equity and the 
interval in which the “super-profit” are generated95. 
Kester’s noise between the notion of “super-profit” and “advertising expenses” for 
the recognition of goodwill might be seen as a sort of anticipation of Nelson’s (1953) 
“momentum” theory. Nelson (1953: 492) deliberately defines the momentum theory 
as: 
«The hypothesis that a businessman purchases a promotional push instead of an 
annuity and that the “push” dissipates like momentum». 
From the above definition we can develop the main assumption of this theory. 
Namely, an asset cannot indefinitely live and as a corollary descends the need to 
amortize goodwill over the estimated life of the momentum96. We also see that in the 
decision to purchase a company, the purchaser focuses on the marketing or 
promotional “push” and the higher stream of revenues is the consequence deriving 
from this starting “push”97. Although Nelson identifies this starting “push” only with 
the marketing advantages, Bloom (2008: 72) suggests other circumstances tied with 
the goodwill momentum, such as the existence of a trained staff, established 
production and administrative procedures and other ordinary advantages. Even 
though Nelson hopes that his “momentum” theory will be distinguished from the 
“annuity” theory I suggest that these theories assumptions are essentially comparable 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the $ 40,000 shown in the balance sheet, and for this reason, instead of paying $ 10,000, R is required 
to invest $ 12,500. The excess of $ 2,500 is paid by R as an offset to the shares of the others in the 
goodwill of the firm». 
95 Purposely, Kester (1930, Vol. I, p. 360) claims that: «The usual method of valuing goodwill 
requires an estimate of the period during which it may be reasonably expected that the excess earning 
power of the business will continue under the new owners, i.e., goodwill is based and must be valued 
on the ability to make above-normal profits. Valuing it, therefore, requires a consideration of the 
following factors: 1) a determination of the net asset values used in the business which have 
contributed to securing above-normal profit; 2) Determination and acceptance of a normal rate of 
return on such net assets; 3) Estimate of the period during which the above normal profits will 
continue, i.e., their reasonable expectancy of life».  96 !Nelson (1953: 492) argues that: «Due to the nature of this momentum, it seems that the 
amortization would, in most cases, be over a life from two to ten years. The Annuity Theory would 
call for a shorter life than the Momentum Theory hypothetically, since excess earnings would cease 
before all the “push” was dissipated». 
97 Nelson explains that a purchaser is disposed to pay for goodwill because he wants a starting “push” 
as the creation of goodwill requires effort. Specifically the Author (1953: 491) writes: «Goodwill is 
about as fickle as the human nature of which it is an aspect. (…) Fickle or not, it is hard to build up, so 
the buyer of a concern will often pay a large sum of money for the goodwill. The reason is that he 
wants this starting “push” in his new enterprise, rather than to start fresh in a similar business and 
devote much effort and money over a long period of time to develop such goodwill; especially since 
his profits are likely to be meager until goodwill is developed». 
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and I deviate from prior literature highlighting the differences (Bloom, 2008; Ratiu 
and Tudor, 2013). The “annuity” theory focuses for the goodwill definition on the 
generation of “super-profit”. The “momentum” theory implicitly refer to the 
generation of higher profits as the payment of an higher cost is associated to the will 
of the purchaser to start with a “push” and avoid the likelihood to obtain “meagre 
profits” until goodwill is developed. Of course, it is important to point out also that 
for Nelson it is not essential the obtainment of “super-profit” while in the “annuity” 
theory is. Both Nelson and Leake suggest goodwill to be amortised over its life. 
Nonetheless, since in the “annuity” theory the goodwill is tied to the generation of 
“super-profits” it is likely that its life is shorter while the “momentum” theory 
indicates that goodwill should be amortised in a span of period from two to ten years 
conditional to the “push” duration.  
Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) provide empirical evidence that advertising and 
research expenditures are relevant sources of goodwill, this result in a certain sense is 
supportive of Nelson’s theory. 
The literature stresses how the “momentum” theory actually did not attract much 
debate even though it tries to find an alternative explanation for the recognition of 
goodwill (Bloom, 2008; Ratiu and Tudor, 2013). As I see it, Nelson’s contribute has 
not been so much appreciated as it develops concepts anticipated by prior literature. 
Indeed, prior literature already tried to define goodwill specifying certain causal 
factors that might be at the base of the goodwill value. It should be anyway 
acknowledged the momentum theory contribution as it specifically identifies the 
main goodwill constituents with the marketing and promotional “push” deriving 
from acquiring a firm with goodwill. 
Tearney (1973) aims at theoretically demonstrating that the goodwill acquisition is 
based upon certain identifiable conditions and argues that the failure in their 
recognition discloses nebulous information to the financial statement users. He 
(1973: 44) wittily argues that: 
«Whenever an acquired entity does possess excess profitability (theoretical 
goodwill), the underlying reasons for this excess could be identified, valued and 
recorded, rather than ignored and arbitrarily labeled “goodwill”». 
Acting this way rather than determining the goodwill through the residual method 
and than amortise this value over a pre-established forty years period would disclose 
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more relevant information98. According to him the valuation methods already at the 
time he wrote were sufficiently developed and sophisticated to avoid the existence of 
goodwill within the statements as that value could be attributed to the identified 
assets (Tearney, 1973: 45)99. This contribution is an anticipation of what would be 
more recently proposed in Australia by Lonergan (1995) who grounds a theory on 
the “analyses of the goodwill components”. The analysis of the goodwill components 
would help the financial statement preparers to better identify the useful life of the 
goodwill and amortised the identified sub-categories in a less indiscriminate manner 
over their life. To this scope Lonergan (1995) distinguishes amongst goodwill 
components with short (0-3 years), medium (3-7 years), long (7-10 years) and very 
long (10-20 years) useful lives. Specifically, the quality of management team, 
marketing expertise, know-how and technical skills are components that should be 
amortised over a short/medium period. The synergies are expected to expire in the 
medium period, while consumer preference loyalty, economies of scale, distribution 
network and locational are expected to expire in the medium-long period. Finally, the 
individuality/uniqueness and monopoly useful life may swing between short and 
long period. It is evident that the goodwill should be considered in terms of its 
constituent’s elements avoiding to interpret it as a residual value as a top-down 
approach would imply (Bloom, 2008).  
Leading this last theory to its extreme limit, in other words, being able to completely 
allocate the goodwill value over the corresponding identifiable intangibles, the 
goodwill would disappear from the financial statements. I wonder if the users in this 
latter case have more relevant information. To the extent that the system value is 
different from the mere aggregation of the net assets, as I see it this difference when 
allocated to the goodwill is representative of the firm past, present and future 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Tearney (1973) critically observes that: «The failure of accountants to require identification and 
valuation of so-called “hidden assets” is not because the task is impossible or impractical, but 
apparently because of a lack of interest when a generally acceptable and less time-consuming 
alternative exists—i.e., labeling the entire excess cost “goodwill”». 99!The identification of the assets composing the goodwill value become as much important as being 
raised to a social responsibility for accountants. In this sense, Tearney (1973: 45) writes:! «By 
substituting the catchall account “goodwill” for many assets purchased in business combinations, such 
as personnel skills and marketing channels, accountants are not only ignoring the existence of expert 
appraisers but perpetuating a disservice to clients and the general public as well. It is high time that 
we accountants recognized our social responsibility in this area». !
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perspectives100. Otherwise, the residual value should be allocated on the identified 
net assets overvaluing the assets or undervaluing the liabilities. This latter manoeuvre 
would certainly increase the subjectivity and would obscure the true and real value of 
the identified assets and liabilities101. Another alternative is to directly expense the 
residual value in the income statement, avoiding flexible attribution of value on the 
net assets. However, in this latter case the financial statement users would miss the 
information on the value of the system, interrelationships and synergies102. 
The above theory seems also consistent with the bottom-up perspective illustrated by 
Johnson and Petrone (1998) where the goodwill value is split in six components. 
This approach is also consistent with the IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 on business 
combinations103. 
 
1.5. Goodwill reporting under IAS 36 and in SFAS 142 
 
After the historical excursus and before the empirical research it is important to 
zoom in on the origin and qualification of goodwill as an asset and then on the 
procedure of impairment as required by both the IAS/IFRS and US GAAP (see e.g. 
Paolini et al., 2003; Azzali, 2005; Allegrini et al., 2006; Andrei, 2006; Guatri and 
Bini, 2009; Di Pietra, 2010; Di Pietra and Allegrini, 2011; Marchi and Potito, 2012; 
Quagli, 2013).  
The goodwill arises from a business combination as the excess of the consideration 
transferred by the acquirer over the net assets acquired (SFAS 141: § 34; IFRS 3: § 
32)104.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!100!Preinreich (1937: 29) underlines the importance of the future perspectives tied with the goodwill 
value: «The first point to remember in valuing goodwill is that the problem is concerned with the 
future, not with the past. It is necessary to look forward and not backward, because goodwill depends 
on future probabilities».  101!In a certain sense it would inflate the net assets value with earnings management policies.  102!For the financial statement users it becomes relevant both the information at the aggregation and 
disaggregation levels. Hence, the goodwill may represent the value of the aggregation which 
otherwise would remain hidden. In this sense see Miller (1973) who suggests that the aggregation 
level is important for wealth measurement and that: «This does not deny the relevance of information 
on individual asset valuations. In fact, a variety of attributes of assets at a variety of aggregation levels 
is relevant in assessing the current status of an enterprise and making decisions about investment, 
disinvestment, and future prospects. But any individual valuation should be interpreted within the 
context of a purposive system and, because of the interconnections in an enterprise, a number of 
perspectives on individual assets are required as well as information on the interrelations». 
103 For instance, cf. the Basis For Conclusion (B313) to SFAS 141 (revised 2007). 
104 Both the IASB and FASB prohibit the recognition of the internally generated goodwill. This 
prohibition in addition to the prohibition of the reversals of impairment on goodwill may constitute an 
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Once recognised as an asset in the statement of financial position, goodwill shall be 
assigned to reporting units (called cash generating units in the IAS/IFRS, CGU 
hereafter) of the acquiring entity that are expected to benefit from the synergies 
deriving from the combination (SFAS 142: § 34; IAS 36: § 80). 
In a similar vein, the FASB’s Exposure Drafts (1999, 2001) and the IASB’s ED 3 
(2005) list the six components that result from a business combination, of which only 
two directly refer to goodwill105. As indicated in the aforementioned Drafts, the 
“core” goodwill deriving form a business combination is formed (1) by the fair value 
of the going concern element of the acquiree’s existing business and (2) by the fair 
value of the expected synergies or other benefits deriving from the combination of 
the acquirer’s and acquiree’s net assets. Saying it differently, the fair value of the 
going concern element represents the ability to achieve from the acquired net assets a 
rate of return higher than that expected by the management whether it have had 
acquired these assets and liabilities individually. The first component (1) of goodwill 
represents the value of the synergies detected within the acquired business, which 
was already recorded as goodwill in the acquiree’s statement of financial position or 
was concealed in the form of internally generated goodwill (IFRS 3 BC 313). The 
second component (2) of goodwill often known under the label of “combination 
goodwill” takes form only after the business combination and is exclusively 
consequential of the synergies expected from that combination (Johnson and Petrone, 
1998: 296; Henning et al., 2000)106.  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) first introduced in USA the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142 “Goodwill and other intangible 
assets” in 2001. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
incentive to avoid or underestimate goodwill write-offs. As a consequence, unrecognized goodwill 
write-offs might be meaningful (Chambers and Finger, 2011). Indeed, unrecognised goodwill write-
offs may suggest that the acquired goodwill has been (inaccurately) replaced by internally generated 
goodwill, through a strategy of internal growth rather than through the external growth achieved with 
strategies of M&A or business combinations.  As a matter of fact, some studies highlight how the 
fictitious separation between the internally generated goodwill and the purchased goodwill become 
clouded and the two items become undistinguishable (Bloom, 2009).  
105 For a complete exposition of the six components refer to note 18.  
106 These aspects are not mere technical accounting definitions. Indeed, the management strategies are 
continuously designed and changed according to the future benefits that may be derived from a certain 
operation, transaction or action and the composition and origin of goodwill enclose the future 
perspectives or expectations that the management has upon the firm and its investments (Chalmers et 
al., 2011). 
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International Accounting Standard 36 (IAS 36) in 2004107. The statements set the 
requirements for accounting goodwill and other intangible assets after their first 
recognition in the financial statements. The rationale for the issuance of new rules for 
goodwill and other intangibles stated in SFAS 142 was to provide better information 
about these assets, which are important economic resources, to analysts and other 
financial statements users (SFAS 142, p. 5). The scope for revising IAS 36 in 2004 
«was to improve the quality of, and seek international convergence on, the 
accounting for business combinations and the subsequent accounting for goodwill 
and intangible assets acquired in business combinations» (IAS 36: § IN 2). 
SFAS 142 and IAS 36 change the approach to how goodwill is accounted subsequent 
to its acquisition in accordance with SFAS 141 and IFRS 3; indeed, since it is no 
longer amortized its value will not decline systematically as under prior statements. 
Goodwill is not anymore presumed as a wasting asset (with definite life) and thus 
having indefinite useful life it will be tested at least annually for impairment108. A 
goodwill impairment loss arises when the carrying amount of the CGU (or CGUs) to 
which goodwill is allocated exceeds its implied fair value.  
Following SFAS 142 (§§ 19-22) the impairment test on goodwill is carried out by the 
entity using a two-step process. The first step concerns with the estimation of the fair 
value of the CGU to which the goodwill was allocated and its comparison with the 
carrying amount of the same CGU to identify any potential impairment. When the 
carrying amount of the CGU exceeds its fair value, then the entity proceeds with the 
second step by measuring the amount, if there is, of the impairment loss of goodwill. 
Thus, the second step deals with the comparison between the estimated implied fair 
value109 of reporting unit goodwill and the carrying amount of that goodwill. The 
excess of the carrying amount of reporting unit goodwill over its implied fair value 
corresponds to the impairment loss. The total amount of the impairment losses 
recognised in each reporting units shall be represented as a separate line within the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 The International Accounting Standards Committee originally issued the IAS 36 in 1998. Equally 
to the US SFAS 142 impairment-only-approach for goodwill, also IAS 36 mandates that goodwill is 
no longer subjected to the amortization process over its expected useful live while it has to be tested 
for impairment at least annually. 
108 The same approach is adopted for intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, while intangible 
assets with finite useful lives have to be amortized over their useful lives and they are tested for 
impairment only when there is an indication that an asset may be impaired. 
109 To determine the implied fair value of goodwill the entity shall allocate the fair value of a CGU to 
all of its assets and liabilities, comprising also the unrecognized intangibles, hence adopting the same 
procedure used in a business combination. Then, the amount exceeding the fair value of that CGU 
over the amounts allocated to its assets and liabilities corresponds to its implied fair value. 
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income statement before the subtotal income from continuing operations, unless the 
impairment losses are corresponding to discontinued operations.  
Following IAS 36 (§ 104) the impairment loss deriving from the excess of the 
carrying amount over the recoverable amount of a CGU shall be allocated firstly to 
reduce the goodwill carrying amount allocated to the impaired CGU and the 
remaining impairment loss pro-rata to the other assets of the CGU on the basis of 
their carrying amount. 
The adjusted carrying amount of the goodwill becomes the new accounting basis and 
subsequent reversals of previous impairment losses are not allowed (SFAS 142: § 20; 
IAS 36: § 124).  
Ultimately, the SFAS 142 in paragraph 28 (and IAS 36 in paragraph 90) indicates 
that the impairment test on goodwill shall be performed between annual tests even 
when a particular event or circumstance occur and make it more likely that the 
carrying amount of the reporting unit exceeds its implied fair value (that the CGU 
value is impaired in IAS 36). Thereupon, the SFAS 142 lists a set of examples (not to 
be considered exhaustive) of such events or circumstances (e.g. a significant adverse 
change in the business climate; unanticipated competition; a loss of key-personnel; a 
more-likely-than-not expectation that a significant portion of a reporting unit will be 
sold)110. Similarly, IAS 36 in paragraph 12 indicates some triggering events for the 
impairment distinguishing between external sources of information (e.g. observable 
indication that the asset’s value has declined significantly more than would be 
expected; significant changes with an adverse effect have taken place or will take 
place in the near future in the technological, market, economic or legal market in 
which the entity operates111; market interest rates have increased affecting the 
discount rate used to calculate the value in use; and the carrying amount of the entity 
net assets is higher than its market capitalisation) and internal sources of information 
(e.g. evidence is available of obsolescence or physical damage; significant changes 
with an adverse effect have taken place or will take place in the near future, in the 
extent to which, or manner in which, an asset is used or is expected to be used, these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110  In literature there are critics on the non-exhaustive list provided by the accounting standards 
regarding the triggering events. Amongst others Comiskey and Mulford (2010: 746) acknowledge 
that: «The standards themselves provide only limited guidance on what constitutes a triggering event 
and how an impairment charge should be measured. Further, the guidance provided is somewhat 
sterile and textbook- like, devoid of the richness and situation variability found in practice». 
111 Examples of such changes with an adverse effect might be the issuance of new norms that limit or 
do not allow the use of certain machinery, the exercise of particular activities or the 
commercialization of determined products (see Lionzo, 2007: 64). 
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changes comprise the asset becoming idle, future discontinuing, restructuring, 
disposal; and evidence is available indicating that the economic performance of an 
asset is, or will be, worse than expected). 
 
1.5.1. (Dis)-approvals to impairment of goodwill !
Accordingly, one of the main functions of the financial reporting is to provide 
financial users with sufficient and adequate information allowing the stakeholders to 
assume economic decisions and the investors to rationally allocate their resources 
(so-called decision-usefulness objective). To this scope, are fundamental certain 
reporting characteristics such as objectivity in terms of verifiability and neutrality. 
The high flexibility allowed by the accounting standards with reference to the 
impairment test and specifically with the accounting for goodwill has always raised 
doubts in terms of reliability of the accounting numbers. The ample room for 
discretion left to the financial statement preparers if on the on hand increases the 
economic relevance of the accounting numbers, on the other hand may lead to 
earnings management practices. Thus, the trade-off between reliability and relevance 
may be well represented by two different stream of literature. The first stream of 
literature criticises the impairment test as it would reduce the financial reporting 
reliability allowing earnings management through anticipated or postponed losses 
(i.e. timeliness) as well as with the overvaluation or undervaluation of the 
impairment losses (Francis et al., 1996; Watts, 2003; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 
2006; Zang, 2008; Lhaopadchan, 2010)112.  
The flexibility allowed by the accounting standards relating to goodwill surfaces 
since its first recognition. As a matter of fact the goodwill originally has to be 
allocated to the CGU or CGUs, which are expected to benefit from the business 
combination synergies (Massoud and Raiborn, 2003; Jordan and Clark, 2004)113. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Watts (2003: 217) directly maintains that: «Assessing impairment requires valuation of future cash 
flows. Because those future cash flows are unlikely to be verifiable and contractible, they, and 
valuation based on them, are likely to be manipulated». Laopadchan (2010: 123) stresses that the 
prohibition of impairment reversals on goodwill incentivises to avoid or postpone the losses: «As such 
this creates incentives to time goodwill write-downs or even postpone impairment as any fall in value 
is charged against the current period’s profits». 
113 Jordan and Clark (2004: 65) note that: «Discretion is required in allocating assets among reporting 
units and certainly is needed in determining fair values for the assets in the reporting units. This 
discretion opens the door for earnings management and big bath charges». 
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Hence, the room for judgements derives from the identification of the CGU114, the 
identification and consideration of the triggering events115, the selection of proper 
market value benchmarks and of the key inputs for the estimation of the value in use 
(e.g. risk-adjusted discount rates, growth rates, cash flow projections, etc.)116. The 
great number of variables to take into account in carrying out the impairment 
procedure makes the results across firms also scarcely comparable (Comiskey and 
Mulford, 2010)117. The cost-based accounting supporters maintain that values are too 
subjective and also they depend on the time variable; hence it is preferable to use the 
historical cost. The historical cost allows higher verifiability and objectivity hence it 
would better assist users in evaluating the convenience of certain investments and 
more generally the firm economic and financial conditions (Bedford and Ziegler, 
1975).  
A second stream of the literature maintains that the impairment test flexibility is 
exploited in order to send credible information to the market on the effective values 
of the tested assets (Rees et al., 1996; Godfrey et al., 2009; Jarva, 2009). The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 The identification of the size of the CGU is not neutral since the impairment loss of a CGU cannot 
be offset by any potential revaluation of other CGUs, then the larger the CGUs the lower, ceteris 
paribus, the likelihood to impair the goodwill is. For example, Carlin and Finch (2011: 379) observes 
that: «By defining too few CGUs relative to the true number of operating units within the organisation 
which generate independent streams of cash flows and with which at least some goodwill is 
associated, the level of disclosure transparency achieved falls, and the risk that impairment losses 
which should be recognised in a given period are not recognised in that period, rises». Also Guatri and 
Bini (2009: 69, translated) observes that: «The identification of the CGUs is a critical aspect of the 
goodwill impairment test». 
115 It is significant to point out that besides the annual test, the impairment test triggers off whenever 
any indication of impairment is judged to affect the CGU recoverable amount. This implies a 
preliminary (and subjective) assessment of the overall firm situation and on the likelihood that the 
CGU value is impaired.  116 For instance the guidance to IAS 36 A17 may open to earnings management; Husmann and 
Schmidt (2008: 60) state that: «if a highly leveraged entity is interested in a high impairment, it may 
determine the value in use using an estimated cost of capital based on the ‘incremental borrowing 
rate’. If the entity is not highly leveraged, it may use WACC as the discount rate instead. If the 
reporting entity is interested in a low impairment, it may act the other way round, that is, use WACC 
if the entity is highly leveraged, and the ‘incremental borrowing rate’ if it is not». In a similar vein 
Carlin and Finch (2009: 334) state that: «If bias in the selection of discount rates exists, fundamental 
questions must be asked about the quality of reported earnings, the validity of valuations ascribed to 
goodwill and the status to be accorded to financial statements produced in conformity with the IFRS 
regime». 117!Comiskey and Mulford (2010: 765) supports that the implementation impairment of goodwill is 
challenging, indeed: «Triggering events are many and vary greatly in significance and severity. 
Different valuation models are used and there is little conformity in the selection of discount rates. In 
some cases, but not consistently, control premiums are used to enhance the indicated market values of 
reporting units. Some firms may even deny the need for an indicated impairment charge. We often 
noted the need for the use of estimates and the possibility that these estimates might be managed to 
avoid goodwill impairments. At a minimum, assessments of goodwill impairment limit the 
comparability of results across firms». 
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impairment decisions in this sense are used to signal the firm economic and financial 
performance to the stakeholders. Some researchers find that the impairment losses 
are associated with the firm stock-returns and with poor-operating performance 
(Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Rees et al., 1996; Ahmed and 
Guler, 2007). Li et al. (2011) find that both investors and financial analysts after the 
announcement of an impairment loss revise downward their expectations and this 
revision is related to the magnitude of the impairment loss. Bens et al. (2011) also 
find a negative and significant stock market reaction to unexpected goodwill write-
offs. Interestingly, they find that this negative stock market reaction is attenuated for 
firms with low information asymmetry (their proxy is a high analyst following). 
When the firm impair the goodwill then the market already incorporated the 
information, hence the negative stock return is attenuated. Jarva (2012) examines the 
consequences of SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs according to different points of view. 
The first one explores whether the write-offs generate positive ‘abnormal’ returns in 
the year following the impairment of goodwill, as investors tend to fixate on 
earnings. The second perspective investigates the association between goodwill 
write-offs and analyst-forecast accuracy as regards future earnings. The last tested 
hypothesis refers to audit pricing and it asserts that firms recording goodwill write-
offs pay higher audit fees than non-write-offs firms. Consistently with the basics of 
market efficiency, analyst-forecast rationality and efficient audit pricing, the Author 
(2012) concludes that investors and analysts are able to incorporate the information 
related to goodwill write-offs and the auditors charge higher fees to balance the 
greater effort required. 
As observed by Kim et al. (2013) it is not inconsistent that IAS 36 and SFAS 142 
created two opposite views on the introduced higher subjectivity. Indeed, 
verifiability and representational faithfulness represent two sides of the same coin, in 
other words, both the above-mentioned features, that not necessarily occur together, 
are explicative of the reliability concept.  
 
1.5.2. Accounting& for& goodwill:& Impairment& of& goodwill,& amortization& of&
goodwill&and&immediate&writeWoff.&&!
Given the above-mentioned doubts on the impairment of goodwill it might be 
interesting to succinctly hint at the diverse accounting approaches generally 
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discussed for goodwill. For example, Laghi (1994) analyses the considerations 
behind three different alternative practices used to account goodwill: 1) the goodwill 
has an indefinite useful life and as such its value should not be systematically 
amortised; 2) the goodwill as the other assets has a definite useful life hence its value 
should be amortised along its life; 3) the goodwill value should be immediately 
written-off, either offsetting its value against the reserves, or directly expensing its 
cost in the income statement118. 
The first school of thought believes that the goodwill value represent a set of internal 
and external relations, coordinated and combined in such a way that contributes to 
the firm going concern. Hence the goodwill value is a sort of “collection of 
favourable attributes” that perpetuates through unceasing transformations until the 
firm complex continues its operations (Laghi, 1994: 44). The fallout of these 
considerations is the conception of goodwill as an asset with indefinite useful life 
whose value should not be amortized. Some Authors point out how by retaining the 
value of the goodwill is methodologically rather more rigorous119 (Stacy, 1987; 
Tweedie and Blanchet, 1989). For instance, Tweedie and Blanchet (1989) dissent 
from the major disapproval to this method, which maintains that retaining the value 
of purchased goodwill is an elusive manner to include the value of the future 
internally generated goodwill120. Also, if we consider the goodwill as an asset with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!118 !Also Brunovs and Kirsch (1991) recognises three alternatives accounting methods for the 
goodwill, specifically: «By the early 1900s three clear schools of thought had emerged. Hughes 
identified and classified the alternative accounting treatments as: (a) immediate write-off, (b) 
permanent retention as an asset, and (c) gradual reduction». In literature there are also the proposals of 
other alternative methods for the accounting of post-acquisition goodwill (see Carlin ad Finch, 2007: 
77-78). 
119 Stacy (1987: 22) lively debates that: «The fact that a price may be calculated mathematically by 
reference to profits for a particular period does not mean that it is only those profits that the purchaser 
is acquiring an interest in. The effect of a high discount rate in arriving at a present value means that 
profits after, say, 10 years have very little effect on a business valuation, but the profits for the period 
after that time are still available. So if a valuation for goodwill appears initially to be based upon 10 
years’ profits, than as the years go by its value will continue to be supported by an evaluation of 10 
years’ profits. Nothing has been used up or realised; the purchaser acquired the right to profits for an 
infinite period and nothing has changed». Tweedie and Blanchet (1989: 20) write that: «The argument 
in favour of retaining acquired goodwill as an asset is that its book value should not be reduced as 
long as the value of the asset appears unlikely ever to fall below the cost». On the other hand: 
«Arguments used against amortisation are: that net income should not be reduced by both depreciation 
and by expenditure intended to maintain the value of goodwill; that any period of amortisation is in 
essence arbitrary, as the life of goodwill is indefinite; and that the selection of an arbitrary period for 
amortisation can lead to an understatement of net income during the period and an overstatement 
later».  120!Tweedie and Blanchet (1989: 20) continue saying: «This method is criticised as acquired goodwill 
is deemed eventually to be replaced with self-generated goodwill. Income, it is argued, can be 
overstated if acquired goodwill is not written off as its benefits expire, and income would be 
understated when the eventual write-off took place».!
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indefinite useful life, its subsequent write-downs will constitute unwavering indicator 
of the overall financial and economic position of the firm. Besides, the recognition of 
goodwill as an asset diminishes the difference between the equity book value and the 
market value (Woolf, 1990)121.  
On the contrary, another part of the literature supports the amortization of goodwill 
(Graham and Mcgolorick, 1964; Rutteman, 1987). The goodwill as the other long-
lived assets is an anticipated cost for future benefits thus it should be amortised over 
the time it produces income122. As the other long-lived assets the value of goodwill 
depreciates as the synergies and relationships from which it derives are predestined 
to change over time. Cooper (2007: 255) recalls a long list of Authors supporting the 
capitalization at cost of the goodwill and the subsequent amortisation to profit and 
loss123. In this framework, the goodwill like the other assets has a definite useful 
life124. 
The third approach suggests to immediately write-off goodwill against reserves or 
expensing in the income statement. The immediate write-off against reserves is based 
on the belief that the purchased goodwill should be treated consistently with the 
internally generated goodwill. Since the internally generated goodwill cannot be 
recognised in the statement of financial position, the cost of the purchased goodwill 
should be immediately written-off, but this write-off should not affect the income 
statement and the future income. The reason underlying the write-off of goodwill 
against the equity derives from the fact that it is motivated only by a reason of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Indeed, Woolf (1990: 93) says that: «One advantage of permitting the undepreciated retention of 
acquired goodwill in qualifying instances would be to reduce the discrepancy between balance sheet 
values and market capitalisation». The Author disapproves the goodwill amortization; putting it into 
his words: «This problem lies at the heart of the goodwill conundrum: all methods of eliminating it 
assume (without proof) that goodwill is a depreciating asset, and this assumption has now become a 
feature of both European directives and U.K. legislation». 
122 Rutteman (1987: 32) specifies that: «This would reflect the reality that the price paid for another 
company is dependent on the perceived value of the intangible asset of goodwill, that the intangible 
asset represents a cost used up in earning additional profits, and that the cost (amortisation) and the 
profits should both reflected in earnings per share». 
123 Specifically, within this school of thought Cooper (2007) cites the following Authors: Bourne 
(1882: p. 604), Guthrie (1898: pp. 428–429), Storer, Trevor, Grierson, Fred Scott and Matheson (in 
Roby, 1882: p. 293), Whinney (in Payne, 1892: p. 145), Densham (1898: p. 570), Cooper (in Smith, 
1904: pp. 48–49) and Leake (1912, 1914, 1921). 
124 On the definite useful life of goodwill read Guthrie (1898: 428) stating that: «No goodwill is 
eternal, and some provision, however small, should be made for its ultimate extinction, whether its 
estimated life – and the estimate must always be absolutely arbitrary – be it ten years or a hundred 
years». Read also Emery (1951: 566) arguing that: «It must be realized that all factors giving rise to 
goodwill value are finite or temporal». 
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consistency with the internally generated goodwill125. Finally, the immediate expense 
of goodwill in the income statement is grounded on the hypothesis that the goodwill 
does not satisfy the assets definition as it is not controlled by the company and the 
higher cost paid is not related to expected future benefits (Laghi, 1994: 57). 
This short discussion of some alternatives for the accounting of post-acquisition 
goodwill should be interpreted also in light of the recent debate on the goodwill 
write-off. As indicate Bratten et al. (2013) in the USA the US Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board calls for research on the goodwill write-off. In Europe 
the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group is currently discussing the re-
introduction of the goodwill amortization in the EU to avoid excessive subjectivity in 
the goodwill impairment (EFRAG, 2014). 
 
1.6. Discussion 
 
The brief historical excursus presented so far highlights some similarities and 
differences amongst the concepts proposed by the Italian literature on “Economia 
Aziendale” and the modern applications in accordance with the accounting standards. 
In general, without going back in the single models, we can see that relating to the 
concept of assets’ recoverable amount, the difference between value in use and fair 
value existent in IAS 36 and SFAS 142 has been somewhat anticipated by both 
Pietro Onida and Giovanni Ferrero with the distinction (still up-to-date) between the 
direct and indirect realizable value. 
In addition, even though the IAS 36 and SFAS 142 do not fully embrace the phase of 
the systemic evaluation, in part and with regard to the impairment test of goodwill at 
the corporate business level, that is when the test is carried out on the CGUs, the 
valuation become systemic. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 Rutteman (1988: 24) notes that: «On one side are those who see no grounds for valuing purchased 
goodwill on a different basis from that used for self-generated goodwill. If the latter is not capitalised, 
than to be consistent the purchased goodwill should be written-off immediately but not so that it 
affects income. (…) Whatever the technical merits of the opposing arguments, a practical factor had to 
be brought into consideration: amortisation reduces reported profits, whereas a write-off against 
reserves does not». 
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Finally, it seems possible to summarily maintain that the international accounting 
standards (and the US GAAP) related to the valuation of long-lived assets126 have 
borrowed some concepts outlined by the past academic literature, approaching in 
certain respects to each model presented and at the same time departing in other 
respects. Recently, some Italian Authors stress how the notion of recoverable amount 
existent in the current accounting standards may be approximated for certain aspects 
with a particular notion of “equity economic value”127.  
With reference to the concept of goodwill we find almost in all the Italian and 
International accounting literature a deliberate intention to define it, to limit the 
boundaries for its recognitions and to regularly control its value through ad hoc 
evaluations practices. Due to the complexity that has inspired the debate on the 
goodwill128, aiming at concisely interpreting it in Table 1.1 I enclose in chronological 
order some of the delineations of goodwill provided by diverse Italian Scholars129 
(see note VI at the end of this chapter). Specifically, Table 1.1 includes the Italian 
and the translated English definition, the corresponding references and finally an 
extrapolation from the entire definition of a summarizing delineation characterising 
each description. Even though we perceive the evolution in the concept, we can also 
perceive that since the first definitions there are some common features. These 
features might be convened according to the Schools that influenced the thought of 
the Authors. We can see that before Besta the goodwill is assimilated to the ability to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 In detail, see with reference to the IAS/IFRS the IAS 16, IAS 36 and IAS 38 and with reference to 
the US GAAP the SFAS 142 and SFAS 144 respectively superseded by the Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 350 and ASC 360. 127!See Florio (2011: 119), Lionzo (2007: 10) and Momentè (2003: 251). 128!See D’Alvise (1938, translated) who notes that: «The ideas divergence is too complex and severe 
to draw, albeit with the best examination, a conceptual conclusion» and De Minico and Amodeo 
(1942: 81, translated) that few years later observe: «Perhaps the long debates that in doctrine and 
practice have long been developed around the topic, are in part due to the fact that each author has 
attributed to the word “goodwill” an all personal meaning, and has set about to refute the other authors 
arguments, without in the most cases clarifying their initial positions of thought». Onida (1956: 7, 
translated) acknowledges that: «The definition and particularly the scientific one, is destined, 
therefore, as the theories, to be superseded with the knowledge extension and with the refinement of 
the investigation methods; in the economic field, then, the definitions can change in the time, also 
because the same phenomena which are the object of the study change in their manifestations». In a 
similar manner Ardemani (1958: 6, translated) highlights that: «We (indeed) must not forget the 
merely instrumental character of the scientific definitions». 
129 We can find a similar approach in Courtis (1983) where the Author in the appendix presents a 
chronology of selective definitions of goodwill from 1882 to 1981. Courtis (1983: 3) observes that: 
«Continuously throughout the chronology of definitions there is this slippage in thinking between 
goodwill as attributes that generate patronage, and goodwill as an asset resulting from application of a 
profit capitalization formula». 
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attract customers or the credibility of the company anyway it was generally 
considered a latent value (Villa, 1870; Giocoli, 1905). 
Overall, we may say that the least common denominator in all the formulations is the 
resolute conviction that goodwill derives from the acquisition of an economic 
complex, as since the first definitions, goodwill is perceived as the excess cost paid 
to acquire a firm. From this point of view, over the decades this conviction has not 
changed. Now as then, the internally generated goodwill cannot be recognised in the 
financial statements, both under the IAS/IFRS and the US GAAP130.  
The income takes on a key role in almost all the formulations of goodwill.  
Some Scholars assimilate the income to the “economic profit” and the goodwill 
becomes the “fictitious capital” (Massa, 1898), the “extra-profit” (Alfieri, 1908) or 
the “condition to obtain economic profit” (Amaduzzi, 1963) that allows the 
achievement of a return higher than that of the interest for the invested capital and 
for the shareholder’s remuneration.  
Other Authors compare the income with the income produced by other companies 
with the same economic conditions (e.g. industry, size, etc.). First and foremost, 
Besta (1922) explains that goodwill ensures a return higher than the normal return 
obtained by similar companies. Following, we find Besta’s disciples like Vianello 
(1932) that associates the existence of a business with goodwill to the obtainment of 
higher profits than other traders, or D’Alvise (1934) that speaks of company with 
goodwill when it produces profits higher than the normal profits produced in the 
same environment, or Della Penna (1931) maintaining that goodwill may derive by 
the way the assets are combined and used beyond the normal efficiency measure. 
Also Zappa (1927) suggests that the existence of goodwill allows the firm to achieve 
profits higher than those considered normal. Further, D’Ippolito (1955) writes that in 
the firms with goodwill it is possible to obtain an income higher than that produced 
by similar firms in the same industry but with a different goodwill and anyway an 
income that is higher than the normal remuneration of the invested capital. 
Conversely, Ponzanelli (1955) indicates that the goodwill value should not be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 IAS 38 at paragraph 48 in bold prescribes what follows: «Internally generated goodwill shall not 
be recognised as an asset». Equally, SFAS 142 paragraph 10 dictates: «Costs of internally developing, 
maintaining, or restoring intangible assets (including goodwill) that are not specifically identifiable, 
that have indeterminate lives, or that are inherent in a continuing business and related to an entity as a 
whole, shall be recognized as an expense when incurred». Also in Italy it is excluded the recognition 
of internally generated goodwill to this regard see Organismo Italiano di Contabilità (OIC) No. 24 
paragraph 69. 
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determined as the ability of the firm to produce profits higher than those produced by 
the average firms of that type. Still in more recent times the goodwill has been 
associated with the efficiency of the elements coordination (Guatri, 1955) or with the 
prospect of durable future income (Ardemani, 1958). 
As hinted at paragraph 1.3.2 in the international literature we can find some common 
points between the concept of “normal income” anticipated by De Minico (1935) and 
“variable income” as suggested by Alexander (1950) and Solomons (1961). Both 
concepts of “normal” and “variable” income, indeed, are forward-looking and are 
basically stable in the long run131. 
Then, out of Italy the theory of the revaluations “fuori bilancio” might be compared 
with some concepts proposed by Edwards and Bell (1961). The Authors develop the 
concept of current income expressive of the increase or decrease in the value of the 
equity, evaluated at current costs. When we consider the decrease in the value of the 
equity it is apparent the link with the downward revision of the goodwill value ran 
through the current impairment test. In detail, they (1961) make reference to the 
replacement cost (Edwards and Bell, 1961), where asset figures are based on 
sacrifice values, the cost that the firm would sustain if it had to repurchase or 
reconstruct that particular asset, and not on benefit values. Thus, the replacement 
cost seems to be less balance sheet oriented than other measurement rules. However, 
especially if realisable holding gains are allocated to the income statement, the 
measurement income process is consistent with the asset-liability paradigm, in so 
that some revenues and costs are obtained just by the variation in the value attributed 
to an asset or liability, without any reference to an actual transaction132. The 
measurement process, as is required in the asset-liability paradigm, begins with the 
determination of the value of each asset and liability and leads to the determination 
of revenues and expenses. It is important, however, to underline the differences with 
the above Italian doctrine. Indeed, Edward-Bell’s replacement cost (current cost) is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 According to Solomons (1961) the economic income will react both to real future changes and to 
changes in human expectations, and the effects of these two sets of factors will be inextricably 
combined. Actually, Alexander (1950) distinguishes between: mixed economic income, pure 
economic income and variable economic income. The first one takes into account the unexpected 
changes. For the economic income and variable income see also: Hicks (1939), Alexander (1950), 
Solomons (1961), Penman (1970), Staubus (1971). 
132 As we can read from Edwards and Bell (1961: 36): «The purposive profit-making activities of a 
firm can be conveniently divided into 1) those yield a profit by combining or transforming factors of 
production into product whose sale value exceeds the value of the factors and 2) those that yield a 
gain because the prices of assets rise (or prices of liabilities fall) while such assets (or liabilities) are in 
possession of the firm». 
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applied indifferently and systematically to all the assets and liabilities (e.g. including 
inventories) while the theory of the revaluations “fuori bilancio” is applied neither 
systematically nor to all the items of the equity. Finally, a relevant difference 
consists in the presence of a gain or loss (holding gain or loss) in the income 
statement following the above equity “adjustments” according to the current cost, 
while, following the revaluations “fuori bilancio” the gain or loss can never appear in 
the income statement. 
This analysis is limited to the study of some models considered significant even 
though it may be considered incomplete, since countless and authoritative Italian and 
International academics have pronounced on the issue. Furthermore, this chapter is 
mostly dedicated to the Italian context, while there is only an overview of the 
International historical context. Specifically, in the paragraph dedicated to the 
overview of the International studies I contemplate only three theories underlying the 
goodwill concept (i.e. “annuity theory”, “momentum theory” and “analyses of the 
goodwill components”). Although the reported list should be considered as a mere 
indicative interpretation of some of the most debated theories but not as an 
exhaustive list. For instance, I do not examine the “residuum theory”; in the 
residuum concept the goodwill is the «balance of the legitimate values attaching to 
an enterprise as a totality, over the sum of the legitimate values of the various 
tangible properties taken individually» (Gynther, 1969: 249). Again, also in the 
paragraph dedicated to alternative methods to account for post-acquisition goodwill I 
explore only three alternatives (i.e. impairment, amortization and immediate write-
off of goodwill). This list should not be considered as complete as prior literature 
suggested also other alternative accounting treatments. Finally, in the analysis I do 
not consider the perspective of the practitioners and of professional bodies in the 
history, which could be constructive as they may anticipate or on the contrary may 
be anticipated by the academics streams of literature.  
In light of these premises, in the following chapter I present the methodology and 
methods used in the thesis and in chapter three I show the empirical research carried 
out on the relationship between the impairment test and corporate governance. 
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 Table 1.1: A
 chronological list of selected delineations of goodw
ill provided by the Italian “Econom
isti Aziendali”. 
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«D
iconsi capitali im
m
ateriali le som
m
e che si im
piegano per esem
pio 
nell'acquisto di clientele, altrim
enti avviam
ento di com
m
ercio. Se, rilevando 
un negozio, si pagano 10 m
ila lire a titolo di avviam
ento, non viene perciò ad 
aum
entare di un m
illesim
o il valore delle m
ercanzie com
perate; m
a il credito 
di cui gode il negozio rilevato, la buona qualità delle m
ercanzie, l’onestà de’ 
prezzi, attirandovi gli avventori, le dieci m
ila lire sono il valore di questo 
credito». 
«W
e call them
 intangible assets the sum
s that are used for exam
ple in the 
purchase of custom
ers, otherw
ise trade goodw
ill. If, acquiring a business, you 
pay 10,000 Lire for goodw
ill, it does not therefore increasing the value of a 
thousandth of the acquired m
erchandise; but the credit ow
ned by the business 
acquired, the good quality of the m
erchandise, the prices honesty, attracting 
the custom
ers, the ten thousand Lire are the value of this credit». 
C
redibility of the 
com
pany acquired 
Elem
enti di 
am
m
inistrazione e 
contabilità, 1870: 48-
49 
M
A
SSA
 
«L’avviam
ento di un negozio viene da m
olti considerato com
e un capitale e 
com
preso nell’inventario. Se un negozio in proporzione al capitale 
im
piegatovi, frutta una som
m
a rilevantissim
a, di gran lunga superiore 
all’interesse del capitale ed anche ad un largo com
penso al proprietario per 
l’opera sua di direzione, è certo che, dovendosi cederlo, il proprietario non si 
contenterà di riavere il capitale im
piegatovi, che tanto vorrebbe vendere tutto 
e chiudere il negozio; m
a pretenderà un com
penso per l’avviam
ento». 
«The goodw
ill of a business is w
idely considered as a capital and included in 
the inventory. If a business in proportion to the capital invested, returns a 
very considerable sum
, far superior to the capital interests and also to a large 
com
pensation to the ow
ner for its direction activity, it is certain that, having 
to sell it, the ow
ner does not content him
self to get back the capital invested, 
as he w
ould like to sell everything and close the business; but it w
ill dem
and 
a com
pensation for the goodw
ill». 
Fictitious capital 
R
agioneria teoretica, 
1898: 38. 
B
ELLIN
I 
«L’avviam
ento è di tutte le attività im
m
ateriali la più elastica, siccom
e quella 
la cui esistenza accertata potrebbe m
ancare dom
ani. Infatti l’avviam
ento è un 
valore così variabile, che non può venire valutato in m
odo concreto, che 
nell’eventualità della cessione dell’azienda a terzi». 
«A
m
ongst all the intangibles, goodw
ill is the m
ost elastic, as its ascertained 
existence m
ight be m
issing tom
orrow
. Indeed, goodw
ill is a value so variable 
that can be assessed in a concrete w
ay in the event of the com
pany sale to 
third parties». 
The m
ost elastic 
intangible 
Trattato elem
entare 
teorico pratico di 
ragioneria G
enerale, 
1898: 58 
G
IO
C
O
LI 
«…
il reddito conseguibile dal patrim
onio e la capitalizzazione del reddito 
stesso non debbono, in alcuna m
aniera, influire nel determ
inare il valore degli 
elem
enti effettivi, e che il bene com
plem
entare da noi chiam
ato avviam
ento 
conserva un valore latente, com
e fattore potenziale di guadagno, m
a non può 
trovare posto nella parte attiva del bilancio, finchè l'azienda procede nel suo 
regolare funzionam
ento. Tuttavia, abbiam
o, com
e già dicem
m
o, un 
com
ponente patrim
oniale positivo, che richiam
a alla m
ente il detto bene 
com
plem
entare, ed esso appare in bilancio sotto la denom
inazione di spese 
d'im
pianto, o di prim
o stabilim
ento, o di fondazione, sem
prechè si tratti di 
spese effettivam
ente erogate per contribuire a creare e ad accrescere, 
all'azienda una potenza econom
ica». 
«... The incom
e achievable from
 the equity and the capitalization of the sam
e 
incom
e m
ust not, in any cases, influence in determ
ining the value of the 
actual item
s, and the com
plem
entary item
 that w
e call goodw
ill retains a 
latent value, as a factor of potential earnings, but has no place am
ongst the 
assets in the statem
ent of financial position, as long as the firm
 proceeds in its 
regular operation. H
ow
ever, w
e have, as w
e already said, a positive equity 
com
ponent, w
hich brings to m
ind the said com
plem
entary item
, and it 
appears in the financial statem
ent under the nam
e of installation costs, or first 
plant, or establishm
ent, proved that these are expenses actually incurred to 
contribute to create and increase, to the firm
, an econom
ic pow
er». 
C
om
plem
entary asset; 
latent value 
La valutazione 
dell'avviam
ento, 1905: 
15 
M
IN
G
A
R
ELLI 
«L’avviam
ento è l’elem
ento im
m
ateriale, il capitale m
orale dell’azienda; è 
l’indice m
isuratore e valutabile della sua prosperità attuale; è il risultato di «The goodw
ill is the intangible elem
ent, the m
oral capital of the com
pany; it 
is the indicator that m
easures and evaluable of its current prosperity; it is the 
M
oral capital of the 
com
pany 
D
i una form
ula 
m
atem
atica per la 
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tutte le cure, di tutti i sacrifici e di tutte le lotte del com
m
erciante, congiunti 
ad un com
plesso di fortunate circostanze di tem
po, di ubicazione, di abitudini 
ecc., che hanno concorso ad attirare, conservare ed aum
entare una buona 
clientela». 
result of all the trader cares, sacrifices and struggles, joint to a set of fortunate 
circum
stances of tim
e, location, habits etc., w
hich contributed to attract, 
retain and increase a good clientele». 
valutazione del 
capitale di avviam
ento 
in una taberna 
instructa, 1906: 5 
R
O
SSI 
«Q
uando un’im
presa è stata ben istituita in un am
biente adatto e quando 
abbia acquistato se non la certezza alm
eno una certa sicurezza di potersi 
ricavare negli anni futuri un reddito netto o costante o gradualm
ente 
crescente, si è form
ata una energia, una potenza econom
ica sui generis 
capace di dare un reddito, se oggettivam
ente considerare, sono capitali, così 
anche quell’energia che si è form
ata con un’azienda produttiva sarà da 
considerarsi com
e un capitale, avente un valore proporzionato al reddito che 
procura. O
ra codesta potenza econom
ica, codesta energia, insom
m
a codesto 
capitale sui generis…
dicesi avviam
ento, buon avviam
ento cioè dell’azienda 
in cui è nato e in cui m
anifesta i suoi effetti col m
ezzo del reddito netto». 
«Si guardi però dal ritenere che l’avviam
ento sia un capitale vero e proprio…
 
il buon avviam
ento si risolve in un reddito annuo costante sinchè durano le 
condizioni in cui si è form
ato». 
«W
hen a firm
 has been w
ell established in a suitable environm
ent and w
hen it 
has acquired if not the certainty at least a sort of sureness of being able to 
obtain in future years a net incom
e either constant or gradually increasing, it 
has form
ed an energy, an econom
ic pow
er sui generis able to produce an 
incom
e, if objectively considered, they are capital, so also that energy that 
w
as form
ed w
ith a productive firm
 w
ill be considered as a capital, having a 
value proportionate w
ith the incom
e it produces. N
ow
 this econom
ic pow
er, 
this energy, in short this sui generis capital... is called goodw
ill, goodw
ill of 
the firm
 that w
here it has been originated and w
here it show
s its effects by 
m
eans of net incom
e». 
«B
ew
are, how
ever, to consider the goodw
ill as a real capital…
the goodw
ill 
results in an annual constant incom
e constant as long as the conditions in 
w
hich it w
as form
ed last». 
Econom
ic pow
er, 
capital w
hose value is 
com
m
ensurate w
ith the 
incom
e that produces 
 
Sulla tassabilità del 
prezzo di avviam
ento 
delle im
prese e del 
sovrapprezzo delle 
società com
m
erciali e 
industriali. 1906: 12-
13  
A
LFIER
I 
«…
se trattasi d’im
presa in condizioni tali da non far tem
ere che sia prossim
a 
la sua fine e da far piuttosto sperare che avrà vita lunga e proficua, i valori dei 
singoli elem
enti patrim
oniali possono determ
inarsi in guisa che la loro 
som
m
a indichi quanto si ricaverebbe dalla vendita com
plessiva dei beni a chi 
volesse m
antenerli nell’attuale loro destinazione. Q
uesta som
m
a di valori 
adeguasi a quella del valore di alienazione dei singoli elem
enti patrim
oniali, 
distintam
ente presi e del valore di avviam
ento dell’im
presa; considerando 
com
e effetto dell’avviam
ento l’extra-profitto che, per lo stato dell’im
presa 
stessa, si potrà ancora ottenere; voglio dire l’aum
ento futuro del patrim
onio 
netto oltre la som
m
a degli interessi norm
ali sui capitali assegnati all’im
presa, 
il prem
io per il rischio e la rim
unerazione norm
ale per l’opera personale 
dell’im
prenditore». 
«In the case of a firm
 in conditions that do not cause concern that it is close to 
its ending and that m
ake hope that it w
ill have a long and fruitful life, the 
values of its individual assets can be determ
ined in such a w
ay that their sum
 
indicates how
 you w
ould derive from
 the sale of the total asset to those w
ho 
w
ould like to keep them
 in their current destination. This sum
 of values 
conform
s to the sale value of the individual assets, taken separately and of the 
firm
 goodw
ill; considering as a result of the goodw
ill the extra-profit w
hich, 
for the condition of the firm
 itself, you w
ill still be able to obtain; I m
ean the 
future increase in equity over the sum
 of the norm
al interest on capital 
allocated to the com
pany, the risk prem
ium
 and the norm
al rem
uneration for 
the personal w
ork of the entrepreneur». 
R
eal capital 
coordination  
La valutazione 
dell’avviam
ento, 
1908: 156 
SA
LV
A
TO
R
I 
«La valutazione al costo non soccorre al bisogno. C
on essa non possiam
o 
rappresentare che l’onere sostenuto per la spese di prim
o im
pianto, di 
fondazione e sim
ili occorse all’azienda. Q
ueste infatti sono incluse fra le voci 
attive del bilancio e si am
m
ortizzano gradatam
ente. Talune volte si risolvono 
in una perdita effettiva, specialm
ente quando profuse senza ponderazione. 
C
om
unque il valore di avviam
ento non può essere contenuto nei lim
iti delle 
som
m
e erogate per dar vita e solidità all’azienda, m
a deve estendersi a quel 
com
plesso di requisiti d’ordine econom
ico, m
orale e intellettuale necessari 
per l’avvenire dell’azienda stessa». 
«The cost valuation does not help w
hen needed. W
ith it w
e can represent only 
the expenses for the installation cost, establishm
ent and sim
ilar that the 
com
pany occurs. These indeed are com
prised am
ong the active item
s of the 
financial statem
ent and are gradually am
ortised. Som
etim
es they resolved in 
an effective loss, especially w
hen squandered w
ithout a w
eighted 
consideration. H
ow
ever, the goodw
ill value m
ay not be contained w
ithin the 
lim
its of the sum
s paid to give life and solidity to the com
pany, but it m
ust 
extend to the com
plex econom
ic, m
oral and intellectual requirem
ents, 
necessary for the com
pany future». 
The goodw
ill value 
extends to the com
plex 
econom
ic, m
oral and 
intellectual 
requirem
ents 
L’avviam
ento, 1912: 
482 
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B
ESTA
 
«…
trova la ragion di sussistere e la m
isura sua nella som
m
a dei beni che 
l’im
presa può sperare di ottenere in avvenire, com
e frutto di capitali suoi, al 
di sopra dei frutti norm
ali che sogliono dare i capitali nelle im
prese 
congeneri». 
«The goodw
ill exists and is m
easured as the sum
 of the resources that the 
com
pany hopes to achieve in the future, as a result of its capital 
(investm
ents), higher than the norm
al profits that are used to be produced by 
the investm
ents of sim
ilar com
panies». 
C
om
plem
entary asset 
La R
agioneria, Libro I 
1922: 75 
B
ESTA
 
«…
il valore cui l'im
presa prospera ha per sé stessa indipendentem
ente dai 
beni suoi, o se vuolsi il m
aggior valore che acquistano questi beni in quanto 
trovansi congiunti insiem
e e im
piegati in m
odo proficuo oltre la m
isura 
norm
ale». 
«…
The value w
hich the thriving entity has itself regardless of its assets, or if 
w
illed the greater value that these assets acquire as being joined together and 
used in a profitable w
ay beyond the norm
al m
easure». 
 
La R
agioneria, Libro I 
1922: 85 
B
ESTA
 
«…
valore dell'avviam
ento è essenzialm
ente pari all'eccesso dei frutti che, 
nell'ipotesi di una gestione norm
ale retta da energie fisiche, di volere e di 
intelligenza norm
ali, ordinarie, possono sperarsi o presum
ersi dai capitali 
effettivam
ente investiti in quell'affare o in quell'im
presa sui frutti m
edi che 
sogliono dare i capitali im
piegati con pari sicurezza in altri affari o im
prese 
sim
ili o analoghe, m
a in condizioni com
uni, non privilegiate». 
«…
The value of goodw
ill is essentially equal to the excess of the profits that, 
assum
ing a norm
al m
anagem
ent supported by physical energies, of norm
al, 
ordinary w
ill and intelligence, can be hoped or assum
ed from
 the capital 
actually invested in that business or in that entity on the average profits that 
tend to return the capital invested w
ith equivalent safety in other business or 
in sim
ilar or analogous entities, but in com
m
on conditions, unprivileged». 
 
La R
agioneria, Libro 
I, 1922: 422) 
ZA
PPA
 
«L’avviam
ento è un capitale im
m
ateriale costituito da quei fattori che 
concorrono a fare sì che la rim
anente porzione del patrim
onio di una 
determ
inata im
presa frutti oltre la m
isura norm
ale. Tra i principali fattori 
dell’avviam
ento può innanzitutto ricordarsi il credito, ossia la reputazione e la 
fiducia di cui l’azienda gode sul m
ercato sia per cause soggettive – inerenti 
agli am
m
inistratori suoi, com
e per cause oggettive quali la qualità o la 
specialità dei prodotti. (…
) (l’avviam
ento) però non è un’entità econom
ica 
corrispondente ed equivalente al m
aggior utile, m
a è invece, com
e già dissi, 
un capitale, un capitale “effettivo”, “vero e proprio” e di im
portanza talora 
rilevantissim
a…
». 
«G
oodw
ill is an intangible capital m
ade up by those factors that concur to 
ensure that the residual portion of the equity of a given firm
 gives a return 
beyond the norm
al m
easure. A
m
ong the m
ain factors of goodw
ill, w
e can 
first of all rem
em
ber the credit, that is the reputation and the confidence the 
firm
 enjoys in the m
arket both for subjective causes - related to its directors, 
as for objective causes, such as the products’ quality or specialty. (...) but (the 
goodw
ill) is not an econom
ic entity corresponding and equivalent to the 
higher profit, but is instead, as I said, a capital, an “effective” capital, “real” 
and som
etim
es of very considerable im
portance…
». 
Im
m
aterial capital 
Le valutazioni di 
bilancio con 
particolare riguardo ai 
bilanci delle società 
per azioni, 1910 
(ristam
pa 1927) 
ZA
PPA
 
«…
il valore di avviam
ento di un capitale in funzionam
ento, che è la più 
sintetica espressione della redditibilità di una im
presa, non può derivarsi dalla 
com
posizione dei valori attribuiti agli elem
enti patrim
oniali: un com
plesso 
econom
ico non può scindersi quantitativam
ente in parti costitutive». 
«The goodw
ill in the context of the incom
e-based valuation m
ethod is no 
m
ore considered as an asset, but as observed by Zappa the value of the 
goodw
ill of a going-concern com
pany, that is the m
ost concise m
anifestation 
of profitability, cannot be derived by the m
ere com
position of the assets 
values since an econom
ic com
plex (system
) cannot be broken dow
n 
quantitatively into constituent portions». 
Synthetic 
m
anifestation of 
profitability 
La determ
inazione del 
reddito nelle im
prese 
com
m
erciali, 1920-
1929: 583 
ZA
PPA
 
«…
il cosìdetto costo dell’avviam
ento non suole essere altro che una porzione, 
m
aggiore o m
inore determ
inata nelle più bizzarre guisa, del prezzo di apporto 
di un com
plesso econom
ico». 
«…
the so-called cost of goodw
ill is nothing else than a portion, higher or 
low
er determ
ined in the m
ost bizarre m
anner, of the price of a conferred 
econom
ic com
plex». 
H
igher/low
er price of 
an econom
ic com
plex 
La determ
inazione del 
reddito nelle im
prese 
com
m
erciali, 1920-
1929: 670 
V
IA
N
ELLO
 
«L’avviam
ento, econom
icam
ente considerato è il plusvalore che, in caso di 
cessione, può attribuirsi a un’im
presa com
m
erciale prospera e fiorente di 
fronte al valore che risulta dalla valutazione delle diverse attività e passività 
che costituiscono, nella loro som
m
a algebrica, il capitale netto di essa». 
«The goodw
ill, econom
ically considered is the surplus value that, in case of 
transfer, m
ay be attributed to a prosperous and thriving com
m
ercial firm
 
com
paring to the value resulting from
 the evaluation of the different assets 
and liabilities that constitute, in their algebraic sum
, the net assets of it». 
Surplus value 
Istituzioni di 
ragioneria generale, 
1930: 53 
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D
ELLA
 PEN
N
A
 «In fine, gli elem
enti attivi dell’ultim
a classe che Fabio B
esta ha chiam
ato 
com
plem
entari, abbracciano principalm
ente: l’avviam
ento delle im
prese, 
ossia il valore che l’im
presa prospera ha per se stessa indipendentem
ente dai 
beni suoi, o se vuolsi il m
aggior valore che acquistano questi beni in quanto 
trovansi congiunti insiem
e e im
piegati in m
odo proficuo oltre la m
isura 
norm
ale». 
«Finally, the active elem
ents of the last class that Fabio B
esta called 
com
plem
entary, m
ainly em
brace: the entity goodw
ill, w
hich is the value that 
the thriving entity has itself independently from
 its assets, or if w
illed the 
higher value that have these assets as joint together and used in a profitable 
w
ay beyond the norm
al m
easure». 
Sim
ilar definition of 
B
esta 
I fondam
enti della 
ragioneria, 1931: 123 
D
ELLA
 PEN
N
A
 «La stim
a dei frutti si applica anche all’avviam
ento se il valore 
dell’avviam
ento di un’im
presa è considerato pari alla som
m
a dei valori attuali 
di tutti i futuri sovraprofitti. N
ella pratica, d’ordinario, avviene questo: in 
vista della cessione di un’azienda e com
e base del contratto tra cedente e 
cessionario, fra im
presa societaria e socio, si fa l’analisi della sostanza, si 
considerano cioè distintam
ente nei loro valori i com
ponenti di essa: tanto, per 
le m
erci; tanto altro, per le m
acchine; ecc. non escludendo l’avviam
ento, 
perché l’azienda perm
ane; avviam
ento che nasce dalla buona organizzazione, 
dalla solerzia, dalla puntualità del personale, dall’onestà dell’im
prenditore, 
dalla oculata pubblicità, dalla felice ubicazione dei locali, dalle tendenze, 
dalle abitudini, dalle stravaganze del pubblico; avviam
ento che si m
anifesta 
nel buon nom
e, che si estrinseca nella clientela, che si risolve in sopraredditi 
futuri». 
«The estim
ate of the profits also applies to the goodw
ill if the value of the 
entity goodw
ill is considered to be equal to the sum
 of the present values of 
all the future excess-profits. In practice, ordinarily, it happens w
hat follow
s: 
in view
 of the sale of an entity and as the basis of the contract betw
een the 
acquiror and acquiree, betw
een com
pany and shareholder (ow
ner), you do the 
substance analysis, that is considering distinctly in their values the 
com
ponents of the com
pany: for the goods; for m
achines; etc. not excluding 
goodw
ill, because the com
pany rem
ains; goodw
ill that arises from
 good 
organization, diligence, staff punctuality, the honesty of the entrepreneur, the 
shrew
d advertising, the great location of the sites, tendencies, habits, public 
extravagancies; goodw
ill that is m
anifested in reputation, w
hich is expressed 
in custom
ers, w
hich results in future extra-profits». 
R
ecall to the valuation 
criteria used by B
esta 
I fondam
enti della 
ragioneria, 1931: 138 
O
N
ID
A
 
«L’avviam
ento, dunque, è l’espressione della redditibilità stessa dell’im
presa: 
piuttosto che com
e un bene a sé, esso può concepirsi com
e un attuale m
odo di 
essere ed un presunto m
odo di divenire (secondo le possibili previsioni), 
dell’im
presa o, se vuolsi, della coordinazione di tutti i fattori (la dim
ensione e 
la qualità degli im
pianti, l’ubicazione degli stabilim
enti e dei negozi di 
vendita, l’andam
ento dei m
ercati, la clientela, la ditta, la qualità delle persone 
che dirigono l’im
presa, l’abilità e la fedeltà delle m
aestranze; i rapporti 
dell’azienda con altre, relativi ad acquisti, vendite o “finanziam
enti”, ecc., 
ecc.), di tutti i fattori, diciam
o, che concorreranno a determ
inare la 
“redditibilità dell’im
presa”». 
«G
oodw
ill, therefore, is an expression of the sam
e firm
 profitability: rather 
than as an asset in itself, it can be conceived as a present w
ay of being and a 
supposed w
ay to becom
e (according to the possible forecasts), of the firm
 or, 
if you w
ill, of the coordination of all the factors (the facilities’ size and 
quality, establishm
ents’ and shops’ location, m
arket trends, custom
ers, the 
com
pany nam
e, the quality of the people m
anaging the firm
, skill and loyalty 
of the w
orkers, the relationship w
ith other firm
s, pertaining to purchases, 
sales or "loans", etc.), of all the factors, let’s say, that w
ill help to determ
ine 
the firm
 profitability». 
A
 current w
ay of being 
and a supposed w
ay to 
becom
e 
I finanziam
enti iniziali 
di im
presa, 1931: 388 
O
N
ID
A
 
«In vero, se con le suaccennate nozioni si volesse sem
plicem
ente esprim
ere 
che la “redditività” dell’im
presa in funzionam
ento, e quindi il valore di 
questa, risultano dal concorso di elem
enti m
olteplici, non solo m
ateriali m
a 
anche im
m
ateriali, o m
eglio derivano dalla coordinazione degli uni agli altri e 
si volesse riserbare il nom
e di avviam
ento a questo o a quello degli elem
enti 
im
m
ateriali, od al com
plesso di essi, od al risultato della coordinazione di 
tutti gli elem
enti, m
ateriali ed im
m
ateriali, non vi sarebbe che da discutere 
«A
ctually, if w
ith the above-m
entioned notions you sim
ply w
ant to express 
that the "profitability" of the going-concern firm
, and then its value, result 
from
 the com
bination of m
any elem
ents, not only m
aterial but also 
im
m
aterial, or rather [they] result from
 the coordination of to each other and 
w
ant to give the nam
e goodw
ill to this or that intangible item
s, or to the 
com
plex of them
, or the result of the coordination of all the elem
ents, tangible 
and intangible, there w
ould have to be discussed of the m
ore or less 
Im
m
aterial elem
ent 
I finanziam
enti iniziali 
di im
presa, 1931: 380 
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sull’uso più o m
eno appropriato della parola avviam
ento in questo o in quel 
senso. O
gni altra disputa verrebbe, peraltro, elim
inata quando si dichiarasse il 
significato che a quella parola si vuol dare». 
appropriate use of the w
ord goodw
ill in this or that w
ay. Every other dispute 
w
ould, how
ever, elim
inated w
hen you declare the m
eaning you w
ant to give 
to that w
ord». 
V
IA
N
ELLO
 
«L’avere un negozio avviato vuol dire, per un com
m
erciante, guadagnare più 
degli altri che non si trovano in questa condizione; avere di fronte agli altri 
com
m
ercianti, un profitto o reddito com
m
erciale m
aggiore; avere cioè un 
extra reddito o un extraprofitto» 
«H
aving a business w
ith goodw
ill m
eans, for a trader, earning m
ore than the 
others that are not in this condition; have com
pared to other traders, a higher 
profit or com
m
ercial incom
e; that is, to have an extra-incom
e or extra-profit». Extra-profit; 
Essential com
plem
ent 
Istituzioni di 
ragioneria generale, 
1932: 49 
D
'A
LV
ISE 
«E veniam
o ora ad una aspettativa più discussa, ad una aspettativa generale 
attiva, che si trova soltanto nelle così dette im
prese. A
bbiam
o notato che esse 
hanno per fine il lucro. O
ra, fino a che il lucro che si aspetta, si giudica non 
essere superiore alla norm
alità, non si parla di im
presa ben avviata; se invece 
il lucro è superiore a quello norm
ale dei capitali im
piegati nell’am
biente in 
cui opera l’azienda, allora si dice che l’im
presa è ben avviata, ed 
all’avviam
ento suo si bada com
e ad una caratteristica del suo com
plesso 
econom
ico». 
«A
nd now
 let’s deal w
ith a m
ore discussed expectation, w
ith a general active 
expectation, w
hich is found only in the so-called firm
s. W
e noticed that they 
have as aim
 the profit. N
ow
, until the profit w
e expect, is judged not to be 
higher than norm
al, w
e do not talk about w
ell-started firm
; but if the profit is 
higher than the norm
al capital invested in the environm
ent in w
hich the firm
 
operates, then it is said that the firm
 is w
ell-started, and w
e consider its 
goodw
ill [w
ell-started firm
] as a feature of the w
hole econom
ic com
plex». 
A
ctive expectation 
Principi e precetti di 
ragioneria, 1934: 100 
D
E G
O
B
B
IS 
«Q
uando l’azienda è acquistata per una som
m
a superiore di quella che 
rappresenta il suo netto, l’eccesso del prezzo pagato sul netto rappresenta il 
costo dell’avviam
ento. La m
aggior som
m
a pagata non può dirsi perduta, se 
l’azienda che possiede una folla di clienti soddisfatti dovrà nell’avvenire, 
spendere, per pubblicità, m
eno di quello che dovrebbe spendere, se dovesse 
costituirsi, faticosam
ente, a poco a poco, una nuova clientela, se il nuovo 
proprietario di essa può contare fino dal prim
o giorno sopra dei redditi 
verosim
ilm
ente sicuri, sui quali non potrebbe contare, forse per m
olto tem
po 
e forse m
ai, se avesse proceduto all’im
pianto di un’azienda nuova». 
«W
hen the com
pany is acquired for a sum
 higher than its equity, the excess 
of the price paid over the equity is the cost of goodw
ill. The higher sum
 paid 
cannot be said to be lost, if the com
pany that ow
ns a crow
d of satisfied 
custom
ers w
ill have in the future, spending for advertising, less than you 
w
ould spend if you w
ere to build up, painfully, gradually, a new
 custom
ers, if 
the new
 ow
ner of it can count since the first day on probably safe incom
e, on 
w
hich it could have not relied on, perhaps for a long tim
e and m
aybe never, if 
he proceeded to the establishm
ent of a new
 com
pany». 
Special elem
ent 
R
agioneria generale. 
C
orso teorico pratico, 
1939: 22/23 
D
E M
IN
IC
O
 
A
M
O
D
EO
 
«Si denom
ina così il m
aggior valore che si ritiene abbia l’im
presa rispetto a 
quello che avrebbe in condizioni norm
ali, in conseguenza di alcune 
circostanze che si reputa avranno influenza sul reddito futuro dell’im
presa 
stessa». 
«It is referred to as the higher value that is believed to have the com
pany than 
it w
ould under norm
al conditions, as a result of som
e circum
stances w
hich it 
are believed w
ill have influence on the future incom
e of the sam
e com
pany». H
igher value of the 
firm
 
Saggi di econom
ia 
delle aziende, 1942: 
77 
D
E M
IN
IC
O
 
«Il valore attuale, calcolato sulla base di un tasso norm
ale di capitalizzazione, 
dei sopraredditi avvenire risultanti dalle eccedenze dei previsti redditi 
effettivi d’im
presa sui presunti redditi norm
ali, costituirebbe il valore 
dell’avviam
ento. La capitalizzazione della corrente effettiva dei redditi 
avvenire adduce al valore capitale lim
ite; la capitalizzazione della corrente 
norm
ale di reddito determ
ina il valore del capitale infra-lim
ite; la differenza 
dei due valori capitali individua il valore attuale dei futuri sopraredditi. 
Sicchè il valore dell’avviam
ento costituirebbe la fonte del flusso dei 
sopraredditi futuri; il valore del capitale infra-lim
ite quella del flusso di 
reddito norm
ale avvenire, e il valore capitale lim
ite la fonte della futura 
«The present value, calculated on the basis of a norm
al capitalization rate of 
the future extra-profits resulting from
 the higher actual expected incom
e than 
the predicted norm
al incom
e, w
ould constitute the goodw
ill value. The 
capitalization of the actual future incom
e flow
 leads to the equity lim
it-value; 
the capitalization of the norm
al incom
e flow
 determ
ines the equity value 
interim
-lim
it; the difference betw
een the tw
o equity values identifies the 
present value of future extra-profits. H
ence, the goodw
ill value w
ould be the 
source of the future extra-profits flow
; the equity value interim
-lim
it w
ould 
be the source of the norm
al future incom
e, and the equity value lim
it the 
source of the future expected value flow
. (...) The w
ill, w
ith an im
aginary 
Source of the future 
extra-profits flow
 
U
na picconata 
all’avviam
ento, 1946: 
11/12 
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corrente del valore atteso. (…
) Il volere, con una linea im
m
aginaria 
longitudinale, separare nel corso del tem
po il flusso di reddito effettivo in due 
flussi di reddito com
ponenti, l’uno norm
ale, l’altro dei sopraredditi e far 
derivare, in conseguenza, il valore capitale infra-lim
ite al prim
o flusso 
com
ponente e il valore dell’avviam
ento al secondo, scindendo così in due il 
valore capitale lim
ite, poggia sulla possibilità di fram
m
entare il reddito e in 
corrispondenza frantum
are il valore capitale». 
longitudinal line, to separate over the tim
e the actual incom
e flow
 into tw
o 
incom
e flow
s com
ponents, one norm
al, the other one of the extra-profits and 
deriving, as a consequence, for the first com
ponent the interim
-lim
it equity 
value and for the second the goodw
ill value, splitting so in tw
o parts the 
equity lim
it-value, is based on the possibility to fragm
ent the incom
e and 
correspondingly to break up the equity value». 
O
N
ID
A
 
«L’azienda si dice bene o m
ale avviata a secondo che la sua redditività si 
giudichi soddisfacente o insoddisfacente; più o m
eno bene avviata secondo 
che la sua redditività si presum
a più o m
eno elevata». 
«The firm
 is said w
ell- or bad-started depending on w
hether its profitability is 
judged satisfactory or unsatisfactory; m
ore or less w
ell-started depending on 
w
hether its profitability is presum
ed to be higher or low
er». 
Proportional to 
profitability 
L’avviam
ento nelle 
valutazioni di cessione 
o di liquidazione di 
azienda, 1949 
M
A
SI 
«Più specialm
ente l’avviam
ento si presenta com
e la differenza fra due valori: 
quello speso per rilevare un’azienda avviata e quello che è stato determ
inato 
valutando le varie attività e passività rispettivam
ente in base ai costi che si 
sosterrebbero per costituirle e al valore dei crediti al netto dei debiti che 
gravino su di esse». 
«M
ore especially the goodw
ill is presented as the difference betw
een tw
o 
values: the one spent to acquire a com
pany started and the one that w
as 
determ
ined by evaluating the various assets and liabilities, respectively, 
basing on the costs that w
ould be incurred to establish them
 and to the value 
of the receivables net debt w
hich burden on them
». 
D
ifference betw
een 
tw
o values 
R
agioneria generale, 
1954: 115 
A
M
A
D
U
ZZI 
«Se poniam
o noto il valore attribuito al capitale con criterio della presunta 
liquidazione dei suoi singoli cespiti attivi e passivi, ovvero anche con criterio 
del presunto realizzo ed estinzione com
piuta attraverso il funzionam
ento 
aziendale, e chiam
iam
o C
l  o C
 tale valore; se poniam
o altresì noto il valore 
attribuito , com
e bene unico in funzione della sua capacità di reddito, al 
com
plesso aziendale, e lo chiam
iam
o C
e ; ci dom
andiam
o che cosa rappresenti 
la differenza, che può essere positiva o negativa tra C
e  e C
l o C
. Poniam
o che 
C
e sia superiore a C
l prendendo C
l  a secondo term
ine del rapporto. 
L’eccedenza del valore del capitale econom
ico del com
plesso, rispetto al 
valore del capitale delle singole parti patrim
oniali che lo com
pongono, indica 
di quanto l’insiem
e vale più della som
m
a delle parti. In term
ini patrim
oniali, 
l’insiem
e è un capitale e le parti sono com
ponenti di capitale, m
a poiché la 
categoria econom
ica “capitale” dipende dalla categoria econom
ica “reddito”, 
l’increm
ento di valore capitale rispetto al valore capitale delle singole sui 
parti dipende dall’essere il reddito dell’insiem
e superiore alla som
m
a dei 
redditi delle singole parti che cooperano alla sua produzione, parti di capitale 
e di lavoro. D
’altronde l’increm
ento di reddito dell’insiem
e, rispetto alla 
som
m
a dei redditi di capitale e di lavoro che confluiscono all’insiem
e, è il 
reddito che spetta all’organizzazione, forza creatrice dell’im
presa, senza della 
quale capitale e lavoro non sarebbero fecondi. La differenza fra C
e e C
l  nel 
caso di C
e > C
l  costituisce il valore capitale attribuibile – nell’am
bito della 
esistenza del valore del com
plesso – all’avviam
ento che può dirsi, in riflesso 
«If w
e suppose know
n the value attributed to the capital w
ith the criterion of 
the alleged liquidation of its individual assets and liabilities, or also w
ith the 
criterion of the presum
able realization and extinction accom
plished through 
the firm
 operation, and w
e call that value C
l  or C
; if w
e suppose also know
n 
the value attributed, as unique com
plex in term
s of its ability to generate 
incom
e, to the firm
 com
plex, and w
e call C
e ; w
e w
onder w
hat constitutes the 
difference, w
hich can be positive or negative, betw
een C
e  and C
l  or C
. 
Suppose C
e  exceeds C
l  taking C
l  as the second term
 of the relationship. The 
excess of the equity value of the com
plex, com
pared to the value of the 
econom
ic capital of the individual parts that m
ake it up, indicates how
 m
uch 
the w
hole is w
orth m
ore than the sum
 of its parts. In balance sheet term
s, the 
w
hole is a capital and the parts are com
ponents of capital, but as the 
econom
ic category “capital” depends on the econom
ic category “incom
e”, the 
increase in capital value com
pared to the capital value of the individual parts 
depends on being the incom
e of the w
hole greater than the sum
 of the incom
e 
of the individual parts that cooperate in its production, parts of capital and 
labour. B
esides the increase of incom
e of the w
hole, com
pared to the sum
 of 
the incom
e from
 capital and labour that flow
 to the w
hole, is the incom
e that 
is up to the organization, creative force of the enterprise, w
ithout w
hich 
capital and labour w
ould not be fruitful. The difference betw
een C
e  and C
l  in 
the case of C
e > C
l  is the capital value attributable - as part of the existence of 
the value of the com
plex – to the goodw
ill that can be said, in reflection of the C
ondition that allow
s 
the com
pany to obtain 
profits higher than the 
sum
 of the incom
es of 
the parts that flow
 into 
the com
pany  
Teoria della 
valutazione dei 
com
plessi aziendali e 
dell’avviam
ento, 
Estratto dalla “R
ivista 
di Politica 
Econom
ica” 1955: 5 
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al reddito che il capitale esprim
e, quella condizione per cui l’im
presa (o il 
com
plesso) consente un reddito superiore alla som
m
a dei redditi delle parti 
che vi confluiscono». 
incom
e that the capital expresses, that condition for w
hich the enterprise (or 
com
plex) allow
s an incom
e greater than the sum
 of the incom
es of the parts 
that flow
 into [the enterprise]». 
A
M
A
D
U
ZZI 
«La condizione per la quale l’azienda è atta a produrre redditi che significano 
econom
icam
ente profitti; cioè che siano superiori a quelli richiesti dal 
m
inim
o della convenienza econom
ica; superiori a quella m
isura che rim
uneri 
capitali, energie personali, grado di rischio econom
ico». 
«The condition for w
hich the com
pany is liable to produce incom
e that m
ean 
econom
ically profits; that is, that they are higher than those required by the 
m
inim
um
 of econom
ic convenience; higher than that extent that rew
ards the 
capital, personal energies, level of econom
ic risk».  
C
ondition that allow
s 
the com
pany to obtain 
profits 
L’azienda nel suo 
sistem
a e nell’ordine 
delle sue rilevazioni, 
1963: 96 
D
’IPPO
LITO
 
«Più particolarm
ente, le im
prese che consideriam
o sono quelle dette in 
avviam
ento, od anche avviate. In tali im
prese, secondo una definizione per 
più aspetti criticabile m
a utile per un prim
o chiarim
ento d’idee, il sistem
a di 
operazioni ed in genere l’am
m
inistrazione si svolge così favorevolm
ente, che 
è possibile conseguire un reddito relativam
ente superiore a quello che può 
essere ottenuto da im
prese analoghe funzionanti sullo stesso m
ercato e non 
ugualm
ente avviate, o solo all’inizio del processo di avviam
ento o, com
unque 
un reddito superiore a quello che potrebbe essere la rim
unerazione “norm
ale” 
dei capitali investiti» 
«M
ore particularly, the com
panies that w
e consider are those called w
ith 
goodw
ill, or even [w
ell-]started. In these com
panies, according to a definition 
in m
any respects questionable but useful for a first ideas clarification, the 
system
 of operations and in general the adm
inistration takes place so 
favourably, that you can achieve an incom
e relatively higher than the one that 
can be achieved by sim
ilar com
panies operating in the sam
e m
arket and also 
equally started, or only at the beginning of the start-up process, or at least a 
higher incom
e than the rem
uneration that w
ould be "norm
al" for the invested 
capital».  
Incom
e relatively 
higher than the one 
that can be achieved 
by sim
ilar com
panies 
La valutazione delle 
aziende in 
avviam
ento, 1955: 2. 
 For a sim
ilar 
definition see also: 
L’avviam
ento, 1963: 
8-9. 
D
’IPPO
LITO
 
«Q
ui interessa ferm
arsi brevem
ente a identificare il contenuto 
dell’avviam
ento, del quale si vorrebbe stim
are o “determ
inare” il prezzo 
distinto. Tale identificazione in term
ini non equivoci, ed anche soltanto in 
term
ini sufficientem
ente approssim
ati per consentire una stim
a inequivoca, 
m
anca nella dottrina econom
ico-aziendale com
e, del resto, m
anca in quella 
giuridica. Si crede di supplire a tale m
ancanza con l’indicazione dei così detti 
“fattori di avviam
ento”, con la indicazione cioè delle “cause” che sarebbero o 
dovrebbero considerarsi diretta fonte dell’avviam
ento». 
«H
ere it is interesting stopping briefly to identify the contents of goodw
ill, of 
w
hich one w
ould like to estim
ate or "determ
ine" the separate price. This 
identification in unequivocal term
s, and even just in term
s sufficiently 
approxim
ated in order to estim
ate unequivocally, is lacking in the “econom
ia-
aziendale” doctrine as, indeed, is lacking in the legal discipline. It is believed 
to m
ake up for this lack w
ith the indication of the so-called "factors of 
goodw
ill", that is w
ith the indication of the "causes" that w
ould or should be 
considered a direct source of goodw
ill». 
It is not sufficient the 
indication of the so-
called "factors of 
goodw
ill" 
La valutazione delle 
aziende in 
avviam
ento, 1955: 6 
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PO
N
ZA
N
ELLI 
«(…
) l’avviam
ento coincide con la notorietà che l’im
presa si form
a 
nell’am
biente, affidata in prevalenza alla capacità di chi ha la responsabilità 
della gestione e pertanto legata ai fattori soggettivi di correttezza, 
avvedutezza, senso dell’opportunità , facoltà di intuizione e di previsione, 
percezione degli aspetti delle circostanze, facilità di com
prensione degli 
interessi altrui. (…
) L’esistenza di elem
enti m
ateriali di proprietà 
dell’im
presa quali im
pianti, attrezzature, strum
enti, utensili, m
aterie, 
m
agazzini e negozi non ha invece alcuna im
portanza per l’avviam
ento 
dell’im
presa». 
«C
i sem
bra pertanto di poter afferm
are che il calcolo del valore di 
avviam
ento, ossia del valore dell’elem
ento astratto vivificatore e 
valorizzatore di “una coordinazione econom
ica in atto”, non debba di 
necessità essere equiparato al calcolo del valore di quella speciale capacità di 
un’im
presa di offrire profitti superiori a quelli prodotti dalla m
edia delle 
im
prese di quel tipo. Tutte le im
prese che non sono giunte al lim
ite della 
ragione di loro esistenza hanno un valore di avviam
ento positivo, nullo, o 
negativo. Se positivo, quel valore sarà ovviam
ente tanto m
aggiore quanto più 
accentuati sono gli effetti della esistenza dello stato di fatto di “im
presa 
avviata”, cioè di “im
presa già esistente e funzionante”, ossia quanto m
aggiori 
sono i profitti». 
«(...) The goodw
ill coincides w
ith the reputation that the com
pany form
s in 
the environm
ent, w
hich is entrusted m
ainly to the ability of those having the 
m
anagem
ent accountability and therefore linked to the subjective factors of 
fairness, prudence, a sense of opportunity, right insight and foresight skills, 
perception of the aspects of the circum
stances, ease of understanding of the 
interests of others. (...) The existence of tangible assets ow
ned by the 
com
pany such as plant, equipm
ent, instrum
ents, tools, m
aterials, stores and 
shops has not any im
portance for the goodw
ill of the com
pany». 
«There seem
s therefore to say that the calculation of goodw
ill, i.e. the value 
of the abstract life-giving and really-values elem
ent of "an econom
ic 
coordination in place", should not necessarily be equated w
ith the calculation 
of the value of that special capabilities of a firm
 to produce profits higher than 
those produced by the average firm
s of that type. A
ll com
panies that have not 
reached the lim
it of their existence reason have goodw
ill positive, null, or 
negative. If positive, that value w
ill obviously be greater the m
ore 
pronounced are the effects of the existence of the status quo of "firm
 w
ith 
goodw
ill", that is of "existing and running firm
", i.e. the higher the profits». 
C
om
pany reputation 
        A
bstract life-giving 
and really-values 
elem
ent of "an 
econom
ic coordination 
in place" 
L’avviam
ento, bene 
im
m
ateriale, in N
ote 
di econom
ia aziendale, 
R
om
a, 1955: 7-10 
A
R
D
EM
A
N
I 
«L’avviam
ento può cioè essere inteso com
e la prospettiva di durevoli redditi 
futuri alla luce di fattori econom
ico-finanziari attuali». 
«The goodw
ill can be intended as the prospect of durable future incom
e in 
light of current econom
ic and financial factors». 
Prospect of durable 
future incom
e  
L’avviam
ento 
dell’im
presa, 1958: 26 
PO
N
ZA
N
ELLI 
«N
el caso dell’avviam
ento, l’attribuzione di valore in occasione della 
cessione dell’im
presa è inscindibile dalla attribuzione di valore all’im
presa; 
anzi, è stato già afferm
ato che il valore dell’uno uguaglia o si avvicina m
olto 
al valore dell’altra. N
é si tratta di attribuire valore ai possibili lucri futuri, 
bensì all’organizzazione dell’im
presa, per raggiungere la quale furono 
sostenute, in fase di costituzione, ed oltre, spese non m
aterializzate in alcun 
oggetto specifico concorrenti a creare e a prolungare nel tem
po le m
igliori 
condizioni di efficienza. L’identificazione del valore di avviam
ento colla 
possibilità di conseguire lucri futuri potrebbe, in sede di determ
inazione, 
essere considerata com
e “vendita di cosa sperata” per conseguire la quale 
esistono prem
esse necessarie (…
). Il fondam
ento della valutazione 
dell’avviam
ento è quindi nell’esistente organizzazione ceduta coll’im
presa». 
«In the case of goodw
ill, the attribution of value upon the disposal of the firm
 
is inseparable from
 the attribution of value to the firm
; indeed, it w
as stated 
that the value of one equals or is very close to the value of the other. N
or it 
deals w
ith attributing value to the possible future gains, but to the firm
 
organization, for w
hich there w
ere incurred, in the constitution phase, 
expenses not m
aterialized into any specific object useful to create and extend 
in the tim
e the best efficiency conditions. The identification of the goodw
ill 
value w
ith the possibility of achieving future gains could, in the [incom
e] 
determ
ination phase, be regarded as the "sale of w
hat hoped" to achieve 
w
hich exist necessary prem
ises (...). The basis of the goodw
ill evaluation is 
then in the existing organization sold w
ith the firm
». 
The basis of the 
goodw
ill evaluation is 
then in the existing 
organization sold w
ith 
the firm
 
Sul problem
a della 
esistenza, della 
determ
inazione e della 
contabilizzazione del 
valore di avviam
ento 
nelle im
prese, 1959: 
441-442 
A
M
O
D
EO
 
«Si identifichi il valore econom
ico del capitale dell’im
presa in esam
e; si 
raffronti tale valore al valore «contabile» del capitale di quella, così com
e 
appare dedotto negli strum
enti contabili suoi: la differenza tra i due valori è il «Let’s identify the equity econom
ic value of the com
pany in question; 
com
pare this value to the equity «book» value, as it appears in its accounting 
tools: the difference betw
een the tw
o values is the goodw
ill value. A
 first 
 D
ifference betw
een 
equity econom
ic and 
A
vviam
ento e riserva 
occulta: un 
accostam
ento, 1960: 
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valore dell’avviam
ento. U
na prim
a osservazione si presenta spontanea: quella 
differenza in che andrebbe sintetizzando il valore dell’avviam
ento può essere 
positiva o negativa (…
)». 
observation appears spontaneously: that difference that w
ould synthesize the 
goodw
ill value m
ay be positive or negative (…
)». 
book values 
39 
A
M
O
D
EO
 
«(…
) nel capitale vengono a determ
inarsi, per così dire, due settori o gruppi 
di valori: l’uno, costituito dai valori di tutti i beni, crediti e debiti della 
im
presa ed espresso sinteticam
ente nel capitale netto a com
porre il quale non 
abbia concorso il valore di avviam
ento, ed al quale deve riconoscersi attributo 
in derivazione il reddito norm
ale; e l’altro, costituito dall’unico valore 
dell’avviam
ento, al quale deve ritenersi attributo in derivazione in sopra-
reddito. C
iascuno coglie l’assurdo di queste pur naturali conclusioni: perché 
giam
m
ai potrà esser dato di scernere, entro il reddito unitario, quote riferibili 
a questo o a quell’elem
ento del capitale». 
«(…
) in the capital are determ
ined, if w
e m
ay say, tw
o sectors or groups of 
values: one, m
ade up by the values of all the assets, receivables and payables 
of the com
pany and synthetically expressed in the net assets to w
hich did not 
contributed the goodw
ill value, and to w
hich m
ust be considered as attribute 
the derived regular incom
e; and another, m
ade up by the only goodw
ill value, 
to w
hich m
ust be considered as attribute derived in the extra-incom
e. 
Everyone understands the absurdity of these natural conclusions: because it 
never w
ill be given to distinguish, in the unitary incom
e, portions related to 
this or that elem
ent of capital». 
Extra-incom
e 
R
agioneria generale 
delle im
prese 1964: 
814 
C
EC
C
H
ER
ELLI «Fra le spese che si com
prendono sotto la denom
inazione di spese d’im
pianto 
si usa collocare anche quelle che spesso si sostengono in caso di acquisto, per 
il m
aggior valore attribuito ad un’im
presa funzionante. Si tratta, com
e si 
vede, di una spesa d’im
pianto di natura particolare, che solo in alcuni casi si 
verifica e che potrebbe, in questi casi, per m
aggior chiarezza, form
are oggetto 
di una distinta categoria di valori che opportunam
ente si potrebbero 
raccogliere, com
e spesso si fa, sotto la voce “avviam
ento”». 
«A
m
ong the expenses that are included under the nam
e of installation costs 
w
e are used to place also those that w
e often sustain in the case of purchase, 
for the higher value attributed to a functioning firm
. It is, as w
e can see, of a 
particular installation expense, w
hich occurs only in som
e cases and that m
ay, 
in these cases, for higher clarity, be the subject of a distinct category of values 
that could be appropriately com
prised, as it is often done, under the item
 
“goodw
ill”». 
Particular installation 
cost 
Le istituzioni di 
ragioneria, 1966: 327 
C
EC
C
H
ER
ELLI «…
econom
icam
ente, l’avviam
ento non è com
ponente patrim
oniale che possa 
disgiungersi o pensarsi separato dal com
plesso aziendale per assum
ere una 
posizione autonom
a. Esso fa parte del com
plesso, non com
e elem
ento 
aggiunto che si possa, quando si voglia, incorporare nel patrim
onio, m
a nel 
com
plesso e nelle sue m
anifestazioni di vita, trova origine spontanea ed in 
quanto la forza vitale del com
plesso stesso sia capace di generarlo». 
«The goodw
ill cannot be thought as an asset, w
hich stands alone from
 the 
com
pany com
plex. The goodw
ill is part of the com
pany com
plex and is not 
an elem
ent that can be added in the capital as m
uch as one likes. H
ence, the 
goodw
ill has a spontaneous origin in the com
pany com
plex and in the vital 
pow
er of the sam
e com
pany com
plex that is able to generate it». 
It is not an asset 
Le funzioni 
professionali del 
com
m
ercialista, 1967: 
175 
G
U
A
TR
I 
«Le discipline econom
iche già da tem
po hanno spiegato, nel m
odo più 
elem
entare, il fenom
eno, dim
ostrando com
e un insiem
e di elem
enti disposti 
ed organizzati per il raggiungim
ento di un fine possa avere un valore diverso 
dalla som
m
a dei valori dei singoli elem
enti, essendo tale m
aggiore o m
inore 
valore determ
inato dall’efficienza della coordinazione degli elem
enti in vista 
del raggiungim
ento del fine loro proposto. Il concetto di “avviam
ento” è 
dunque strettam
ente connesso con l’efficienza delle coordinazioni aziendali, 
cioè con la loro varia attitudine al raggiungim
ento del fine pel quale sono 
sorte». 
«Precisam
ente l’avviam
ento può essere definito com
e la differenza in un dato 
istante, tra il valore globale dell’im
presa ed il valore m
edio, opportunam
ente 
calcolato, della som
m
a algebrica degli elem
enti attivi e passivi che 
com
pongono il capitale d’im
presa». 
«The econom
ic disciplines already since long tim
e have explained, in the 
m
ost elem
entary w
ay, the phenom
enon, dem
onstrating how
 a set of elem
ents 
arranged and organized for the attainm
ent of a goal can have a value different 
from
 the sum
 of the values of the individual elem
ents, being such greater or 
lesser value determ
ined by the efficiency of the elem
ents coordination in the 
pursuit of their stated purpose. The concept of “goodw
ill” is therefore closely 
connected w
ith the efficiency of the firm
 coordinations, that is, w
ith their 
varied aptitude to achieve the purpose for w
hich have arisen». 
"Precisely goodw
ill can be defined as the difference at a given tim
e, betw
een 
the global value of the firm
 and the average value, properly calculated, of the 
sum
 of the assets and liabilities that m
ake up the firm
 capital». 
Efficiency of the 
elem
ents coordination 
La m
isurazione del 
valore di avviam
ento 
nelle im
prese, in 
«R
isparm
io», 1954-
1955-1956 
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SA
N
TESSO
 
«La nozione di avviam
ento […
] – com
e differenza tra il capitale netto a 
valori correnti e il costo sostenuto dalla società investitrice – non va confusa 
con il «plusvalore di avviam
ento» esprim
ente la relazione che lega il capitale 
proprio dell’im
presa con il valore del suo capitale econom
ico. Proponiam
o di 
denom
inare il prim
o concetto “sovraprezzo di avviam
ento”».  
The notion of goodw
ill [...] – as the difference betw
een the equity at current 
values and the cost incurred by the investing firm
 – should not to be confused 
w
ith the “surplus value of goodw
ill” expressing the relationship betw
een the 
equity of the com
pany and the value of its econom
ic capital. W
e propose to 
call the first concept “goodw
ill prem
ium
”. 
D
istinction betw
een 
“surplus value of 
goodw
ill” and 
“goodw
ill prem
ium
” 
V
alutazione di 
bilancio: aspetti 
econom
ico-aziendali e 
giuridici, 1992 
C
A
TTU
R
I 
«Se il patrim
onio aziendale è un sistem
a, allora assum
e rilevanza il disegno 
com
binatorio che presiede alla scelta delle sue singole parti e le m
odalità 
seguite nell’aggregazione degli elem
enti che lo costituiscono, l’efficacia 
nell’acquisizione di alcuni di essi piuttosto che di altri, l’efficienza nelle 
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a anche il clim
a che si instaura nella com
unità aziendale…
i 
singoli elem
enti patrim
oniali perdono la loro individualità per costituire parte 
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a unitario, il cui valore si basa su quello contabile, m
a che da esso 
se ne discosta in m
odo più o m
eno significativo a seconda dell’im
portanza 
che viene attribuita a quegli aspetti di intangibilità». 
«The com
pany’s equity is a system
 so it is relevant the com
binatorial design 
that is at the base of the single choices and the m
odalities follow
ed to 
aggregate the item
s that com
pose the equity, the effectiveness in the 
acquisition of som
e resources instead of others, the efficiency in the use of 
the resources, but also the clim
ate that is established in the com
pany. That 
w
ay the single item
 (asset) loses its autonom
y and constitutes part of a unitary 
system
, w
hose value is based on the book value, but it, m
ore or less, m
oves 
aw
ay from
 it according to the relevance that have the intangible resources». 
The notion of goodw
ill 
is underlying the value 
of intangible resources Principi di Econom
ia 
A
ziendale, 2012 
Source: ow
n elaboration 
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Notes to Chapter 1 
I. It is opportune to acknowledge that all translations must be considered with caution, they are an 
approximation of the Italian Authors’ words and as such they may be contestable. However, the 
original Italian texts of all the quotations are available on request. 
II. In line with other historical studies in certain part of the first chapter I do not translate the term 
“Azienda” because of its peculiarities that does not find a perfectly corresponding translation in 
English (Sargiacomo et al., 2012; Alexander and Servalli, 2011; Capalbo and Clarke, 2006; 
Zambon and Zan, 2000; Viganò, 1994). Nonetheless, throughout the chapter I sometimes proxy 
the term “Azienda” by using the words “firm”, “company”, “concern” or “entity”. The foremost 
exponent of the concept of “Azienda” was Gino Zappa (1927) who advanced Economia Aziendale 
as «the science that studies the conditions of existence and manifestations of the life of the 
“Azienda”, the science of the economic administrations of the “Azienda”, in short, Economia 
Aziendale is our science». The Author defines “Azienda” as «the economic coordination 
established and set up to satisfy human needs» (Zappa, 1927: 54) and as «the economic institute 
destined to last that, for the satisfaction of human need, organize and carry out in continuous 
coordination the production or the procurement and the consumption of the wealth» (Zappa, 
1956: 37). Economia Aziendale is made up by three functions: a) gestione (operations), b) 
direzione (management), and c) controllo (control). Thus, considering the wide significance of 
the concept Economia Aziendale in line with prior literature I do not translate the concept (e.g. 
Zan, 1994; Viganò 1994; Sargiacomo et al., 2012). 
III. “Sistema patrimoniale-atomistico” is translated with atomistic or equity-based system as it refers 
to the interpretation of events as mere changes in net worth. This approach is sometimes also 
referred to with worth-based, owner’s equity-based, patrimonialistic or proprietorship system and 
equity-centred accounting system (See Viganò 1994; Galassi and Mattessich, 2004; Sargiacomo 
et al. 2012). 
IV. As the term “operazioni di gestione” does not have an equivalent in English, I sometimes do not 
translate it preferring the Italian term or approximate the translation with “management 
operations”. However, the translation needs some clarification. As underlines Viganò (1994) 
«…gestione presents two aspects: a) “subjective”, which refers to the activity and decisions of 
concern staff, most at a high level. The perspective is the one of the decision-makers, of 
managers. Its exact translation is “management”; b) “objective”, which refers to events occurring 
in the concern. It deals with facts, to what really occurs daily in the concern. It examines the 
dynamics of real trends, that is of processes. Its English equivalent could be “operations”». 
V. “Capitale di funzionamento” is translated with “total assets” or “net assets”, depending on the 
intention of the Italian Authors, as they sometimes refer to the total investment of the firm or to 
its equity. 
VI. Table 1.1 summarising the main goodwill delineations provided by some of the Italian 
“Economisti Aziendali” have not the intent to enclose diverse Authors within the boundaries of 
restricted models or classifications. Indeed, the scope of Table 1.1 is to provide a recollection on 
the main Italian accounting Schools through the evolution on the goodwill conception. Hence, 
even though the definitions are enclosed within the rigid limits of a table, they should be 
interpreted as a continuum (or a definite departure) from an Author to another on the goodwill 
conception and overall, on the logics underlying the equity and income measurements. 
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2. The research design and methodology   
 
The methodology has to be considered as one of the 
research key variables. We can define it as a 
strategic variable because it is able to directly affect 
the quality of the investigation process by placing it 
in line with the times of the scientific knowledge and 
by aligning it with the space and time circumstances 
with which it is connected. 
Ferraris Franceschi, 1998 
 
(…) Accounting is an activity carried out by people 
and one cannot generate a theory that predicts and 
explains accounting phenomena by ignoring the 
incentives of the individuals who account. 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1990  !
 !!
2.1. Theoretical framework !
In the first chapter I have adopted a constructivist epistemological position as I 
aimed at interpreting the thought of several past accounting scholars. Through the 
narrative analysis of Italian accounting textbooks I have attempted to construct the 
interpretation of the “equity economic value” and “goodwill” of selected Authors. I 
have then linked these different concepts to the existing concepts of “goodwill” and 
of “impairment test”. The interpretation of these notions might constitute a 
preliminary basic analysis of some critical matters that arises in our national 
“Economia Aziendale” tradition. This exploration might also help to interpret some 
topical issues in accounting theory and practice. 
In the third chapter, instead, I adopt a positivist epistemological stance. Indeed, the 
research carried out in the third chapter takes on a deductive approach, investigating 
the cause-effect relationship between an accounting decision (i.e. the impairment of 
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goodwill) and the corporate governance system. Hence, starting from an overall 
theory I develop specific propositions and predictions and then I verify these 
hypotheses. The theory underlying all my empirical research is the agency theory 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Since the pivotal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
agency theory has been the theoretical basis of most accounting and corporate 
governance studies (Filatotchev and Wright, 2010). Along with the agency theory to 
the stipulation of a contract between the firm and any subject (e.g. investors, debt 
holders, employees, auditors, managers, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial 
Officer, etc.) stems an agency-relation; the contract indeed gives rise to a relation 
between the “principal” and the “agent”. The separation of ownership and control – 
known also as the separation of management and finance – gives rise to several 
agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
The central objective of the corporate governance is to ensure to the shareholders 
(ownership) that the return on their investment is maximised by the management. In 
few words, the shareholders are primarily concerned with the efficiency objective, 
put it differently they pursue to the firm value maximization.  
However, the information asymmetry between the management and finance allows 
the agent in engaging in self-interested behaviours. The agent, consistently with 
his/her economic rationality, will seek to maximise his/her personal return through 
the use of opportunistic behaviour. Since the contracts between the agent and the 
principal are mostly based on the financial numbers and ratios (e.g. income, leverage 
and so on), the accounting choices directly affect the agent own interests. Positive 
accounting theory aims at predicting the agents’ accounting choices considering 
differing incentives. 
Given the ample room for flexibility left by the impairment of goodwill, it constitutes 
a fertile field to investigate in order to verify if this accounting choice is exploited by 
several corporate governance actors to maximise their own return against the 
“principal” will.  
The agency theory defends the use of corporate governance as a device with which to 
monitor agents’ actions.!The goodwill is difficult to value increasing uncertainty for 
investors. The impairment of goodwill flexibility, which is related to the information 
asymmetries between management and investors, as well as to the goodwill 
allocation amongst the CGUs, may originate several agency problems.  
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2.1.1. The role of corporate governance in financial accounting and in 
the impairment test of goodwill 
 
The corporate governance system may be the cause of several financial accounting 
choices and deficiencies (Whittington, 1993). Levitt (1998) underlines that: «The 
significance of transparent, timely, and reliable financial statements and its 
importance to investor protection has never been more apparent». We derive the 
reciprocal interrelations between corporate governance and financial reporting. In the 
last years both the media and the academic research direct their attentiveness towards 
the well-known financial scandals (e.g. Enron, Parmalat, WorldCom, etc.) stressing 
the association between weak corporate governance mechanisms and low financial 
reporting reliability.  
The positive agency theory predicts that the contracts using the accounting numbers 
are unsuccessful in the alignment of the “agent-principal” interests’ leading the agent 
to exploit the discretion allowed by the accounting standards (Watts and 
Zimmermann, 1990). A large body of the literature investigates the relation between 
corporate governance and financial reporting reliability. The low financial reporting 
reliability has been explicated with earnings management practices (Klein, 2002; Lin 
and Hwang, 2010; Dechow et al., 2012), financial statement restatements (Romanus 
et al., 2008; Baber et al., 2012), financial statement frauds (Beasley, 1996; Carcello 
and Nagy, 2004) and weak controls (Beneish et al., 2008; Jaggi et al., 2014). 
The existence of a relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial reporting is declared also by several corporate governance codes. For 
example the Italian Corporate Governance Code (July 2015: 29) stresses the 
relevance of the internal control and risk management systems in the assurance of 
information reliability stating that: «It contributes to ensuring the safeguarding of 
corporate assets, the efficiency and effectiveness of management procedures, the 
reliability of the information provided to the corporate bodies and to the market and 
the compliance with laws and regulations, including the by-laws and internal 
procedures». The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2014: 9) for instance 
highlights the relevance of the non-executive directors on the integrity of financial 
information: «Non-executive directors should scrutinise the performance of 
management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of 
performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial 
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information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust 
and defensible». Similarly, the USA Principles of Corporate Governance (2012: 9) 
emphasizes the board role «on the integrity and clarity of the corporation’s financial 
statements and financial reporting». Altogether these examples reveal the high 
weight that worldwide the corporate governance institutes place on the impact that 
the corporate governance system has on the financial reporting reliability.  
 
Bushman and Smith (2001) indicate within the agency theory perspective two kinds 
of corporate control mechanisms: internal mechanisms and external mechanisms. 
The internal mechanisms comprise managerial incentive plans, director monitoring 
and the internal labor market while the external mechanisms comprise the outside 
shareholder or debtholder monitoring, the market for corporate control, competition 
in the product market, the external managerial labor market, and securities laws. 
With a comparable approach Weir et al. (2002) distinguish between internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms and include in the first group the board 
structure variables, the debt financing and the insider ownership and in the second 
group the market for corporate control as suggested by Jensen (1993)133.  
Cohen et al. (2004) reviews the literature on corporate governance and its effects on 
financial reporting reliability. The Authors (2004) stress the interplay among the 
inside and outside forces of the corporate governance in shaping the financial 
reporting quality.  
Gillan (2006) develops an expanded model of the corporate governance system 
dividing it between internal and external governance. He categorises the internal 
governance into five main groups: board of directors, managerial incentives, capital 
structure, bylaw and charter provision and internal control systems. The external 
governance groups are: law and regulation, markets 1 (capital markets, market for 
corporate control, labor markets and product markets), markets 2 (providers of 
market information such as credit, equity and governance analysts), markets 3 
(services provided by external subjects as accounting, financial and legal services) 
and private sources of external oversight (e.g. media, external lawsuits). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 According to Jensen (1993): «There are only four control forces operating on the corporation to 
resolve the problems caused by a divergence between managers' decisions and those that are optimal 
from society's standpoint. They are the • capital markets, • legal/political/regulatory system, • product 
and factor markets, and • internal control system headed by the board of directors». The Author 
(2010) confirms the same four control forces operating on the corporation. 
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Similarly, Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010) classify amongst the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms the board composition, the shareholder involvement, the 
executive incentives and the leadership characteristics.  
Brown et al. (2011) classify various corporate governance characteristics as being 
either internal or external to the firm. Internal characteristics derive from the 
shareholder decision and board action and include the board of directors and its 
committees, the ownership structures, the financing arrangements and the executive 
compensations. Within the external corporate governance characteristics there are the 
monitoring exercised by the outsiders as blockholders, institutional investors and 
external auditors. 
Overall, we may say that external corporate governance is the system that considers 
the active stakeholder participation in the governance process defining the roles of 
the shareholder supervision, in other words it consists in the market for corporate 
control. The internal corporate governance regards the relations amongst the actors 
within the firm (i.e. managers, directors, committees, employees) (Jensen, 1993; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bai et al., 2004; Baber et al. 2012; Huyghebaert and 
Wang, 2012). 
Moving from these studies (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 
2010; Brown et al. 2011) I develop a model represented in Illustration 2.1 where I 
distinguish between the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms that 
may affect the financial reporting reliability through the income effect of goodwill 
write-off. Considering the flexibility allowed by the accounting standards I 
conceived the financial reporting reliability easily influenced by the diverse 
corporate governance actors, this is why I enclose it with a dotted line. I then 
separate the internal from the external corporate governance characteristics with a 
dotted blue line. Above the blue line there are the external corporate governance 
mechanisms considered in the thesis: financial reporting, state and institutional 
ownerships, external audit and financial analysts. Under the blue dotted line there are 
the internal corporate governance systems considered: concentrated and insider 
ownerships, reporting incentives, board of directors and audit committees and CFOs. 
Of course, this representation should be carefully construed and embodies only my 
perspective on the influence of the governance system on the financial reporting 
reliability. It is also imperative to point out that the list of the considered corporate 
governance mechanisms is not exhaustive as other relevant corporate governance 
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characteristics (e.g. legal system, standard settings, stock exchanges, professional 
bodies, media, shareholder activism, customers, suppliers, network partners, internal 
control systems, etc.) may affect certain accounting choices as the impairment test, 
but they are out of the scope of the present thesis. A further limitation is considering 
each characteristic independent from the other without considering the reciprocal 
influences leading to endogeneity problems underlying the corporate governance 
studies (Gillan and Starck, 2003; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Brown et al. 2011). 
To sum up, within the internal corporate governance mechanisms, which the 
empirical chapter investigates in relation to the impairment decision, I include the 
insider ownership and the ownership concentration, the managerial reporting 
incentives (i.e. big bath, income smoothing, leverage, bonus and CEO change), the 
board of directors and audit committee and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO here 
after). The financial reporting reliability, as said, then might be affected by external 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the external audit characteristics (i.e. 
auditor size, audit and non-audit fees, tenure and expertise) and the financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
In the following paragraphs I briefly frame each corporate governance mechanisms 
within the agency theory theoretical framework and the literature on earnings 
management. 
 
2.1.2. Internal corporate governance !
The principal-agent problem can take different forms according to the diverse 
internal corporate governance devices employed: board of directors and audit 
committee, reporting incentives, insider ownership and concentrated ownership, 
CFOs.  
 
Board of Directors and Audit Committee 
The literature on the relationship between the board of directors (and its committee) 
and the financial reporting reliability is broad. Board of directors is responsible for 
supervising the information disclosed.  
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An extensive part of the accounting and corporate governance research has been 
dedicated to the composition of the board and of its committees.  
The bigger the board size the deeper the supervisory activity over the management 
might be. For instance, Xie et al. (2003) find that the larger the board size the lower 
the discretionary accruals are. Although, the results are inconclusive as competing 
studies support that the bigger the board, the more difficult the coordination and 
communication activities amongst the members might be (Jensen, 1993). In line with 
this part of the literature, Beasley (1996) finds that as the board size reduces, also the 
likelihood of financial statement frauds reduces. The mixed results are confirmed 
also within the same piece of research where Larcker et al. (2005) on the one hand 
find a positive association between the board size and discretionary accruals and on 
the other hand they find a negative relationship between the size and the absolute 
value of accruals. Reading Harris and Raviv (2008) we may explain these differences 
in the results through the undervaluation of the endogeneity issue which lead to 
pitfalls of inference as the size may be correlated with other variables.  
Beekes et al. (2004) find that UK companies with a higher presence of outside board 
members are less likely to be engaged in untimely bad news in earnings recognition. 
Although, another part of the literature maintains that independent outsider directors 
are less informed about the firm-specific conditions and this restricted knowledge 
over the firm-specific factors reduces their ability to ensure a higher financial 
reporting reliability (Bushman et al. 2004; Armstrong and Weber, 2010). 
Another part of the literature focuses on the independence of the board and of its 
committee. For example, Klein (2002) finds that companies moving from a majority-
independent to a minority-independent board and audit committee’s structure 
experience an increase in adjusted abnormal accruals in the changing year. Jaggi et 
al. (2009) find in the Honk Kong context that independent boards is an effective 
device in restraining earnings management. 
Several scholars study the relation between earnings management and some of the 
board members characteristics. Matsunaga and Yeung (2008) find that CEOs with 
past experience as CFO are more prone to employ income-decreasing accruals (i.e. 
conservative accounting choices) and that for those firms’ analysts’ forecasts are less 
dispersed and less volatile hence more accurate. On a sample of Chines public firms, 
Jiang et al. (2013) find that CEOs with financial experience are less oriented to real 
earnings management practices, but they do not find evidence that they are more 
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involved in accrual-based earnings management. The literature on the directors’ 
busyness suggests that the directors’ level of busyness is positively associated with 
the firm’s market performance (Di Pietra et al., 2008), but also that overcommitted 
directors have less time to dedicate to the monitoring activities (Core et al. 1999; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). The reduced time for the board activities 
compromises also the ability to detect earnings management policies (Sarkar et al., 
2008).  
 
Reporting Incentives 
Mangers behaviour may be driven by their incentives134. Amongst the most studied 
managerial reporting incentives we can find: big bath charges, income smoothing, 
leverage, bonus remuneration, stock option and CEO change.   
Often, managers may have incentives to take a big bath135. Following the definition 
of Mulford and Comiskey (2002: 15) a big bath is: «A wholesale write-down of 
assets and accrual of liabilities in an effort to make the balance sheet conservative so 
that there will be few expenses to serve as a drag on future earnings».  
Managers can have incentives to take a big bath when they do not reach the income 
threshold fixed in the variable compensation schemes or when they have been just 
appointed in order to blame the predecessor management for weak performance. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 In a speech at the NYU Center for Law and Business on September 28, 1998 the chair of the SEC 
Arthur Levitt with a biting tone expressed his fear on the erosion of the earnings quality and stated 
that: «Managing may be giving way to manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion. Many in 
corporate America are just as frustrated and concerned about this trend as we, at the SEC, are. They 
know how difficult it is to hold the line on good-practices when their competitors operate in the gray 
area between legitimacy and outright fraud. A gray area where the accounting is being perverted; 
where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of 
management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company» (emphasis 
added). 
135 The first “accounting gimmick” explained by Levitt (1998) is the “big-bath” charge, according to 
the SEC Chair: «Companies remain competitive by regularly assessing the efficiency and profitability 
of their operations. Problems arise, however, when we see large charges associated with companies 
restructuring. These charges help companies “clean up” their balance sheet-giving them a so-called 
“big bath”. Why are companies tempted to overstate these charges? When earnings take a major hit, 
the theory goes Wall Street will look beyond a onetime loss and focus only on future earnings. And if 
these charges are conservatively estimated with a little extra cushioning, that so-called conservative 
estimate is miraculously reborn as income when estimates change or future earnings fall short. When 
a company decides to restructure, management and employees, investors and creditors, customers and 
suppliers all want to understand the expected effects. We need, of course, to ensure that financial 
reporting provides this information. But this should not lead to flushing all the associated costs – and 
maybe a little extra-through the financial statements».  
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Income smoothing136 may be directed to both increase and decrease the income. 
According to Coffee (2004: 20-21): «Earlier in the decade and during prior decades, 
earnings management was more a game of “smoothing out” the peaks and valleys in 
a corporation’s income flow in order to reduce the apparent volatility in the 
corporation’s returns. Thus, managements characteristically attempted to hide 
“excess earnings” in “rainy day reserves” in order to use such funds later to smooth 
out undesired declines in the firm’s earnings».  
In high leveraged firms the agency relationship can transfer from the owner-manager 
to the debtholder-manager. Usually borrowing contracts comprise covenants limiting 
the dividend distribution in relation to the achievement of specific financial ratios. 
The violations of the covenants may be costly for the firm and consequently for the 
manager, encouraging the agent to behave opportunistically leveraging the 
accounting discretion. 
Several studies maintain that the remuneration contracts may lead the management to 
discretionally reduce (increase) the income when it cannot increase (can increase) its 
variable compensation (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al., 1999; 
Godfrey, 2006). More recently Shuto (2007) studying the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and executive compensation schemes in Japan, finds that 
managers use of income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items is more 
pronounced in firm where managers do not receive bonus. Hence, the alignment 
effect pursued tying the management compensation to the firm performance may be 
superseded by a perverse effect. Denis et al. (2006) show a significant positive 
association between the likelihood of fraud contentions and the measure of 
executives’ stock option. Similarly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that in 
firms where CEO’s potential total remuneration is highly tied to the value of stock 
and option the use of discretionary accruals is more marked. Similarly, Burns and 
Kedia (2006) find evidence that the CEOs are more disposed to misreport when their 
option portfolio is more sensible to stock price. 
The CEO changes may produce a double effect on earnings management. While the 
departing CEO is interested in income-increasing accruals to get higher bonus and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 Levitt (1998) refers to the “income smoothing” practice with the sobriquet of “cookie jar reserves”. 
Specifically, he explains that: «A third illusion played by some companies is using unrealistic 
assumptions to estimate liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty costs. In 
doing so, they stash accruals in cookie jars during the good times and reach into them when needed in 
the bad times».!
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keep high its CEO reputation, the incoming CEO is incentivised to take big baths to 
save future earnings while blaming the prior CEO for the poor performance and 
clean the deck (Wells, 2002). Wilson and Wang (2010) find evidence that CEO 
changes occurred together with chairperson changes are significantly associated with 
income-decreasing earnings management in the year of the appointment. 
 
Ownership structures: ownership concentration and insider ownership  
In the relation between the owner and the manager, the latter is aware of the efforts 
needed to run the firm and to obtain certain results but the shareholder is not able to 
fully understand the manager efforts. In this setting the manager may be induced in 
expropriation activities against the owner-interest. In order to mitigate this moral 
hazard the owner introduces interest alignment mechanisms such as variable 
compensation tied to income or financial reporting variables targets. Although, 
acting in this way the self-interested manager may have incentives to manage the 
earnings in order to reach the determined thresholds. Starting from these premises, 
some studies find that the ownership structures affect the financial reporting 
reliability.  
We can conceive the insider ownership as either with a positive or negative effect on 
the financial reporting quality, appealing to two streams of the literature. Moving 
from the agency theorists recommendations, the higher the insider ownership the 
higher the interests’ alignment between the shareholder, as principal, and the 
manager, as agent, is (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This is 
the motivation that favours the issuance of stock options for the management and the 
directors’ remuneration tied to the firm economic and financial performance. A part 
of the accounting literature finds a reduced earnings management in firms with 
higher insider ownership (Warfield et al., 1995). On the other hand, these alignment 
interests’ tools might convert into managerial reporting incentives to manage the 
earnings. A body of the literature in fact argues that higher insider ownership 
provokes insider directors’ entrenchment and lack of market discipline (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004; Cornett et al., 2008). Insider directors may be less independent, hold 
a self-interested behaviour and favour entrenchment (Klein, 1998; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Huang et al. (2013) demonstrate that 
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higher insider ownership reduces the power of shareholder rights to limit income-
increasing earnings.  
Several studies find evidence that ownership concentration is positively associated 
with the use of earnings management practices. Bouvatier et al. (2014) for example 
show that banks with high ownership concentration achieve income-smoothing 
objectives through the use of discretionary loan loss provisions. Leuz et al. (2003) 
show that earnings management is greater in economies with lower investor 
protection and in the presence of concentrated ownership. 
 
Chief Financial Officer 
The CFO plays a fundamental role in the numbers game as this actor supervises the 
financial reporting process, hence when the firm is involved in earnings management 
the CFO did not success in its primary supervisory function. The CFO in a certain 
sense is a spurious actor. While he/she is the right-hand-person of the CEO at the 
same time he/she is a governance actor when signing the financial statements137. 
Actually, the CFO is very close to the CEO hence the pressure risk to turn a blind 
eye to earnings management is likely. Thus the CFOs may manage the earnings 
either for personal-related incentives (e.g. compensation and equity-related 
incentives) or because he/she undergoes the CEOs wills. We should not undervalue 
that the CEO is in the position to decide/influence the CFO future with reference e.g. 
to career advancements, compensations etc. (Feng et al., 2011). 
Feng et al. (2011) suggest that CFOs permit earnings management practices because 
they suffer the CEO pressure. Geiger and North (2006) find evidence that incoming 
CFOs are negatively associated with discretionary accruals. In a survey aimed at 
showing the CFOs accounting-related choices Graham et al. (2005) indicate that 
CFOs manage the financial reporting as they worry about the short-run stock prices. 
This concern about the short-run stock prices derives from a) the belief it affects the 
firm’s cost of capital; b) it may have a direct impact on their job; c) CFOs are afraid 
that the labor market evaluates their skills basing on the short-run stock prices; d) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 It is sufficient here to recall to the role of the Italian “dirigente preposto alla redazione dei 
documenti contabili” introduced by the law 262/2005 which can be assimilated to the CFO. Indeed, 
the introduction of the above Italian actor is inspired to the norms introduce in Section 302 od the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act with reference to the financial reports corporate responsibility. Furthermore, this 
actor in Italy is appointed by the board of directors and not by the CEO, hence, limited to the role of 
signing the financial reports, he/she becomes a governance player and does not belong to the 
management team. 
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they want to be attractive for a wider analysts coverage of their stock; and e) they try 
to elude uncomfortable questions by analysts in conference calls. Aier et al. (2005) 
find that restatements are negatively associated with the financial expertise (more 
experience as CFOs, MBAs and/or CPAs certifications) of CFOs. The hypothesis on 
the CFO compensation incentive is tested also by Indjejikian and Matèjka (2009) 
finding that from 2003 to 2007 public companies reduced the percentage of CFO 
bonuses conditionally to the financial performance. From this result the Authors 
(2009) deduce that firms attenuate earnings management and misreporting practices 
through the containment of the CFO compensation incentives. !
2.1.3. External corporate governance 
 
Also with reference to the external corporate governance mechanisms in the 
oversight of earnings management practices, prior literature finds divergent results. 
In the thesis I specifically focus on the following external mechanisms:  state and 
institutional ownership, external audit and financial analysts. !
Ownership structures: state ownership and institutional ownership 
 
With reference to state and institutional ownerships these are placed within the 
external corporate governance characteristics (Bushman and Smith, 2001).  
In the Chinese context Ding et al. (2007) find that privately held public firms favour 
earnings increasing practices more than the state-owned firms. Another Chinese 
study conducted by Xianhui and Liansheng (2009) demonstrates that income 
boosting earnings management is lower in state-owned firms compared to non-state 
firms. Besides, both institutional ownership and state-ownership are not associated 
with income-decreasing earnings management. They (2009) further find that in non-
state firms there is a negative association between institutional ownership and 
income-increasing management. Overall, these results are consistent with the 
proposition that state ownership act as a mitigating device in the earnings 
management practices. Although a conflicting perspective on the state-ownership 
advise that the state may purpose to social and political objective (e.g. higher level of 
employment, social stability, etc.) in detriment of the firm value maximization 
(Shleifer and Vishny; 1997; Bai et al. 2004). A related issue is that the government 
often appoint the member of the board and other committee undermining their 
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independence (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Young et al., 2008). Consistently with the 
above assumptions, Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) find that when the state is the 
controlling shareholder the labor redundancy is exacerbated and that the larger the 
board the higher is the labor redundancy in state-controlled firms. 
Concerning with the institutional ownership, Koh  (2003) finds in the Australian 
setting that short-term oriented institutional ownership proxyied by a lower 
institutional level is positively associated with discretionary income-increasing 
accruals. On the contrary, when the level of institutional ownership is high, in line 
with a long-term-oriented investment perspective, the managerial discretional 
accruals are limited. In this second case, the institutional ownership behaves as a 
mitigating actor in the game of earnings management. 
Using a sample of 76 mergers and acquisitions Njah and Jarboui (2013) prove that 
institutional investors are able to constraint earnings management around mergers 
and acquisitions. 
 
External audit  
 
Many researchers maintain that the financial statements of Big-X clients' are more 
reliable. The larger the auditor and the smaller the client, the less incentive the 
auditor has to “cheat” and to behave opportunistically since the risk to loose the other 
clients becomes greater (DeAngelo, 1981). Watts and Zimmerman (1981) explained 
the size as surrogate for audit quality appealing to the advantage that bigger auditors 
have of overseeing individual auditor behaviour. The later literature found evidence 
that the Earnings Response Coefficient of Big-X clients are higher than non-Big-X 
clients (Teoh and Wong, 1993), or that Big-X auditors are more effective in 
constraining discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998, Francis and Krishnan, 1999). 
Kim et al. (2003) found that Big-X auditors can better limit managers' ability to 
income-increasing accruals (Lys and Watts, 1994), but they are less able to detect 
income-decreasing accrual choices than non-Big-X auditors. With these findings, 
they indicate that Big-X auditors actually are more effective just in case their 
reporting incentives diverge from those of the managers. 
A large body of the literature finds a positive association between discretionary 
accruals and audit fees on the strength of the audit risk model (Frankel et al., 2002; 
Gul et al., 2003; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). Alternatively, 
others indicate that auditors charge lower fee to reliable clients (DeFond et al., 
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2012). Several studies suggest that the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees lowers 
auditor independence and as a consequence the quality of financial reporting 
(Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). Another stream of literature failed in finding a positive 
association between non-audit fees and unexpected accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2003, 
Chung and Kallapur, 2003). 
Auditor rotation in literature has been considered both beneficial and detrimental for 
the financial reporting quality. It is beneficial with reference to the experience and 
the client-specific knowledge acquired (Johnson et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2008) but 
detrimental since it may imply an “excessive familiarity” with the client (Chi and 
Huang, 2005) reducing its independence. Also, auditor changes have always drawn 
the attention because they might be caused by managerial opportunism (DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998). As explained by Davidson III et al. (2006) auditor changes 
can be motivated by two opposite aspirations. On the one hand management might 
decide to change auditor to improve the firm’s performance by reducing expenses or 
to obtain a more effective new auditors; on the other hand, they might change auditor 
for opportunistic reasons, entrenchment of management, higher earnings, higher 
bonus compensation and “friendlier” audit opinions. If auditor changes are caused by 
opportunism, the level of discretionary accruals would be greater after the 
substitution. 
Another valid constraint for earnings management can be the auditors' industry 
expertise (Krishnan, 2003). A large body of the literature found that auditors 
experience in specific industry is associated with a better ability in identifying errors 
(Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Solomon et al., 1999) or in detecting fraud (Johnson et al., 
1991). 
Finally, many authors studied the relation between earnings management and 
modified audit opinions, i.e. qualified or adverse opinion, and again, the evidence is 
mixed. A part of the literature maintains that modified opinions are positively 
associated with the level of discretionary accruals (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; 
Bradshaw et al., 2001). Another part underlines how qualified audit reports are not 
necessarily associated with abnormal accruals (Butler et al., 2004; Ajona et al., 2008, 
Nelson et al., 2002). 
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Financial analysts 
Financial analysts are considered governance subjects and gatekeepers, as their 
primary role is to attenuate the information asymmetry problems between outsiders 
and insiders (Brennan and Huges, 1991). For example a downward revision of the 
analyst earnings forecasts after the issuance of the financial reports may indicate 
deteriorated future conditions of the firm. As a consequence, a large body of the 
literature studied the stock price reactions to analysts’ forecasts revisions (Barry and 
Jennings, 1992; Abarbanell et al., 1995; Barron et al., 1998; Kothari, 2001; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Francis et al., 2004; Bagnoli et al., 2005; Arya and Mittendorf, 
2007). Also it has been found that the information asymmetry is negatively 
associated with the analysts’ coverage (i.e. the number of analysts following a firm) 
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Louis and Robinson, 2005; Houston et al., 
2010). Related to this information asymmetry mitigating role, O’Brien and Bhushan 
(1990) suggest that institutional investors prefer investing in firms with analyst 
coverage. At the same time the analysts transfers the market expectations to firms. 
Hence some studies investigate the impact that analysts’ forecasts have on the CEO 
turnover (Farrell and Whidbee, 2003) and bonus (Bolliger and Kast, 2004). Analysts 
are mainly focused on the forecasts of the firms’ earnings; this is why any earnings 
management practices might affect their accuracy (or, looking at the other side of the 
coin, the forecast error). When the earnings management practices are not taken into 
account, an income-increasing manoeuvre leads to pessimistic earnings forecast, 
while an income-decreasing manoeuvre leads to optimistic earnings forecasts 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). Competing findings suggest that analysts consider 
earnings management when doing their forecasts (Brown, 2004; Keung et al., 2010). 
The analysts’ pay depends on their ability in providing accurate estimates to 
brokerage and investment banks. Some studies find that analysts’ turnover is 
associated with their performance (Mikhail et al., 1999). Analysts mainly draw from 
the information provided by the management. It is relevant to recall that brokerages 
tend to have their own stock portfolio hence they exert pressure on the analysts to 
issue favourable recommendations on that portfolio of shares (Francis and Philbrick, 
1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1996; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et al. 2000; Lim, 
2001; Agrawal and Chen, 2006). 
O’Brien et al. (2005) provide evidence that affiliated analysts consider 
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asymmetrically good and bad news, responding quickly to good news while avoid to 
issue bad news. In other words, analysts are less timely in downgrading from “Buy” 
and “Hold” their recommendations compared to the inverse upgrading from “Hold”. 
Conversely, when the analysts are affiliated to firms that provide also underwriting 
services seem to be less optimistic (Cowen et al., 2006). Following Ronen and Yaari 
(2008), we can classify the literature debates on analysts in three streams: 1) analysts 
being gatekeepers limit earnings management (DeGeorge et al., 2004; Frankel and 
Li, 2004; Lang et al., 2004; Rees and Sivaramakrishnan, 2006); 2) analysts look for 
the equilibrium of the differing pressures, the maintenance of their reputation and the 
firm’s management desires (Easterbrook and Nutt, 1999; Mest and Plummer, 2003; 
Agrawal and Chen, 2006); and 3) the collusion between management and analysts 
threatens analysts’ objectivity and independence (Lim, 2001; Abarbanell and 
Lehavy, 2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; Durtschi and Easton, 2005). 
In literature there is wide evidence that firms engage in earnings management to 
meet or beet the analysts forecasts (market expectations) (Bannister and Newan, 
1996; Bange and De-Bondt, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Moherle, 2002; 
Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Louis, 2004; McVay, 2006; Brown et al., 2006; Barua 
et al. 2006). 
Williams et al. (2006) suggest that the discretionary increasing of earnings adversely 
affect the firm’s future ability to meet or beat the expectations. Consistently with this 
observation some studies find that the firms that meet or beat the estimates on 
average perform better (Bartov et al., 2002). 
 
In literature there are already some studies investigating the relation between the 
impairment of goodwill and certain corporate governance mechanism. However, as 
far as I know it is still missing a comprehensive study investigating the relation 
between the impairment of goodwill and most of the subjects involved in the 
corporate governance puzzle138. Grounding on the above theoretical framework in 
the following paragraph I build my basic research question and advance additional 
research hypotheses tested or suggested in the empirical chapter.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Cohen et al. (2004) talks about the corporate governance “mosaic” providing a good idea about the 
reciprocal ties and connections amongst different corporate governance actors. 
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2.2. Objectives !
Prior literature investigates the relation between diverse corporate governance actors 
and earnings management. In this thesis I narrow down the investigation of the 
earnings management studying the manipulation of the earnings through the 
impairment of goodwill. My basic research question is: Does the corporate 
governance affect the impairment of goodwill? 
This research question is empirically verified in the third chapter and it is further 
split into different research propositions and hypotheses. Specifically, in chapter 
three there are four sections, according to the diverse corporate governance issue 
related to the impairment: reporting incentives, ownership structures and governance 
mechanisms, chief financial officer, external auditor and financial analysts. In the 
first two sections I examine the effects that the internal corporate governance 
characteristics have on the impairment test. In the last two sections I explore and 
suggest the effects that the external corporate governance characteristics may have 
on the impairment test. 
The first section (§ 3.1) examines the studies on the earnings management objectives 
obtained through the manipulation of the impairment of goodwill. In detail, I focus 
on the literature’s contributes on the impairment of goodwill used for the following 
managerial reporting incentives: big bath, income smoothing, leverage, CEO bonus 
and CEO change. The paragraph then deals with the empirical research on the impact 
that certain ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms have on the 
impairment of assets in Italy, UK and Germany. This paragraph analyses the 
corporate governance impact in contexts in which the same accounting standards are 
adopted, but which present different governance systems and different ownership 
concentration. This allows appreciating the differences in the impacts. The United 
Kingdom shows a prevalence of public companies with widespread shareholdings 
and monistic governance systems (known also as one-tier system for the presence of 
only one body: the Board of directors), based on a strong presence of independent 
directors on the Board and on the separation between the office of the CEO and that 
of the Board Chairman. Italy is featured by concentrated ownership structure (in 
which the main shareholder is a family or a coalition), presence of shareholders on 
the Board, potential conflicts of interests with minority shareholders and dualistic 
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horizontal governance model. The Italian model is also known as the dualistic 
horizontal model made up by two bodies both of them elected by the shareholders: 
the board of directors and the board of statutory auditors (collegio sindacale). The 
first is responsible for managing the company while the latter oversees the control of 
the operations comprising those carried out by the board. Finally, Germany is 
characterized by mixed-ownership structures and dualistic vertical governance model 
with a strong employee role in the supervisory board. Specifically, the German 
model is called dualistic vertical model as it is characterised by the presence of the 
Supervisory Board elected by the shareholders and of the Management Board 
appointed by the Supervisory Board. The underlying research question of this 
paragraph is: Do ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms affect 
the impairment of assets in Italy, UK and Germany? This research question is 
expressly divided into the four following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, insider shareholding is positively associated to the 
magnitude of discretionary impairment losses. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, state ownership is positively associated to the 
magnitude of discretionary impairment losses. 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, institutional investors ownership is negatively 
associated to the magnitude of discretionary impairment losses.  
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, stronger governance mechanisms are negatively 
associated to the magnitude of discretionary impairment losses.  
In the second section (§ 3.2) I conduct a survey on the CFOs perception on the 
management of the goodwill write-off under both IFRS/US-GAAP. After asking the 
information on the organization in which they work and their personal background, I 
ask CFOs to manifest their perceptions on the impairment of goodwill accounting 
standard (e.g. if the elimination of the goodwill amortization has introduced greater 
subjectivity, if the goodwill write-off reflects the macro (micro)-economic 
conditions, etc.). Then I question their insights on the reasons that may induce 
management to discretionally use the impairment of goodwill (e.g. to meet analysts 
forecasts, to save their reputation, to increase their bonuses, etc.), whether certain 
ownership structures affect the impairment of goodwill (e.g. insider ownership 
implies underestimated goodwill write off, institutional ownership constraints the use 
of discretionary goodwill write-off, etc.), on the external audit influence on the 
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impairment of goodwill (e.g. big-4 auditor and the auditor expertise can better 
constraint the managerial discretion on goodwill write-off, etc.). I also require 
answering to questions concerning the difficulties underlying the impairment of 
goodwill (e.g. the level of difficulty for the external audit and for the CFOs, which 
procedures do they carry out in ascertain the goodwill impairment test, with whom 
do they compare their evaluations, etc.). Finally, I ask for suggestions to enforce the 
reliability of the accounting for goodwill and whether they overall prefer the 
goodwill impairment test or the amortization of goodwill. From these questions I 
ensue this specific research question: Do CFOs perceive that managers discretionally 
use the goodwill write-off under IFRS/US-GAAP? 
The third section (§ 3.3) explores the literature on audit quality and financial 
reporting reliability. Since the literature suggests that the financial reports are a joint 
statement from the auditors and the managers (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991) the 
auditors plays a paramount role in the constriction of the discretionary use of 
goodwill write-offs. Linking the literature on audit characteristics and earnings 
management I develop a set of proposition on the likely associations between certain 
auditor characteristics and discretionary goodwill write-offs. Following I list the 
propositions developed in paragraph 3.3: 
Proposition 1: Ceteris paribus, Big X auditors are more effective than non-Big X 
auditors in preventing goodwill write-off understatements but avoid preventing 
goodwill write-off overstatements.  
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, audit fees are negatively associated with goodwill 
write-off overstatements. 
Proposition 3: Ceteris paribus, audit fees are positively associated with goodwill 
write-off understatements. 
Proposition 4a: Ceteris paribus, non-audit fees are positively associated with write-
off manipulations.  
Proposition 4b: Ceteris paribus, non-audit fees are negatively associated with write-
off manipulations.  
Proposition 5a: Ceteris paribus, auditors’ tenure is negatively associated with write-
off manipulations.  
Proposition 5b: Ceteris paribus, auditors’ tenure is positively associated with write-
off manipulations.  
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Proposition 6: Ceteris paribus, auditor expertise is negatively associated with write-
off manipulations.  
In the last section (§ 3.4) with an exploratory approach I deepen the literature on 
analysts’ forecasts and earnings management. Similarly to the external audit the 
financial analysts assume a key role in the game of manipulating the earnings. 
Hence, as in the previous section, basing on prior literature I develop two 
propositions relating the impairment of goodwill and analysts forecasts: 
Proposition 1: Ceteris paribus, the goodwill write-offs understatements are positively 
associated with optimistic financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, the goodwill write-offs overstatements are positively 
associated with pessimistic financial analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
In the following page in Illustration 2.1 I confine my research objectives outlining 
the different associations investigated between the goodwill write-off (hence 
financial reporting) and determined corporate governance actors (internal and 
external of the firm). 
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Reporting!Incentives:!
• Big!Bath!
• Income!Smoothing!
• Leverage!
• Bonus!
• CEO!Changes!
External!Audit:!
• Size!
• Fees!&!NonBAuditBFees!
• Tenure!
• Expertise!
Financial!Analysts:!
• Earnings!Forecasts!!
CFOs’!Perceptions!
Ownership!structures!!
• State!ownership!
• Institutional!ownership!
• Insider!ownership!
• Ownership!concentration!!
External&
Corporate&Governance&
Internal&
Corporate&Governance&
FINANCIAL&REPORTING&
&
Goodwill&write?offs&
Illustration 2.1: Impacts of internal and external corporate governance on goodwill write-offs. 
 
Board!of!directors!&!Audit!Committee!
• Independent!directors!
• CEO!duality!
• Meetings!frequency!
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2.3. Methods !
To explore my overall research question and the specific hypotheses above proposed, 
I embrace a multiple-methods approach (Hoque et al., 2013). In detail, I adopt the 
historical method in the first chapter while in the third chapter I mix the critical 
analysis of the literature (§§ 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4) with archival (§ 3.1) and survey 
research (§3.2). 
 
2.3.1. Historical method !
In the first Chapter I mainly follow a historical method139. In particular, I have tried 
to comparatively analyse the main Italian Accounting Schools from the “precursors” 
to the “economisti aziendali” on the issues of goodwill and its evaluation criteria. In 
addressing past developments of the Italian accounting tradition I propose some 
relationships between the explored Authors and the current accounting standards on 
impairment of assets. The emphasis of the chapter is on the Italian context with some 
hints to the International accounting traditions. Notwithstanding, given the narrow 
investigation on the International setting, the first chapter cannot be considered as a 
comparative international accounting history study. Yet, the first chapter is neither a 
biographic study on prominent Italian accounting scholars as the focus is not on the 
Authors lives and careers, but on their main pioneering contributions on the matters 
of goodwill and impairment of assets. This part of my research has been carried out 
through the critical analysis of some important stages in our discipline on the issues 
mentioned, trying to contextualise the words of various Authors within different 
approach, due to different periods and contexts.  
Precisely, the first chapter proposes the development on the financial evaluations, 
with specific focus on goodwill, construed through the Italian accounting 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 When I talk about the historical method I refer to the method clearly exposed by Giannessi in the 
posthumous publication (1992) with the title “Considerazioni introduttive sul metodo storico”. In that 
publication the Author explains that “acting with method” means using scientific rigour, examining 
the verifiable interrelations and the causal relationships. Only the logical analysis of the facts and 
things has scientific relevance.  
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traditions140. Hence, I assume a constructivist epistemological position, trying as 
much as possible to avoid the objectivism of constraining theoretical classifications 
as well as the subjectivism accompanying the biography exaltation of singular 
Authors or Schools141. I construe the historical research as a comparative analysis 
where the past theoretical accounting approaches may be useful to interpret the 
current accounting practices and, perhaps, to build new financial valuation 
approaches able to better represent the firm’s condition. In comparing different ways 
of reporting goodwill or evaluating the equity economic value I use the historical 
method through the analysis of historical books, chapters and other writings in 
general by past eminent accounting Authors142.  
The diverse equity evaluation approaches and income measurements presented in the 
first chapter confirm the accounting relativism also within the national boundaries, 
which as suggest Zambon and Zan (2000: 817) may add «further insights into the 
interpretation of dissimilar national accounting histories and historiographies».  
The motivation to introduce my thesis with an historical chapter can be explained by 
the following Carnegie and Napier’s (2012: 329) statement: «History can inform our 
appreciation of contemporary accounting thought and practice through its power of 
unifying past, present and future. Our current activities, when viewed through the 
lens of history, appear neither eternal nor ephemeral, but are grounded in their past». 
 
2.3.2. Critical literature review  !
A critical literature review generally constitutes the building foundation of researches 
using other research methods. However, the systematic and organised literature could 
be considered a method itself for example when the purpose of the study is 
exploratory (Robson, 1993). A search of the literature seems key when determining !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Giannessi (1992: 26) explicitly says that the researcher uses the results of prior studies, initiating 
the research from a threshold of science already reached. Wittily, he also says that the speech should 
be advanced by degrees or with unexpected leaps forward, but always basing on prior knowledge. 
141 The constructivist historiography has been presented by Claudio Lipari in a contribution entitled  
“Introduzione alla storia e alla storiografia” at the “Scuola di metodologia della ricerca storica” third 
edition hosted at Università degli Studi Milano Bicocca, 10th – 12th June, 2015. 
142 See Antonelli and D’Alessio (2011: 468) that with the publication “Summa DB: A research note 
about an Italian accounting history database”: «Enables Italian and international scholars to 
commence building a bibliography for an accounting history paper by identifying the cluster of 
publications which are relevant to their particular». 
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whether a topic should be investigated (Saunders et al., 2009). From a critical 
literature review the researcher derives not only a ground for its research but also 
recommendations for further research. It should be acknowledged that certain 
journals calls for synthetic and rigorous literature review in the form of e.g. synthesis 
article as well as in the form of commentaries to current issues (e.g. Journal of 
Accounting Literature). Being aware of the importance of developing a critical 
literature review, in the thesis (specifically in §§ 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4), I review the 
studies on the relationships between the impairment and the earnings management (§ 
3.1), the impairment and the external auditor (§ 3.3) and the impairment and 
analyst’s estimates (§ 3.4). Even though these relationships have been broadly 
explored in the past, I have found either some gap in the literature, which might be 
examined in future research, or divergent results suggesting the need of further 
investigation.  
In details in § 3.3 I carry out a conceptual investigation of whether and how some 
key attributes of auditors affect the reported goodwill write-offs’ reliability. After 
reviewing the literature on the use of goodwill write-offs as an earnings management 
tool (§ 3.1), I explore possible relationship with auditors’ attributes and financial 
reporting quality (Stolowy and Breton, 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2012). 
I identify four auditor attributes that affect the audit activity’s effectiveness in 
goodwill write-offs: size, fees, tenure and expertise. Building on agency theory, I 
discuss how these characteristics shape auditors’ incentives when reviewing 
goodwill write-offs. I develop a set of propositions on how the external auditors’ 
attributes can or cannot contribute to more reliable goodwill write-offs. 
Finally, in § 3.4 I explore the literature on financial analysts’ forecasts and again I 
suggest possible relationship to investigate in future studies between analysts 
forecasts and the impairment of goodwill. 
These paragraphs may constitute the fundaments for future literature meta-analysis. 
Altogether, I find several research opportunities to answer to research questions 
involving corporate governance and accounting issues. !
2.3.3. Archival research !
In paragraph 3.1 I analyse collected data. The sources from which I have developed 
my database are both primary and secondary. Indeed, I have hand-collected certain 
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data directly form the firms’ corporate governance reports and annual reports 
(primary) while other data (e.g. the economic-financial information) were gathered 
from secondary sources (e.g. Worldscope Datastream Global Database). This part of 
my empirical research is based on time-series data – from 2005 to 2010 – hence for 
the validity of my research I accounted of possible problems associated with 
secondary data (Foster, 1986; Smith, 2003). Specifically, I controlled that structural 
changes have not taken place during the period within the sample; also accounting 
method during the period did not change; and finally I considered possible 
accounting classification issues. Hence, I ensured that the same companies made up 
the sample during the whole period. The companies within the sample then are all 
IAS/IFRS adopters thus during the period 2005-2010 there were not substantial 
changes in the standards. Furthermore, the hand-collection of certain data (such as 
the impairment losses amount) ensured that accounting classification issues were 
under control. The attention on these preliminary issues ensures a higher external 
validity than e.g. the experimental or simulation approaches as the archival method is 
anchored to empirical data. 
I then explored the data gathered through archival method with statistical analysis, 
using both univariate and multivariate statistics (see § 3.1 for a deeper explanation of 
the research design and for the empirical results). 
 
2.3.4. Survey research !
A social phenomenon may be studied through direct observation or it may be asked 
(Corbetta, 2003). Since in § 3.2 I aim at exploring the CFOs’ perceptions, attitudes 
and beliefs on the impairment of goodwill I use the survey method to collect the 
information. A big benefit of survey data is that they can be used for quantitative 
analysis and are easily generalizable (Perecman and Curran, 2006).  
I decided to conduct a survey on the perceptions of the CFOs because I wanted to 
tailor the data on specific research questions. The questions I asked to the CFOs can 
form a sort of conceptual summary of the whole empirical research carried out. Also, 
these data provides results never before studied with potential new insights on the 
impairment of goodwill issue. 
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While conducting a survey, the first matter to consider is the sampling procedure 
(Kish, 1965). Hence, the pre-survey work consisted in: definition of the sample, 
questionnaire preparing and piloting the questionnaire. Firstly, I defined the 
population of interest: the CFOs working in companies adopting IAS/IFRS or US 
GAAP. Secondly, traditionally in a survey the researcher should draw a list of 
possible respondents. In this second phase, I have downloaded from Orbis Bureau 
van Dijk Database a list of full name, e-mail address and type of managerial position 
within the active companies that adopt the IFRS or US GAAP. Then, I also used the 
CFOs contacts of the companies’ corporate sites of some European listed companies. 
Finally, I directly searched for the LinkedIn connection with the CFOs. The sample 
size is an important aspect to be considered (see § 3.2 for the statistical analysis).  
Then I made my research question regarding this empirical research apparent (see 
above § 2.2) and I purposely-built the questionnaire (Roberts, 1999). While drafting 
the questionnaire I bore in mind to keep it short to increase the likelihood that the 
respondents maintain the same attention for the entire questionnaire. I worded the 
questions in English and tried to make them as simpler, neutral and direct as possible 
as well as familiar to the CFOs expected knowledge and experience. Usually, to 
evaluate a question it is tested its reliability (in terms of consistency of the responses 
to the question) and its validity (i.e. the question gauges what is intended to gauge) 
(Perecman and Curran, 2006) (see § 3.2 for the statistical analysis on the 
questionnaire). I then uploaded my question on eSurv.org that is a provider of free 
survey management tools. ESurv.org allows the collection of data online, sending the 
survey link by email address143.  
To make the time devoted to answer shorter I designed the questionnaire mostly with 
closed-ended questions (requiring yes/no, Likert-scale responses or tick-a-box type 
answers) and just the last question is open-ended to eventual suggestions and/or 
recommendations for the research. In § 3.2 there is a wide description of the 
questionnaire and Appendix B2 reports the questionnaire sent.  
Before beginning to ask CFOs to answer the survey I conducted five pilots testing144. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 According to Smith (2003): «Mail questionnaires allow a large enough sample to reduce sampling 
error to acceptable levels, at considerably lesser costs than either telephone or face-to-face interviews. 
In addition, mail surveys provide no opportunity for interviewer bias, a potentially serious problem in 
both face-to-face and telephone interviews». 
144 I asked to answer to the questionnaire to the following five persons: 1) Full Professor in 
Accounting; 2) Researcher in Accounting; 3) Ph.D. Student in Statistics; 4) Ph.D. Student in 
Accounting and Finance; and 5) Chief Professional Accountant. 
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I revise the questions and finally sent out the questionnaire145. 
I prepared personal email and addressed the survey not to unnamed CFOs but to 
targeted by both their CFOs position and by their full name (Dillman, 1978); 
specifically, I sent email to CFOs already connected with my profile on LinkedIn. I 
prepared a clear cover email where I briefly introduced myself and my research 
project, ensuring the confidentiality of the responses and the possibility to share the 
results (see Appendix B1 for a facsimile of the sent emails). The participants then 
find further details and instructions at the beginning and during the questionnaire 
(see Appendix B2). Using e.Surv.org provider there is no need to record the answers 
as the software directly save the responses in the Microsoft excel format.  
I then analysed the collected data through the survey method with statistical analysis, 
using descriptive statistics (see § 3.2 for a deeper explanation of the research design 
and for the empirical results). 
The results of the survey may complement a future qualitative study. They allow 
identifying interesting case studies but also they help to select certain question that 
might shape interesting discussions within focus groups.  
 
Illustration 2.2 summarises the epistemological position, theoretical perspectives, 
methodology and methods used in throughout the thesis. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 The e.Surv.org provider gives back responses already in anonymous form; hence I could not 
identify the non-respondents to send them out a reminder email. However, this limitation is partially 
mitigated by a relatively high rate of response. 
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To sum up, I adopt multiple-methods including both qualitative approach (critical 
analysis of the literature), and quantitative approaches. In detail, the quantitative 
approach used includes both archival and survey researches. Using a “within-method 
triangulation” offers complementary perspectives on the same phenomenon 
increasing the validity and reliability of the research (Smith, 2003). 
Objectivism 
 
Chapter 3 
Positivism 
• Textual 
analysis 
• Archival 
research 
• Survey 
research 
• Critical 
literature 
review §§ 3.1, 
3.3, 3.4 
• Statistical 
analysis § 3.1 
• Questionnaire § 
3.2 
Deductive 
Epistemology Theoretical perspectives Methodology Methods 
Research 
approach 
Constructivism 
 
Chapter 1 
Historical method 
Textual analysis 
(Historical books 
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Adapted from: Gray, 2013 
Illustration 2.2: The relationship amongst epistemology, theoretical perspectives, research approach, methodologies and methods. 
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3. The empirical researches !
Increasingly, I have become concerned that the 
motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations 
may be overriding common-sense business 
practices. Too many corporate managers, auditors, 
and analysts are participants in a game of nods and 
winks. In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings 
estimates and project a smooth earnings path, 
wishful thinking may be winning the day over 
faithful representation. 
As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion 
in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality 
of financial reporting. Managing may be giving way 
to manipulation; integrity may be losing out to 
illusion. 
Levitt, 1998 !
The impairment test is a procedure carried out at different levels within the firm 
organization, involving in general terms the operational management and the top-
management as well as external subjects such as the external auditor. This chapter 
articulates as follows. Firstly (§ 3.1), I briefly explore the literature on the 
impairment test and I particularly focus on the literature that studies the impairment 
test as an earnings management tool. Then, I empirically verify if certain ownership 
structures (i.e. concentrated ownership, managerial ownership and state ownership) 
and the firm corporate governance affect the discretionary use of asset-write offs. In 
paragraph 3.2 I surveyed CFOs to obtain their perception on the use of a hardly 
verifiable estimate as the goodwill write-off is. It follows (§ 3.3) a conceptual 
investigation on determined auditor characteristic and their likely association with 
the discretionary use of goodwill write-offs. Finally in paragraph 3.4 I theoretically 
explore the relation between financial analysts and the impairment of goodwill.
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3.1. Impairment, earnings management, ownership structures and 
corporate governance !
I believe we need to embrace nothing less than a 
cultural change. For corporate managers, 
remember, the integrity of the numbers in the 
financial reporting system is directly related to the 
long-term interests of a corporation. While the 
temptations are great, and the pressures strong, 
illusions in numbers are only that – ephemeral, and 
ultimately self-destructive.  
Levitt, 1998 !
 
 
As highlighted in chapter 2 and as suggested by previous literature owner-manager 
agency conflicts prompt managers to use write-offs for earnings management 
purposes. The management exploits the discretion allowed by accounting rules146 to 
move future write-offs into current periods for agency-related reasons, such as 
remuneration concerns and signalling to the financial markets (Riedl, 2004; 
Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Scott (2003) suggests that earnings management does 
not have only a “negative” side but it can be used to convey management’s private 
information to the external parts, this way the stock prices adapt to the future 
perspectives anticipated in the “managed” earnings. 
Some studies have found evidence that managers recognize overstated write-offs to 
report large losses or “big baths” (Riedl, 2004). By doing so, the management: 1) 
“saves” the future periods from the write-offs, 2) maximizes the probabilities of 
future earnings-based bonuses and payments (Godfrey, 2006), and 3) signals to the 
outside that “bad times” are behind and better periods lie ahead (Riedl, 2004).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 For example Rockness et al. (2001) following the issuance of SFAS 142 argue that: «The new 
impairment charges are prime candidates for movable expenses from one period to another to achieve 
desired earnings targets». !
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Other researchers have found that managers use unnecessary write-offs to smooth the 
firm’s income (Guler, 2006; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). By doing so, managers 
moderate the overall net income volatility, while keeping the profits above the 
threshold specified in earnings-based bonus plans (Guler, 2006).  
Several studies have suggested that incoming CEOs report large, unnecessary write-
offs in their first year of appointment to improve the investors’ perception of the 
firm’s future financial performance, exploiting the opportunity to blame the prior 
management for the write-off (Masters-Stout et al., 2008; Zang, 2008).  
Regardless of the managerial aims, overstated write-offs result in income-decreasing 
manipulations, undervalued assets and clouded future firm profitability perspectives. 
Managers can understate write-offs (or even avoid the expected recognition) to 
protect their target earnings-based bonus compensation, their own share value and/or 
their reputation (Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Brochet and Welch (2011) find that 
directors who have more acquisition experience are more sensitive to agency 
conflicts when it comes to their goodwill write-off decisions, as they are more likely 
to face higher reputation costs. Ramanna and Watts (2012) find evidence that write-
offs are, on average, lower in firms in which the CEO is more sensitive to reputation 
costs. Managerial shareholding exacerbates the incentive to avoid or understate 
write-offs. Owner-managers are concerned that asset write-offs directly map into 
stock prices, affecting their own wealth (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna, 2008). 
As the level of ownership grows, owner-managers are more likely to have a long 
tenure as directors and to be responsible for the original acquisition decision of the 
impaired assets. Since write-offs suggest that the acquisition price was too high, 
reputation costs contribute to private wealth concerns, leading to understated write-
offs (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Regardless of the 
managerial aims, understated write-offs result in income-increasing manipulations, 
inflated asset values and clouded future firm profitability perspectives. 
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3.1.1. Impairment(and(ownership(structures((
 
One of the major consequences of the economic crisis for listed companies is the 
impairment of long-lived assets (goodwill, PPE and intangibles). Besides affecting 
the current earnings, the assets write-off discloses to the outside the management’s 
estimation about the firm’s future ability to generate cash flows (Zucca and 
Campbell, 1992). The assets write-off can have several financial consequences 
including: the reaction of stock markets, the possible subsequent M&A activity, the 
re-assessment of the firm financial health, as measured by certain key ratios (Zucca 
and Campbell, 1992; Gu and Lev, 2011). Given the important economic and market 
implications, this accounting choice is expected to be carefully assessed at the 
company’s top. Ownership structures and corporate governance can thus be 
potentially intervening variables in impairment decisions (Gu and Lev, 2011).  
Prior research on assets impairment focused on earnings management as a primary 
reason for write-offs (Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996). Taking 
advantage of the discretion allowed by accounting rules, the managers manipulate 
earnings, either through the timing of impairments and through the determination of 
the amount recorded as loss. The literature identified reporting incentives related to 
asset write-offs, such as debt contracting, big bath, income smoothing or 
management changes (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006; 
Zang, 2008).  In a related stream, other researchers suggest that the write-offs are not 
used for earnings manipulation, but to send credible information to the market about 
the effective decline in the values of the impaired assets (Rees et al., 1996; Godfrey 
et al., 2009; Jarva, 2009).  
In this part of the empirical research, I study the association between certain 
ownership structures and selected corporate governance mechanisms on the 
impairment of long-lived assets, that is PPE, intangibles and goodwill (Rees et al., 
1996; Guler, 2006; Chao and Horng, 2012).  In line with the most recent researches 
on assets write-offs, I partition the impairment losses into expected non-discretionary 
and unexpected discretionary portions. I then explore whether both ownership 
structures and corporate governance affect the magnitude of discretionary 
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impairment losses, comparing three different corporate governance environments: 
United Kingdom, Germany and Italy.  
The period 2006-2010 sets the stage for my investigation. This time frame saw the 
beginning and the development of the world economic crisis and provides an 
interesting empirical setting to investigate whether and how the ownership types and 
the governance structures influence the write-off of companies’ assets. 
Although being all European Countries, UK, Germany and Italy display a significant 
diversity. The UK setting is featured by large public companies with dispersed 
ownership, whilst Italy sees the dominance of companies featured by concentrated 
ownership and high insider shareholding in the board (often by controlling families 
members). The German setting shows a mix of large companies with more dispersed 
ownership and companies controlled by large dominant shareholders. The three 
Countries have also different governance systems: the one-tier system in UK and 
Italy, the two-tier system in Germany with wider stakeholders representation in the 
supervisory board (Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2009). 
Consistently with predictions by agency theory and political theory, I find that 
ownership types and corporate governance affect the magnitude of discretionary 
assets write-off. Insider ownership is positively associated to discretionary 
impairment losses in the UK and in the Italian sample. As expected, state ownership 
is found to be positively associated to discretionary asset write-off in the Italian 
sample. Institutional investors ownership is found to constrain the manipulation of 
assets impairment in the UK and in the German sample. Also, governance 
mechanisms in UK and German firms contribute to limit discretionary asset write-
offs. 
This analysis can contribute to prior literature in several ways. Firstly, it provides 
evidence that ownership types and corporate governance are intervening variables in 
the accounting decision-making process leading to assets impairment. Secondly, the 
findings suggest possible interdependencies among ownership structures and 
corporate governance in influencing the accounting choices. On the one hand, the 
ownership types influence on discretionary assets write-offs appear to be facilitated 
or constrained by the legal and the governance context; on the other hand, ownership 
structures can prevent effective monitoring by governance mechanisms.  
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3.1.2. Hypotheses( development( relating( to( ownership( structures( and(
corporate(governance(
 
The seminal work by Francis et al. (1996) posed two opposite views on the 
managerial discretion in recording assets impairment losses. Most of the following 
research was dedicated on understanding whether the assets impairment losses are 
guided either by earnings management purposes or by the objective to provide 
reliable information to the markets. Several studies found evidence that the asset 
write-offs are associated to managerial incentives like big bath, income smoothing, 
debt contracting, or CEO changes (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and 
Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008). Other studies found evidence that the asset write-offs are 
appropriate responses to changes in the firms’ performance and economic 
environment, like declines in profitability or declining macro-economic trend (Rees 
et al., 1996; Godfrey et al., 2009; Jarva, 2009). 
A common feature of this literature is the consideration of the impairment losses as 
either entirely opportunistically determined or entirely credible information. Unlike 
this literature, I follow the work by Chao and Horng (2012) in partitioning 
impairment losses into an expected non-discretionary portion and a discretionary 
portion. The non-discretionary portion captures the expected loss given a set of 
economic factors like the firm performance and growth opportunities, the industry 
performance and the macro-economic trend. The discretionary portion captures the 
impairment loss manipulation, either downward or upward, and its overall magnitude 
can be influenced by managerial reporting incentives. The lower is the magnitude of 
the discretionary impairment losses, the more reliable is the asset write-off 
information disclosed. I investigate if ownership and corporate governance influence 
the discretionary portion of the impairment losses, across different governance 
environments. 
 
Insider ownership !
The academic literature provides alternative views on the impact of insider 
ownership (ownership by corporate founders, controlling family members, managers, 
sitting in the board) on the accounts manipulation. One view is that low insider 
ownership implies poor alignment of interests between shareholders and managers 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). To mitigate agency conflicts, 
contractual constrains are used, often incorporating accounting-based restrictions on 
the managerial actions (e.g. debt covenant, bylaws, compensation rules). Corporate 
management may attempt to adjust accounting numbers to relieve such behavioural 
constraints (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 1990; Warfield et al., 1995). Prior 
literature found evidence of the management’s opportunistic behaviour, such as 
accrual manipulation, to increase earnings-based compensations, relax contractual 
constraints or avoid debt covenants (Holthausen et al., 1995). In this perspective, 
high insider shareholding implies a convergence of interests between insiders and 
outsiders shareholders (Leftwich et al., 1981; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This 
convergence of interests reduces the incentive for managers-shareholders to avoid 
behavioural constraints. Accordingly, prior literature found evidence of lower 
magnitude of accounts manipulation in companies with high insider ownership 
(Warfield et al., 1995). 
Alternatively, greater insider ownership can result in entrenchment by 
directors/shareholders and lack of market discipline (Morck et al., 1988; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004; Cornett et al., 2008). Insider shareholders may engage in the search 
for a trade-off between profits and private benefits (Morck et al., 1988). Insiders can 
try to maximize their own welfare and expropriate wealth from other investors as 
well as from other stakeholders, i.e. the employees (Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The entrenchment hypothesis predicts opportunistic behaviour 
detrimental to the outside shareholders’ interests, including extraction of private 
rents, compensation schemes, related party-transactions, accounts manipulation 
(Claessens et al. 2000; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  
Following prior literature, I expect that the entrenchment effect will overcome the 
alignment effect with regard to the manipulation of impairment losses, due to the 
nature of the insider shareholders concern. Ramanna and Watts (2009) suggest that 
equity-asset-pricing concern is a key factor influencing impairment manipulation. 
The accounting choices may take into account, or even try to influence, the stock 
prices (Fields et al., 2001; Ramanna, 2008). Insiders may be concerned that assets 
write-offs directly map into stock prices, affecting their own wealth (Ramanna, 
2008). The higher insider shareholding is, the greater would be the concern about the 
effect of asset write-offs. In this situation, insider shareholders may be tempted to put 
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private benefits ahead of market discipline (Morck et al., 1988; Claessens et al. 2000; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004). The equity-asset-pricing concern can thus lead to more 
discretionary impairment losses. 
Also, at high level of ownership, insider shareholders are more likely to have a long 
tenure as directors and to be responsible for the original acquisition decision of the 
impaired assets (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2009). Since the 
impairment may suggest that the acquisition price was too high, reputational concern 
may be added to the equity pricing concern, leading to more discretionary assets 
write-off (Francis et al., 1996; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2009). 
Given the abovementioned considerations, I formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, insider shareholding is positively associated to the 
magnitude of discretionary impairment losses. 
(
State ownership !
State-owned firms are de facto under the control of politicians (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). The key objectives of politicians can diverge from those of external investors 
and be different from the overall aim of maximizing the firm-value (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). The influence of state ownership over 
financial reporting can be explained basing on two broad views. 
The first view can be based on the political theories of North (1990) and Olson 
(1993), who generally argue that the primary objectives of politicians are staying in 
power and managing wealth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Bushman and Piotrovskij, 
2006). Through the control of enterprises and banks, the politicians may provide 
employment, subsidies and other benefits to supporters and cronies, who in return 
provide votes and other contributions, including bribes (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). Bushman et al. (2004) hypothesize that state-owned 
companies conceal firm specific information to hide expropriation activities by 
politicians and their cronies. Using a global sample, the Authors find that high state 
ownership of enterprises and banks is associated with reduced financial transparency. 
If politicians are interested in concealing the firms’ performance and overall 
financial situation, than the manipulation of the impairment losses can be part of 
their obfuscation activity. 
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The second perspective advocates a benevolent view of the state (Gerschenkorn, 
1962; Shleifer, 1998). This view argues that government ownership of firms can play 
a crucial development role, ensure general welfare, or deal with market 
imperfections, such as externalities (Shleifer, 1998). Even from a “benevolent” view 
of the state ownership, the pursue of public interest by politicians could be again 
detrimental to the external investors interests. Politicians may be more concerned by 
unemployment than by the firm-value maximization (Shleifer, 1998; Ding et al., 
2007; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). Also, politicians can sponsor local suppliers or 
keep afloat state-owned firms with financial difficulties (Huyghebaert and Wang, 
2012)147. These circumstances can lead to impairment losses manipulation, to avoid 
the economic and market implications of such write-offs. 
Both views on the politicians control of firms lead to the hypothesis that state 
ownership is associated to an increased magnitude of discretionary impairment 
losses. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, state ownership is positively associated to the 
magnitude of discretionary impairment losses. 
 
Institutional investors ownership !
Institutional investors have the financial ability and the incentives to be more 
informed and to exercise stricter control over the firms’ performance (Schipper, 
1989; Pound, 1992; El Gazzar, 1998; Koh, 2003). Large investors ownership makes 
option exits more expensive, given the significant discounts related to large share 
sales (Black and Coffee, 1994; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998). This implies 
that as the institutional investors shareholding increases, the cost of being less 
informed or inactive becomes more relevant (Pound, 1992), whilst the costs of 
monitoring and being better informed can lower by sharing those activities among 
joint groups of investors (Hand, 1990; Utama and Cready, 1997; El-Gazzar, 1998; 
Koh, 2003). Accordingly, the presence of such sophisticated market participants is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 The usage of a listed firm as tool to implement public policies is well embodied by the Petrobras 
case (Economist, 2012). Petrobras and its suppliers account for the 10% of the Brazilian GDP. 
Petrobras choices, such as the use of local highly expensive suppliers, instead of much cheaper 
imports, are driven by the state owner. Such choices benefits the local economy in the short term, but 
are against the interests of the other shareholders (and probably of Brazil in the long term as the 
Petrobras CEO argues). http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21566645-how-gra%C3%A7a-
foster-plans-get-brazils-oil-giant-back-track-perils-petrobras 
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found to be associated to overall higher quality financial reporting, i.e. reduced 
earnings management, higher disclosure quality (Bushee, 1998; Bradshaw et al., 
2004; Leuz and Wisocki, 2008).  
Besides the active control attitude, institutional investors tend to buy stocks in 
companies whose financial reporting is already believed to have a good level of 
reliability and quality. So, their presence can be expected in companies with more 
reliable accounting information (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Leuz and Wisocki, 2008).  
Given the abovementioned considerations, I expect that the institutional investors 
shareholding is negatively associated to the manipulation of impairment losses, as a 
result of the greater attention paid by such sophisticated market participants to 
quality financial reporting, as well as of the stricter control exercised over the 
financial information. I formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, institutional investors ownership is negatively 
associated to the magnitude of discretionary impairment losses.  
 
Corporate governance !
Corporate governance is a fundamental device to monitor the managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour. As already said in other parts of this thesis, a key aim of 
corporate governance is to help investors by aligning the interest of the managers 
with those of shareholders, as well as by ensuring that reliable information about the 
company’s performance is released to the outside (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dechow et al., 1996). 
Academic’s literature prevailing view is that stronger governance mechanisms 
ensures reliable financial reporting and limit accounts manipulation by managers 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Core et al., 1999; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005; DeFond et al., 2005; Gu and Lev, 2011). Empirical research found 
evidence of several governance mechanisms effective in enhancing the financial 
reporting quality and constraining accounts manipulation, such as: higher proportion 
of independent directors in the board (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996; Peasnell 
et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2008); separation of Chairman and CEO roles (Dechow et 
al., 1996; Cornett et al., 2009); board and audit committee meeting frequency (Xie et 
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al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ebrahim, 2007; Cornett et al., 2009; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Following this stream of literature, I expect that in weakly governed firms the level 
of discretionary impairment losses will be higher and vice versa. I formulate the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, stronger governance mechanisms are negatively 
associated to the magnitude of discretionary impairment losses.  
 
3.1.3. Research( design:( sample( selection,( ownership( structures,( corporate(
governance(and(discretionary(impairment(losses(estimation(
 
Sample selection  
 
The initial sample includes the UK firms listed in the FTSE 100, the German 
companies listed in the DAX 100 and the Italian firms listed in the FTSE-MIB 40 
and in the FTSE-MID 60 (taken together the two Italian indexes include the first 100 
companies per capitalization as the other two indexes). I then discarded the 
companies not listed continuously in the index in the period 2006-2010 and 
companies with missing or unavailable data over the period 2006-2010.  The final 
sample is composed by 1,420 firm-year observations (96 UK, 94 German and 94 
Italian individual firms). I gathered the ownership and corporate governance data 
from the firms’ websites and from their annual reports. The financial data were 
downloaded from Worldscope-Datastream. Data on impairment losses were hand-
collected from the companies’ annual reports. 
 
Discretionary impairment losses estimation 
 
Consistently with prior research, I jointly consider the impairment of long-lived 
assets, that is PPE, intangibles and goodwill (Rees et al., 1996; Guler, 2006; Chao 
and Horng, 2012). This choice is also consistent with the IAS 36, that (1) is not 
applied to assets such as the inventory or the financial assets; (2) requires a 
substantially unitary impairment procedure through the creation of cash generating 
units148. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 According to the IAS 36,& if it is not possible to estimate the recoverable amount of the individual 
asset, a company has to determine the recoverable amount of the cash-generating unit to which the 
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I use a dummy variable (IMPAIR) for the recognition of an impairment loss, 1 if 
there is an impairment loss on long-lived assets, 0 otherwise. The impairment losses 
are jointly considered, e.g. the dummy is 1 if both losses on goodwill and PPE are 
recognized in the year or if there is a loss in the year only on PPE. Another variable 
(WO%) measures the sum of impairment losses on long-lived assets on total assets, 
reflected as a positive amount  (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Godfrey and Koh, 
2009). 
I estimate the expected discretionary impairment losses by regressing the observed 
impairment losses on a set of economic factors, identified in prior literature as 
determinants of assets write-offs (Francis et al, 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 
2006; Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Chao and Horng, 2012). I then calculate the 
discretionary impairment losses as the difference among observed impairment losses 
and expected impairment losses. 
Following prior research I use the Heckman two stage selection model on the full 
sample of impairing and non-impairing firms (Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Chao and 
Horng, 2012). The first stage models the decision to report a write-off and the second 
models the amount of impairment loss. This procedure ensures that I take into 
account the decision to report a loss in the estimation of the discretionary impairment 
loss, avoiding possible self-selection biases (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Chao and 
Horng, 2012). Also, the two stage design allows to capture the two sequential 
choices (that is the decision to impair and the decision about the amount of the loss), 
without joining them as a single simultaneous choice (Riedl, 2004)149. The first step 
of the Heckman model is a probit regression of Model 1. 
 
Model 1 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
asset belongs. Given the nature of the goodwill and of most assets, the creation of CGUs is a standard 
procedure. The impairment loss for a CGU is to be allocated primarily to the goodwill and then pro 
rata to the other assets.   
149 This also reflects the IAS 36 decision pattern. The standard requires an assessment whether there is 
any indication that an asset may be impaired. If there are any indications, a measurement of the 
recoverable amount is required. 
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Where: = dummy variable, 1 if there is an impairment loss on long-lived 
assets, 0 otherwise. = firm’s i change in return on assets from period t to t-1; 
= firm’s i change in operating cash flows from period t to t-1; = 
growth options, proxied by the firm’s i market-to-book value at time t;  
= the median change in the firm i industry return on assets from period t to t-1;  
 = the median market-to-book ratio in firm i industry at time t; 
= change in the national gross domestic product at time t;  = dummy 
variable, 1 if the firm reported a loss at time t;  = firm’  size, proxied by the 
total assets at time t. 
  
I include in the equation the economic factors used in prior literature on the 
determinants of assets write-offs (Francis et al, 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 
2006; Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Chao and Horng, 2012). I firstly consider three firm-
specific economic factors. I use two measures aimed at capturing the firm’s 
performance: the change in the Return on Assets (ΔROA) from period t to t-1 and the 
change in the operating cash flows from period t to t-1, divided by the total assets at 
the end of t-1  (ΔOCF). I then consider the firm’s growth options. Firms that have 
lots of growth options will be less likely to record IAS 36 impairment losses because 
they are less likely to have impaired assets. I use the ratio of the firm’s market to 
book value of assets to proxy for its growth options (Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 
2006).  
Two industry-specific variables are added: the median change in the firm i industry 
return on assets from period t to t-1 (ΔINDROA), and the median market-to-book 
ratio in firm i industry at time t (INDGROWTH), proxying for the overall growth 
opportunities in the industry. To capture the changes in the macro-economic 
environment, I include the yearly change in the gross domestic product (ΔGDP). 
Finally, I control for the firm i’s size, proxied by the total assets at the end of t 
(SIZE), and for a dummy variable (LOSS), indicating 1 if the firm reported a loss 
and 0 otherwise (Godfrey and Koh, 2009). 
The second stage of the Heckman regression models the impairment losses. The 
regression includes the inverse Mills ratios (MILL) of the first stage probit regression 
fitted values as additional control variable (Heckman, 1976). Unlike prior literature 
itIMPAIR
itROAΔ
itOCFΔ  GROWTH it
itINDROAΔ
itINDGROWTH
itGDPΔ itLOSS
itSIZE
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(Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Chao and Horng, 2012), I use maximum likelihood 
estimation in the second regression instead of an OLS model. MLE allows more 
efficient estimates than least squares and avoids the problems related to the 
autocorrelation in the residuals of cross sectional time series data (Maddala, 1977; 
Greene, 1997; Gujarati, 2004). 
The second step of the Heckman two stage selection model is Model 2. The 
dependent variable of the regression is the relative amount of the impairment loss 
(IMPLOSS), defined above. 
Model 2 
 
 
Where:  = firm’s i reported write-offs in long-lived assets for period t 
(reflected as a positive amount ), divided by total assets at the end of period t – 1; 
= firm’s i change in return on assets from period t to t-1; = firm’s i 
change in operating cash flows from period t to t-1; = growth options, 
proxied by the firm’s i market-to-book value at time t;  = the median 
change in the firm i industry return on assets from period t to t-1;   
= the median market-to-book ratio in firm i industry at time t; = change in 
the national gross domestic product at time t;  = dummy variable, 1 if the 
firm reported a loss at time t;  = firm’  size, proxied by the total assets at time 
t; = inverse Mills ratios of the first stage probit regression. 
The dependent variable (the magnitude of discretionary impairment losses) is given 
by the absolute value of the residuals of Model 2. 
Ownership structures, corporate governance and discretionary impairment  
In this study, I measure insider ownership (INSIDE) as the percentage of ordinary 
shares held by the firm’s directors, regardless of whether they are executive or not 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Klein, 2002; Jiambalvo 
et al., 2002; Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2007; Choi et al., 2012). The 
government ownership (STATE) is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares 
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held by the national government, its agencies or by local authorities (Ding et al., 
2007; Chen et al., 2008; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). The institutional investors 
ownership (INST) is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
professional investors, including banks, investment funds and pension funds (Utama 
and Cready, 1997; Koh, 2003; Park and Shin, 2004). 
To proxy for the strength of governance mechanisms, I use a comprehensive measure 
(CORPGOV), aimed at capturing the overall firm specific governance environment 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Davila and Penalva 2006; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. 
2007; Chao and Horng, 2012). The comprehensive measure is calculated as the un-
weighted average of the standardized value of four variables for the UK and the 
Italian sample: the proportion of independent directors in the board (Dechow et al., 
1996; Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2008); the separation of 
Chairman and CEO roles (Dechow et al., 1996; Cornett et al., 2009); the board and 
the audit committee meeting frequency (Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005; Ebrahim, 2007; Cornett et al., 2009; Greco, 2011). For the German sample, the 
composite measure is given by the following variables: the proportion of 
independent directors in the supervisory board (Aste, 1999; Siregar and Utama, 
2008; Millet-Reyes and Zhao, 2010), the supervisory board and the audit committee 
meeting frequency (Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ebrahim, 2007; 
Cornett et al., 2009; Greco, 2011). 
I also control for ownership concentration (OWNCONC), proxied by the percentage 
of ordinary shares owned by the larger shareholders. Ownership concentration is 
used in prior international comparison studies on earnings manipulation (Leuz et al., 
2003). This inclusion allows the study of the influences on discretionary assets write-
off that are related to the different owner type (insider, state and institutional 
investors) taking into account the effect of large shareholding (Leuz et al., 2003). 
I include in the model proxies for reporting incentives (Rees et al., 1996; Francis et 
al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Godfrey et al., 2009; 
Jarva, 2009). The proxy for big bath reporting (BATH) is equal to the change in the 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings from period t to t-1 divided by the total assets at the end 
of period t -1 when below the median of nonzero negative values, 0 otherwise (Riedl, 
2004). The proxy for income smoothing (SMOOTH) is equal to the change in the 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings from period t to t-1 divided by the total assets at the end 
of period t -1 when above the median of nonzero positive values, 0 otherwise (Riedl, 
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2004). The firm leverage (LEV) is measured by the firm’s total debt at time t, 
divided by the total assets. Additionally, we control for the firm’s size (SIZE), 
proxied by the total assets at time t. 
The following equation shows Model 3, including independent variables and control 
variables. 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Where: = discretionary impairment losses (see above);  = insider 
ownership, percentage of ordinary shares held by directors for firm i; = 
state ownership, percentage of ordinary shares held by the national or local 
governments or their agencies for  firm i; = institutional investors ownership, 
percentage of ordinary shares, held by institutional investors form firm i; 
= composite measure of the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms (see the text above for the details); = percentage of 
ordinary share owned by the largest shareholder;  =  big bath, equal to the 
change in the firm’s pre-write-off earnings from period t to t-1 divided by the total 
assets at the end of period t -1 when below the median of nonzero negative values, 0 
otherwise;  = income smoothing, equal to the change in the firm’s pre-
write-off earnings from period t to t-1 divided by the total assets at the end of period 
t -1 when above the median of nonzero positive values, 0 otherwise;  = 
leverage, measured by  by the firm’s total debt at time t, divided by the total assets; 
 = firm’ size, proxied by the total assets at time t. 
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3.1.4. Empirical( results( on( the( influence( of( ownership( structures( and(
corporate(governance(on(the(discretionary(impairment(losses(
 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for assets impairment in each Country settings are 
displayed in Table 3. The effect of the economic crisis can be seen in the overall 
frequency of the assets impairments, as well as in their relative amount. Yet there are 
differences in each Country. UK shows the smallest number of impairment losses 
recognised and the highest relative amount. Germany shows the highest number of 
impairment losses (323 observations) and a steady number per year with the 
exception of year 2009 when the economic crisis peaked in Europe. In the German 
sample, the impairment test seems to be made on a regular basis, with changes on the 
relative amount that follows the economic trend. In the UK sample the number of 
impairments dramatically increase from the 2008 on, together with the relative 
amount of impairment losses. 
 
[INSERT Table!3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Italian sample displays a different pattern. The number of impairment losses in 
the Italian firms steadily grows in the period, this may hint that some impairments 
were delayed. The relative amount follows more closely the economic trend, being 
smaller on average than in the other two Countries. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample companies. The average size 
of UK firms is almost the double of the German firms, with the Italian companies 
being on average the smallest (36 billions € of total assets).  Ownership structures 
appear to be different across settings. Overall, ownership concentration is very high 
in the Italian companies, where the first shareholder owns on average the 44% of the 
ordinary shares. UK is the Country with the less concentrated ownership, whilst 
Germany is in the middle with average ownership concentration of 24,6%. Average 
insider ownership is 21% in the Italian firms, such type of ownership is significantly 
smaller in the other two sample: 7,6% for the German sample and 2,5% for the UK 
sample. Institutional investors ownership is on average slightly above the 20% in 
German and UK firms, whilst it is 3,8% for the Italian firms. State ownership is 
present in the Italian setting (average the 5,8%) and in the German setting (2,9%), 
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whilst it is almost absent in the UK setting. State ownership appears in the UK after 
the government bailout of some banks that followed the financial crisis.   
Overall the statistics show that UK is featured by public companies, with low insider 
ownership and significant presence of institutional investors. Italy sees smaller 
public companies with large dominant shareholder and significant presence of 
insiders and of the state. Germany is somewhat in the middle, with a mix of large 
public companies with dispersed ownership and firms owned by large shareholders. 
The institutional investors ownership is high, with a considerable presence of banks 
(by contrast UK sees a wider presence of investment and pension funds). 
 
[INSERT Table!4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Discretionary impairment losses estimation 
Table 5 shows the Heckman two-stage maximum-likelihood estimation of Model 2 
for each sample analyzed. The results show that the determinants of assets 
impairment are mainly firm-specific. Across panels, the changes in the operating 
profit (ΔROA) and the growth options (GROWTH) are negatively significantly 
associated with impairment losses (WO%). Worsening operating profitability and 
poor growth options are associated to higher impairment losses. Also the impairment 
losses are positively significantly associated to a loss reported in the income 
statement (LOSS), with p-value <0.001 in all the panels. The industry-level variables 
are not significant or poorly significant.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with prior research (Riedl, 2004; Godfrey and 
Koh, 2009; Chao and Horng, 2012): the firm-specific conditions affect the 
impairment losses to a greater extent than the industry-level trend. I can extend this 
finding to the macro-economic trend that is not significantly associated to 
impairment losses.  
As abovementioned, the discretionary impairment losses (DWO) are given by the 
absolute value of the residuals of the regressions of Model 2. 
 
[INSERT Table!5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Impact of ownership types and corporate governance on discretionary assets write-
offs 
 
To examine the impact of ownership types and corporate governance on 
discretionary assets write-offs, I use a Tobit regression of Model 3. The Tobit 
regression, whose mechanics is based on the method of maximum-likelihood, is 
widely used in prior research on the impairment of assets (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 
2004; Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Chao and Horng, 2012)150.  
Table 6 displays the results. The findings show that insider shareholding (INSIDE) is 
significantly positively associated to discretionary assets write-off in the Italian 
setting (p-value <0.01, Panel B). These findings provide support for HP1: equity-
asset-pricing concern and reputation concern can be effective incentives to 
impairment losses manipulation. As predicted by HP2, state ownership (STATE) is 
found to be significantly positively associated to a higher magnitude of discretionary 
impairment losses in the Italian sample. As expected, the politicians’ control of listed 
firms can lead to divergence of interests with the other shareholders and to increased 
accounts manipulation.   
 
[INSERT Table!6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The association between institutional investors ownership and discretionary assets 
write-off is instead not significant in the Italian setting (Panel C). 
In the Italian sample the governance mechanisms do not display a significant 
association with the impairment losses manipulation. 
Consistently with prior research, the proxies for the management reporting incentives 
appear to influence the magnitude of discretionary assets write-off (Rees et al., 1996; 
Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Godfrey and 
Koh, 2009; Jarva, 2009). Income smoothing (SMOOTH) is a relevant factor 
associated to increased discretionary asset write-off in the Italian sample (Panel B, p-
value <0.01) and in the German sample (Panel C, p-value <0.05). The leverage 
(LEV) has a significant positive correlation with discretionary asset write-off in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150  The Tobit regression is considered appropriate given the censored nature of the data on 
impairment. The IAS/IFRS (as the US GAAP in other studies) do not allow reversal of impairment on 
goodwill. “These unobservable increases are the censored portion of the distribution of the 
impairment losses that the Tobit model attempts to fill in” (Riedl, 2004, p. 828). Godfrey and Koh 
(2008) and Chao and Horng (2012) provide further discussion on this point. 
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Italian sample. Consistently with prior research, more indebted firms appear to be 
more prone to impairment losses manipulation (Francis et al., 1996; Beatty and 
Weber, 2006). 
 
3.1.5. Discussion(of(the(findings(
 
Besides affecting the current earnings, the impairment of assets has several financial 
consequences, such as the reaction of stock markets, the possible subsequent M&A 
activity, the subsequent increased attention on the financial health of the firm (Zucca 
and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Gu and Lev, 2011). Some 
possible governance consequences regard the damages to the reputation of CEOs and 
executives responsible for the acquisition of the impaired assets and/or for the 
subsequent management of those assets (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and 
Watts, 2009). Given such relevant implications, I expected in this part of the study 
that ownership structures and corporate governance affected this accounting choice. 
Overall, the results are in line with this expectation: the ownership types and the 
governance mechanisms affect the unexpected discretionary portion of the 
impairment losses. 
The specific ownership types appear to play a relevant role in the accounting 
decision-making process leading to assets impairment. After controlling for 
ownership concentration I find that specific owner types are associated to increased 
or lessened discretionary losses. The international comparison uncovers the 
complexity of such influence. I found both similarities and differences across the 
Country settings. 
In the UK sample the average insider ownership is much lower than in the Italian 
sample. However, insider ownership is associated to increased discretionary assets 
write-off in both cases, suggesting a homogeneous behaviour regardless of the 
ownership level. This is not confirmed in the German sample. The lack of significant 
association could be related to the specific German governance environment151 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Li and Filer, 2007). A key feature of the German 
governance environment is the monitoring activity by supervisory boards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 In this discussion I follow the concept of “governance environment” by Li and Filer (2007). The 
Authors consider not only the legally established governance system, but also the social, political and 
economic elements that interplay with governance system in shaping the firm-specific behaviour. 
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(representing a wide range of important shareholders such as the banks, the 
investment and pension funds), that play a central role in the German economy 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Du Plessis et al., 2012). The influence on the 
accounting decisions by insider owners, sitting in the supervisory board and not 
directly involved in the management board, could be lessened or mediated (Aste, 
1999; Millett-Reyes and Zhao, 2010; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Du Plessis et al., 
2012). 
In the UK sample and in the German sample, ownership by institutional investors is 
associated to reduced discretionary asset write-offs. As expected, the greater 
attention paid by such sophisticated market participants to quality financial reporting 
and the stricter control exercised over the financial information, are associated to a 
lower magnitude of discretionary write-offs. No significant association is found in 
the Italian firms. In Italy, concentrated ownership, high risks of wealth expropriation 
and lack of independence in the board, make more difficult for institutional investors 
any influence on the decision-making process (Dyck and Zingales, 1994; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006; Di Pietra et al., 2008; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013).  Once reached a minimum shareholding threshold, the Italian law 
allows the nomination of a “minority” director. If such director nomination is 
proposed at the general shareholders meeting, the appointment is mandatory. Even 
with this device, minority directors can have the access to financial information from 
the inside, but they are still substantially unable to influence the overall strength of 
governance control mechanisms and any key board decision (Gutierrez Urtiaga and 
Saez, 2012; D’Onza et al., 2014)152.   
State ownership is associated to higher levels of discretionary impairment losses in 
the Italian sample. This result is consistent with the political theory expectations 
about the divergence of interests between controlling politicians and external 
shareholders. Either driven by the politicians’ interests or by “common good 
objectives”, state owned companies have incentives to manipulate assets write-offs.  
This result is not found in the German sample. Besides monitoring the management, 
the other key task of the German supervisory board is to reconcile the interests of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 An interesting example episode of minority director “in action” is provided by the Telecom Italia 
2010 case. After the recognition of an impairment loss at the end of year 2010, a minority director 
recommended “further checks” on the carrying value of the goodwill, hinting at a possible 
underestimation of the loss. Although having access to financial information, he was not able to 
influence the final accounting decision. (Sole24Ore, 2010; http://archivio-
radiocor.ilsole24ore.com/articolo-904406/telecom-svaluta-avviamento/) 
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different stakeholders in the discussion of key managerial decisions (Hutzschenreuter 
et al., 2012; Du Plessis et al., 2012). There is no such room for political bargaining 
among politicians and shareholders, as well as stakeholders, in the one-tier 
governance system.  
The German two-tier system may be functional to the monitoring activity exerted by 
banks and institutional investors on the decision making process. This could explain 
why institutional investors ownership is a significant variable affecting discretionary 
impairment losses unlike the other ownership variables considered. This 
interpretation is supported by the significant effect of governance mechanisms in 
constraining impairment manipulation. 
Overall, the international comparison undertaken suggests possible 
interdependencies among ownership structures and corporate governance in 
influencing the accounting decision-making (Judge, 2011). On the one hand, the 
governance environment can shape the influence of ownership structures on the 
accounting decision-making process, as in the German case. On the other hand, the 
findings on the Italian sample suggest that the prevailing ownership structures affect 
the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in constraining accounts manipulation. 
In the Italian context, widespread large insider shareholding prevent efficient board 
monitoring and professional independent control, as this could limit the exploitation 
of the private control benefits, including the extraction of private rents (Dyck and 
Zingales, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006; Di Pietra et 
al., 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Within this context, governance mechanisms 
can hardly influence the accounting decision-making process, leaving it in the hands 
of dominant owners. Illustration 3.1 sketches the proposed dynamics. 
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Illustration 3.1 The Relationship between Ownership structures, corporate governance and the 
accounting decision-making process 
Ownership!structures!!
• State!ownership!
• Institutional!ownership!
• Insider!ownership!
• Ownership!concentration!!
Corporate!Governance!
• Independent!directors!
• CEO!duality!
• Board!of!directors!and!Audit!Committee!meetings!
Accounting 
decision-making 
process 
 141 
 
3.2. Impairment and CFOs perceptions 
 
The fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 
2002 requires that the CFO and CEO certify the 
financial reports of public companies likely 
elevates the power and importance of CFOs 
beyond that of other executives. 
Bedard et al. 2014 
 
 
In the previous sections I investigate the incentives that CEO and the director have to 
manage the earnings. In this section I aim at considering the role that the Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) assume in the impairment test. While in the past the role 
of the CFO was mainly associated to the function of “financial record keeping”, 
currently the CFO position evolved and it is considered one of the top management 
members together with the CEO and the Chief Operating Officer (Copeland, 2001). 
The academic literature indicates that there is still little research on the role played 
by the CFOs on accounting manipulation (Geiger and North, 2006; Feng et al., 
2011). As outlined above the literature concentrated on the CEOs or other corporate 
governance subjects and the earnings management (see Dechow et al., 2010). More 
recently the literature is wondering on the role of the CFOs in the financial reporting 
reliability, for example Jiang et al. (2010) entitles their paper as follows: “CFOs and 
CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?”. Considering that 
CFOs’ main accountability is ensuring that the financial reporting process and 
product are adequate, Jiang et al. (2010) assume and provide evidence that CFOs 
equity incentives are even more relevant than CEOs equity incentives in constraining 
(exacerbating) earnings management.  
We derive that CFOs equally to CEOs has compensation incentives also from the 
fact that e.g. the Securities and Exchange Commission laws require disclosure on the 
compensation paid to CEOs, CFOs and other top-executive officers of public 
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companies153. 
Furthermore, CFOs may be strongly influenced and pressured by the CEOs. Some 
studies find that top-management position (including CFOs) is more likely to change 
after CEOs changes. CFOs have incentives to maintain the CEO in charge; hence, 
they might adopt earnings management practices to obtain certain income results 
(e.g. boosting income when performance is low). These studies imply a very close 
relationship between CEO and CFOs (Mian, 2001; Fee and Hadlock, 2004) and those 
CFOs are agents and subordinates of the CEO (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Feng et 
al., 2011). 
Geiger and North (2006) empirically demonstrate the pivotal role that CFOs have 
over the firms financial reporting. They examine the variation in discretionary 
accruals in the period surrounding the CFO change in a sample of 712 companies. 
Their results suggest that the CFO change is associated with a decrease in 
discretionary accruals. 
Following this short review of the literature I assume that the theory and logic behind 
the CEO reporting incentives could also be applied to the CFO position. Might CFOs 
thoughts on the managerial incentives to manipulate earnings uncover also the 
incentives that they consider in their accounting choices? This assumption motivates 
the building of a survey conducted on a sample of CFOs contacted through LinkedIn. 
However, this question cannot be answered without an underlying solid theory. 
Hence, the aim of this empirical part on the CFOs is just to receive their feedbacks 
on the impairment of goodwill, as they certainly are together with the CEO amongst 
the most influential subject within the firm in the financial reporting process. 
As suggested by Graham et al. (2005) the surveys provides opportunities to query to 
the CFOs precise and qualitative questions about the motivation underlying certain 
financial reporting decisions. Also, the questionnaire format allows taking into 
account the views of the subjects involved in the accounting decision, leading to an 
integrated and multidimensional perspective on accounting choices (Fields et al., 
2001) instead of further narrow the research focus on the data gathered from 
databases. The survey in few words allows obtaining a diverse explanation on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 The SEC clearly states that: «Compensation of the principal financial officer is important to 
shareholders because along with the principal executive officer, the principal financial officer 
provides the certifications required with the company’s periodic reports and has important 
responsibility for the fair presentation of the company’s financial statements and financial 
information» (SEC, 2006). 
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phenomena explored with archival data. Inspired also by a recent study by Pajunen 
and Saastamoinen (2013) on the perceptions’ of auditors about earnings management 
in goodwill accounting under IFRS, I decided to extend their interest with additional 
questions and with the perceptions of another important group: the CFOs. 
 
3.2.1. Research(design(and(survey(delivery(!
I built the initial questionnaire basing on prior literature on goodwill write-offs and 
on a recent questionnaire on the subsequent measurement of goodwill available on 
the website of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group and of the OIC 
(Organismo Italiano di Contabilità) (EFRAG and OIC, 2014). 
Once designed the questionnaire, I conducted five pilot tests soliciting feedbacks on 
the structure of the survey, its length, wording and some possible omissions or 
undervalued aspects. The pilot test has been done by five persons: a Full Professor in 
Accounting, a Researcher whose main interests are on Accounting and Corporate 
Governance, a Ph.D. Student in Statistics, a Ph.D. Student in Accounting and 
Finance and a Chief Professional Accountant. To complete the survey the pilot tests 
lasted between 4 to 18 minutes. I have been recommended to add just a demographic 
question and few other small editing to the wording and format.   
I sent the survey link to my LinkedIn connections with CFOs previously added to my 
connection network. In August 2015 I send the survey to 1,604 CFOs from all over 
the world. By the beginnings of January 2016, 441 CFOs responded to the invitation. 
Given the high rate of responses (27.5%) I did not send the invitation to require the 
participation of non-respondents. In a sample of 441 respondents, 301 work for an 
organization adopting the IAS/IFRS, 65 the US-GAAP and the remaining 75 in 
organizations adopting national accounting standards (neither IAS/IFRS nor US-
GAAP). When the CFOs worked for an organization, which does adopt neither 
IAS/IFRS nor US-GAAP the questionnaire does not proceed; hence the sample 
reduces to 366 responses (response rate 22.8%). The response rate even reduced by 
the responses of CFOs working in firms that do not adopt IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP, 
can be considered still an excellent rate compared to similar researches154. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Smith (2003: 125) states that in accounting studies are usual response rates lower than 25%. 
Indjejikian and Matèjka (2009) on a survey of 29,857 members of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants who are CFOs, CEOs, or other executives obtained a response rate of 6.8%. 
Graham et al. (2005) emailed 3,174 members of an organization of financial executives. Of the 3,174 
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I further exclude the responses to the questionnaire when the survey has not been 
entirely completed by the CFOs (191 partial responses eliminated). The final sample 
on which I conduct the successive analysis is formed by 175 responses, of which 141 
derives from CFOs working in an IAS/IFRS context and 34 in a US-GAAP context.  
 
[INSERT Table!7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2.2. The(questionnaire(!
Five sections make up the questionnaire (see Appendix B2 for the full questionnaire).  
In the first section I require to answer to personal and background information. 
Specifically, I ask if they seat in the board as director, their gender and age, the level 
of education completed and their academic major(s), how many total years they have 
worked as CFO (or similar position) and where they administratively report. 
In the second section of the questionnaire I ask the information about the 
organization for which the CFO is currently working. I ask information on the 
location (head office) of the organization155, about the type of organization (i.e. 
privately held, publicly traded company, governmental and not-for-profit 
organization), the broad industry of the organization, the size (in terms of total assets, 
total employees and total revenues), if the organization is multinational, the 
ownership structure, who is the external auditor, magnitude of the goodwill and who 
carries out the impairment test within the organization. 
Section three enters in the personal interpretation or perception that the CFOs have 
about the impairment of goodwill. This section is formed by four main questions for 
which the responses are of the “star rating” type, allowing participant to rate the 
question with a seven level Likert-scale. The participants give the rate according to 
their agreement with the statements proposed (1, strongly disagree; 2, disagree; 3, 
partially disagree; 4, neutral; 5, partially agree; 6, agree and 7, strongly agree). Thus, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
surveyed executives, 267 responded leading to a response rate of 8.4%. My result can be favourably 
compared also with Daugherty and Tervo (2008) that surveyed Audit Committee chairpersons, CEOs 
and CFOs of the S&P 500 and obtained an overall 5.5% response rate (the response rate on the CFOs 
was lighter higher, 6.8%), Brav et al., (2005) that obtained a response rate of 16% on financial 
executives, with Graham and Harvey (2001) that obtained a response rate of nearly 9% on the total 
4,440 CFOs faxed out and with Trahan and Gitman (1995) that emailed 700 CFOs and obtained a 
response rate of the 12%. 
155 The location results are not tabulated: however, there are not significant differences amongst the 
responses. 
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higher scores correspond to a higher level of agreement with the question/statement 
proposed. 
The first rate group concerns with CFOs’ perceptions on the reliability and relevance 
of the goodwill impairment testing. The questions asked in this group are well 
summarised by the doctrinal debate over the discretionary use of the impairment 
losses (the impairment losses are discretionary used to achieve reporting incentives 
or to send credible signals to the market). In the second group of questions I 
specifically ask the CFOs opinion on the managerial incentives to discretionally use 
the goodwill write-off (e.g. to meet analysts forecasts, to maintain high the CEO 
reputation, to smooth the earnings, etc.). Then, the following group report the 
perceptions on the influences that the ownership structures might have on the 
discretionary use of the goodwill write-off (e.g. managerial ownership reports 
untimely and undervalued goodwill write-off, institutional investors constraints the 
use of discretionary goodwill write-off, etc.). Finally, the last group comprehends the 
perceptions on the influence of certain external auditors characteristics on the 
impairment of goodwill (e.g. Big-4 or expert auditor are better able to constraint the 
goodwill write-off manipulation, mandatory auditor rotation helps in detecting the 
discretionary use of goodwill write-off, etc.). 
The last section of the questionnaire includes the overall thought of the CFOs on the 
accounting for goodwill asking how difficult is assessing the estimates underlying 
the impairment of goodwill, if they compare their evaluation with other evaluation(s) 
of subject(s) in other positions, if they believe that other accounting methods should 
be considered for goodwill and which of a list of suggested methods might enforce 
the reliability of goodwill (e.g. reintroduction of goodwill amortization, additional 
disclosure, to offset goodwill against the equity, etc.). At the end of the questionnaire 
I ask if overall they prefer the impairment test than prior amortization process. 
The duration of the survey ranges between 1 to 57 minutes. The questionnaire 
average time was 17 minutes, while the median time is 13 minutes. The mode is 10 
minutes (results not tabulated). The quality of the information of the data collected 
should be considered good. Indeed, in literature it is suggested that the respondents’ 
attention declines after about 30 minutes (Smith, 2003; Perecman and Curran, 2006). 
I assess the internal consistency of the survey by means of Cronbach's alpha to 
determine whether all the items considered are consistent. Of the total sample of 175 
cases, 174 were processed and 1 was excluded (listwise exclusion of cases)(results 
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not tabulated). The Cronbach’s alpha results 0.760 indicating overall good 
consistency between the 99 items used in the survey156. Deleting any of the 99 
variables would leave the scale’s overall reliability more or less unchanged; hence I 
retained all the items and proceeded with the following analysis. 
 
3.2.3. Survey(results(!
The results on the demographics of the surveyed CFOs indicate that 45% of the 
respondents are also member of the board of directors. The respondents are mainly 
males (96%) and in the 60% of the respondents’ age ranges between 36 and 50 years 
old. The 5.1% of the respondents have an education level lower than the 
undergraduate diploma and the majors academics indicated are finance, accounting, 
general business/management, economics and mathematics/statistics. Almost half of 
the participants CFOs have an experience of more than 10 years in CFOs or similar 
positions. Almost three out of four CFOs administratively report to the CEO, this is 
an important issue that might be further investigated through the perspective of the 
literature on the pressure exerted by CEOs on the CFOs.  
[INSERT Table!8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The frequencies on the demographics of the organizations for which the respondents 
work indicate that the 54.9% is a non-listed company, while the 42.9% are public 
companies, only 1.1% public sector companies and another 1.1% other type of 
organizations. More than a third of the respondents work in the manufacturing 
industry, 10.9% in the service industry, 9.7% in the finance, insurance and real estate 
industry, 6.9% in the construction and again 6.9% in the retail trade, the remaining 
share is split amongst the agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, transportation and 
public utilities, wholesale trade and other industries. More than half of the 
respondents work in organization with more than 1001 employee while in terms of 
total assets and total revenues more than half of the companies is in the smaller sized 
class, that is less than 500 millions dollars. However, the majority of the companies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 Smith (2003: 127) indicates that: «An alpha of 0.8 is normally deemed to be satisfactory, though 
figures slightly lower than this may be acceptable». Nunnally (1978) and Nunnally and Bernstein 
(1994) recommend reliabilities levl of 0.7 or better for basic research and beyond 0.9 when important 
decision are to be made basing on the scores of the test. 
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is international/multinational (73.7%). More than 40% of the respondents work in 
organization whose ownership is mainly familiar, a 30.9% in organization with 
dispersed ownership, 25.7% in organization with prevalence of managerial 
ownership and the remaining 2.3% in mainly governmental-owned companies. 80% 
of the participant financial report are audited by a Big-4 auditor. In terms of 
relevance of the responses it is important to note that only 27% of the respondents 
are working in organization with no goodwill recognised in the statement of financial 
position, while the 20% of the respondents indicate a total value of goodwill higher 
than the 9.1% to total assets, the remaining half of the respondents have goodwill 
value in the classes between 0.1% and 9%. It is relevant to see that about 45% of the 
companies carry out the impairment test internally, more than 20% recur to external 
experts and audit and a third of the sample companies carry out the impairment test 
in cooperation between internal and external experts. This last response arise how 
actually this procedure may involve a large spectre of subjects. 
 
[INSERT Table!9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Moving the attention to the core of the survey I consider for a more direct 
interpretation of the results together the scores 5, 6 and 7 as agreement with the 
statement proposed and the scores 1, 2, 3 jointly as expression of an overall 
disagreement with my propositions. I do not consider in the interpretation the neutral 
score of 4. 
Starting from the first group of propositions, we can see that overall more than 70% 
of the respondents agree that the impairment test provide a more faithful 
representation compared to the amortization. However, at the same time, about the 
60% of the respondents believe that the eliminations of the goodwill amortization 
increased the subjectivity. Also, about 66% of participants think that the valuation 
based on estimated future cash flows is useful in financial reporting and about the 
64% disagree that the management exploits the room for discretion allowed by the 
accounting standards. Consistently with this last result, more than 70% of the 
respondents disagree also that management will not recognize goodwill write-offs 
when the goodwill is impaired and as a consequence about 63% (66%) of the 
respondents are convinced that the impairment losses on goodwill reflect the 
underlying macro (micro) conditions in which the company operates. These 
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responses and percentages are confirmed by the results on the question posed in an 
inverse manner. Indeed, only 28% of the CFOs believe that management 
discretionally uses the goodwill write-offs to match with its own incentives or to 
send credible signals to the outside (about 34%). 
The second group of responses indicate that only the 36% of the CFOs agree that in 
organization with more liquid shares the management is more likely to recognize 
goodwill write-offs but more than 54% believes that prohibiting goodwill write-offs 
reversals leads to untimely and/or underestimated write-offs. About 40% of the 
CFOs agree that the management uses discretionary goodwill write-offs to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. Optimistic analysts earnings forecasts according to CFOs seems 
to be a more preponderant incentives for management compared to other aspects 
such as liquidity of the market, personal incentives and signalling to the outside. Also 
the leverage and the compensation schemes seem strong incentives to manipulate the 
impairment losses (about 40% of agreement for both of them). Reputation concerns 
apparently are even more important according to about 46% of the CFOs. As 
predicted and tested by accounting literature, CEO changes are thought to be relevant 
incentives (about 42% of respondents agree). Concerning big bath and income 
smoothing incentives we can see that CFOs are worried about both of them (about 
49% and 39% agree). 
Regarding the ownership structures (group 3, Table!10) I find that 40% of the CFOs 
consider managerial ownership risky for untimely and underestimated goodwill 
write-offs, the concentrated and state ownership also are believed to increase the use 
of discretionary write-offs (about 41% and 31% agree respectively), while 
accordingly the institutional ownership are perceived as effective constraining tools 
in the manipulation of goodwill write-offs (about 49% and 37% respectively agree). 
Finally, with reference to the role of the external auditors the CFOs overall agree on 
their constraining attitude towards managerial discretion in the write-offs and that 
Big-4 auditors can exert an even higher constraint on this discretion (both 
agreements are at the level of more than the 62% of the respondents). Opposing to 
the audit-risk model predicted by the auditing literature (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008), 
only 25% of the sample CFOs believes that higher audit fees indicate higher audit 
risk and as a consequence potential untimely or underestimated goodwill write-offs. 
Also, only 32% believes that higher non-audit-fees weaken the auditor independence 
increasing discretionary goodwill write-offs. An overall conviction is that both 
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higher auditor expertise in the industry and in the task of assessing goodwill write-
offs limit the discretion in these estimates (agreement of about 65% and 64% 
respectively). We can read the results on auditor tenure and mandatory auditor 
rotation jointly as indication that the CFOs although agree on the possibility that 
long-tenured auditor better detect earnings management (40%) are more convinced 
that mandatory auditor rotation is helpful in the prevention of goodwill write-offs 
manipulation (60%), this result might contribute to the literature supporting the 
mandatory auditor rotation. 
 
[INSERT Table!10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Ramanna and Watts (2012) argues that the estimates underlying the impairment of 
goodwill are hardly verifiable and auditable ex-post. The surveyed CFOs believe that 
for them these estimates are not so hard to assess (about 45% of the CFOs indicate 
that these estimates are from partially easy to very easy to assess), while they 
perceive it is more difficult for auditors (almost 50% indicate that these estimates are 
from partially difficult to very difficult for auditors to assess). This is a significant 
result which contributes to the above literature and which warns standard setters and 
regulators. 
 
[INSERT Table!11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, more than half of the participants use the economic or financial ratios to 
evaluate the overall reliability of the impairment test, about the 45% consider the 
organization risks and 40% whether the financial report has been audited. About 37% 
of the respondents take into account the disclosure and explanations provided for the 
impairment, 29% whether the impairment test has been delegated to third parties and 
27% the company corporate governance system. I did not expect that the 16% do not 
use any specific measures or procedures to check the reliability of the process. A 
CFO than specified that he (or she) uses the historic performance of the cash 
generating unit while another revealed to use the sensitivity analysis disclosed. 
Again, I did not expect that so many respondents do not compare their evaluation 
with the evaluation(s) of other subjects (44%), this result may contribute to the 
behavioural studies on the top-executives overconfidence. Although, 31% of the 
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participants admit to compare their evaluation with those of the controller, 19% with 
those of the internal auditor, 17% with those of the process owner, 15% with those of 
the risk managers and 13% with those of the compliance officer. 
More than 53% of the respondents believe that exist other ways to account for 
goodwill, which might better match the information usefulness objective of financial 
reporting. When asked to indicate which way they suggest in order to enforce the 
goodwill reliability more than 47% indicates the requirement of additional 
disclosure. A wide percentage (37%) believes also that the reintroduction of goodwill 
amortization and its eventual review for impairment might solve the reliability 
issues. We can see that also accounting for goodwill as other intangibles (with 
definite useful life) is perceived as a good solution (27%) as well as to offset 
goodwill against equity (26%) or to expense it on business combination (23%) or to 
determine the value of goodwill as the difference between the book value of the 
equity and the long-term market value of equity. This question raised the interest of 
some CFOs who for instance recommend as follows: «If no amortisation 
reintroduction will be possible, then are absolutely important: a) standardisation of 
mechanism on WACC, g rate and other parameters; b) possibility to reaccount an 
impaired goodwill in front to different economics conditions; 3) impose very 
mandatorily all the sensitivities to be done and to be reported in the disclosures», or 
suggest that the relevance of benchmarks and specialized firms, or the need of 
standardised test methods considering also the capital market valuation practice or 
another that firmly states as follows: «I believe the current approach is the best even 
though it introduces subjectivity». 
Purposely, the questionnaire concludes by asking CFOs their overall preference 
between the impairment test and the amortization process and more than two thirds 
of the respondents (66%) prefer the impairment test. 
 
[INSERT Table!12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The survey method is not immune from potential limitations. First, the perceptions of 
CFOs may diverge from their actual actions. CFOs also may respond replicating 
what they have learned in business schools and training courses without actually 
expressing their perceptions. They may indeed believe that I want to hear what they 
have studied or because they misunderstand some questions. Besides, the CFO that 
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responded may not represent the population157. Still concerning with the sample, I 
could not avoid the auto-selection bias. It is appropriate to remember that I send the 
email for participating to the survey only to the CFOs who previously accepted my 
connection request on LinkedIn. Notwithstanding, I wish to offer unique responses 
which constitute a starting point for future research to enrich existing theories or on 
which ground potentially new accounting theories. Also, the results may be 
significant for practitioners and academics. The responses may indicate when the 
accounting practice on the impairment of goodwill models on the theory and when 
they diverge. The questionnaire indicates several areas where regulators and standard 
setters could meditate. For example, about 54% of the respondent CFOs believes that 
prohibiting goodwill write-offs reversals leads to untimely and/or underestimated 
write-offs, so standard setter might ponder for instance to the possibility of 
considering goodwill as the other intangibles with indefinite useful lives or allow the 
possibility of reversal under certain specific conditions. Concerning the ownership 
structures CFOs indicate higher risks when managerial, concentrated or state 
ownership are prevalent. CFOs internal perspective may suggest when the financial 
reporting reliability may be weakened and hence where substitute corporate 
governance mechanisms should be employed or enforced. Another interesting point 
of view is on the external auditor role. From the responses I infer that CFOs are 
convinced of the importance of auditor expertise in both the industry and in the task 
of assessing the write-offs, regulators might hence improve auditor requirement to 
assess these assessments. Also, CFOs perceive as significantly important in 
constraining the write-off manipulation the mandatory auditor rotation.  
Amongst the responses I find that more than half of the participants reflect on the 
existence of alternative way to account for goodwill that could provide more useful 
information and 47% of the respondents indicate also the importance of requiring 
additional disclosure, this result should be considered pondering the relevance of 
voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure.  
The conclusive question on the CFOs preference between the impairment test and the 
amortization of goodwill directly answers to the EFRAG recent debate on a possible !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 To verify the representativeness of my sample I explored within a sample of 281,507 CFOs 
working in all the active companies located in the OECD downloded from the database Orbis Bureau 
Van Dijicks if certain characteristics are comparable. Unluckly, some bias should be accounted. E.g., 
the responses to my survey are only the 4% from woman while the population of CFOs downloaded 
from Orbis represented by the woman is about the 29%. However this bias may be motivated by the 
predisposition of response, which might differ between different genders.   
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reintroduction of the goodwill amortization. Although the difficulties underlined to 
implement the test, the 66% of the respondents in the main prefer the impairment of 
goodwill. However, the remaining 34% still prefer the amortization process. 
 
3.2.4. CFOs(suggestions(and(recommendations(!
I would like to conclude this paragraph with some of the CFOs suggestions and 
recommendations, which might constitute the case for future investigation. 
Interestingly a CFO suggests to «review/propose impairment test methods/tools», 
hence future accounting studies might create a tool to assess the effectiveness of the 
impairment test. From the above suggestion we might also infer the practitioner need 
of tools to verify the estimates underlying the goodwill value, confirming in a certain 
sense the academic literature worries on the unverifiability of the fair value estimates 
(Ramanna and Watts, 2012). 
On the other hand, another CFO points out how actually in liquid and transparent 
markets the market operators are sufficiently prepared to estimate fair value 
estimates and that they can adjust their expected cash flows, the fall in the share price 
as a consequence advances the recognition of the impairment losses. This CFO 
expresses as follows: «My sense is share price falls after impairment write downs are 
more sentiment driven and a reflection on the ability of the relevant management to 
communicate future direction. After all, an impairment is a correction of a past 
action (an acquisition) and if the market assesses the acquisition won't justify the 
price paid (i.e. the company has overpaid), it will adjust the share price immediately 
and not wait for a subsequent impairment». This observation might be corroborated 
with the literature on the markets reaction to goodwill impairment losses, a linked 
research question is does the market anticipate or react to goodwill write-offs? 
The debate on the goodwill amortization vs. the impairment of goodwill is quite 
vigorous also amongst CFOs. Moving from the CFOs sustaining the amortization we 
can read the following observations against the impairment test: 
A. «Impairment test is worth to assess at a given period the value of the assets 
compared to a straight amortisation method. However given high incidence of 
semi objectives variables in the future cash flows calculations (interest, beta, 
assumptions) the value can differ significantly and results are often forced to 
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obtain a given value. A straight depreciation method reflects the original paid 
value amortisation that should be strengthened by the impairments test»; 
B. «Previous amortization process, while not perfect, was a better solution. 
Impairment test has a tendency to be misused and will hit mostly during 
downturn economical cycles»; 
C. «The old process of amortization was easier to deal with from a forecasting and 
cost stand point.  Impairment has caused hard to forecast changes»; 
D. «In my point of view, the impairment test has been using just as a formal process. 
Without any implications on the company management». 
On the other hand, another stream of thought within these professionals asserts that: 
«Impairment tests are useful in that any projections made one year can be reviewed 
the following and are more difficult to manipulate. Market values based on DCFs are 
somewhat subjective but will always be better than accounting/book measures 
unrelated to market valuations». 
Other CFOs warn on the importance of other corporate governance subjects. E.g. one 
of them suggested to involve in the discussion «a wider public representing CFOs, 
auditors, consultants, bankers and investment analysts». Another recommended 
submitting the survey also to audit firms, endorsing the relevance of my subsequent 
exploratory analysis on the role of the audit firm in the discretionary use of goodwill 
write-offs. 
A CFO recommended studying the relationship between companies owned by 
private equity fund and the impairment as the equity fund ownership may have 
proper issues compared to either public or governmental ownership. The same CFO 
stresses how often the trouble is not the decision to impair or not impair the goodwill 
but with the measurement of the impairment loss. He/she adds: « The first problem is 
the uncomplete standardization of schemes, choice of comparables, interest rates, 
“premium” on cost of capital, WACC, g-rate, perpetuity, etc. which creates a general 
situation of discretionality. But on top of this the bigger problem in my opinion is 
volatility. When I take the data of my comparables, they are at a precise closing date 
(and with different schemes I can't be sure of a perfect comparability), the interest 
rates and the “premium” for small-medium caps had fluctuated a lot in the past 
month to month. So we take punctual data of comparables, under a non-complete 
standardization of methods and schemes, moreover under a very volatile capital 
market, while we pretend to book in a very definitive way a GWO (in fact non 
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recourse for a subsequent revaluation of it)». He/she continues suggesting the 
introduction of the possibility of reversals of goodwill write-offs: «If we have to 
accept the “principle based” approach (so no mandatory schemes and no real 
standardisation), and moreover if we have to accept volatility of many data 
contributing at impairment calculation (especially since 2008 onward), 
that's OK... but in such a situation, we have then to accept even up and down 
volatility of Goodwill value as a consequence (so at least revaluation admitted)». A 
further point raised again the case for goodwill amortization reintroduction arguing 
as follows: «…I repute as workable the goodwill amortization. It has been quite 
clearly demonstrated that a healthy industrial cycle has a duration of maximum 30 
years (and recently... even shorter and shorter). By creating databases of “healthy 
economic cycles” sector by sector, in the future could be available standardised 
methods to amortise Goodwill in a comparable way among comparables». The CFO 
proposes also an alternative accounting method for goodwill: «An alternative to 
Goodwill amortization could be a “clever cap” at the goodwill, so that people will 
obliged to a GWO when exceeding it. For example (free cash flow x 20) = max cap 
allowed for Goodwill. Something simple and possibly based on data of the applicant 
itself, so that it can't be so much arguable. I propose the free cash flow because the 
cash flow scheme in IAS-IFRS is most standardised one and therefore discretionality 
will be limited “by definition”». 
Two competing perspectives from CFOs may condense the conclusion of this 
paragraph. While a CFO stressed the independence of the directors and senior 
management stating that: «As a professional Chartered Accountant my integrity is to 
do the calculation of GWO to the best of my ability. The Directors and senior 
managers I have worked with would always try and do the right thing. People and 
companies in general try to do this...there is always one bad apple however that 
makes your questions fair!»; another CFO argues that companies cannot avoid to use 
“accounting cosmetics” in a financial world which is not transparent, doing earnings 
management is a “self-defence action” employed by the companies. 
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3.3. Impairment and external auditors !
I don't think it should surprise anyone here that 
recent headlines of accounting failures have led 
some people to question the thoroughness of audits. 
I need not remind auditors they are the public's 
watchdog in the financial reporting process. We rely 
on auditors to put something like the Good 
Housekeeping seal of approval on the information 
investors receive. The integrity of that information 
must take priority over a desire for cost efficiencies 
or competitive advantage in the audit process. High 
quality auditing requires well-trained, well-focused, 
and well-supervised auditors. 
Levitt, 1998 
The financial statements audit is undoubtedly an 
economic and professional win for the organizations 
of the catgories, but also a complete mystification of 
reality. This is due to the widespread belief that the 
financial statement, once signed corresponds to 
«truth» (...). The audit, therefore, is very dangerous 
as it gives to the financial statement a reliability that 
it cannot have. 
Giannessi, 1978: 475, translated 
 
 
The auditors should be the gatekeepers for the accuracy of the information disclosed 
to the outside, nonetheless as suggested by Revsine (1991) not only managers can 
derive benefits from selective misrepresentation but also auditors can play a relevant 
role in the game of manipulating the earnings. Auditors for sure want to maintain the 
client-harmony, on the other hand, they need to reduce the litigation risk with third 
parties (Stolowy and Breton, 2004); in order to do this they sometimes prefer rigid 
standards, other times more flexible standards, as IAS 36 and SFAS 142 are. 
Managers can manipulate write-offs, reporting untimely, excessive or insufficient 
amounts, for earnings management reasons, to keep inflated asset values in the 
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balance sheet and to avoid scrutiny on prior investment decisions by investors and 
lenders (e.g. M&A choices). Even if the primary accountability for disclosing 
unfairly rests with the management, external audit might be a fundamental mean to 
ensure that the write-offs are based on sound, coherent and reasonable accounting. 
Auditors’ scepticism over management estimates is a turning point to verify which 
components of the financial statement were directly valued and which, on the 
contrary, were valued basing on management hypotheses, internal business models 
and professional judgements (European Commission, 2010). To assess the 
objectivity underlying the estimates, auditors should hold an efficient and assiduous 
communication with directors as well as internal auditors without compromising 
their independence. In order to increase the rigor to be applied in auditing accounting 
estimates Standard Settings provide guidance on estimating fair value measurements 
(IAASB, 2010; American Institute of CPAs, 2012). For instance, in the USA setting 
the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued AU-C Section 540 requiring auditor to 
obtain  «sufficient appropriate audit evidence about whether, in the context of the 
applicable financial reporting framework a) accounting estimates, including fair 
value accounting estimates, in the financial statements, whether recognized or 
disclosed, are reasonable and b) related disclosures in the financial statements are 
adequate». The mentioned auditing standard is well aware that the evaluation of the 
entity’s fair value measurement depends on the auditor’s knowledge of the nature of 
the business, knowledge that is even more necessary to discover potential write-offs 
under applicable GAAP. Hence, auditor is accountable in assessing the 
reasonableness and consistence of management’s assumptions underlying assets 
valuations.  
Moving from Ramanna and Watts (2012) suggestion that goodwill fair value 
estimates are “unauditable”, since they are unverifiable ex post, I aim at exploring if 
higher audit quality is associated to more reliable goodwill write-offs. If so, then 
these valuations do not threaten the financial reporting’s role as management control 
system when a quality auditor executes the external control. There has been a lot of 
research on the auditors’ value to enhance the credibility of financial reporting and 
the forcefulness of the auditing function in detecting whichever form of earnings 
management has been generally associated to its quality.  
In this part of the thesis, I discuss whether and how certain key auditors’ 
characteristics shape auditors’ incentives when reviewing goodwill write-offs. 
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Building on agency theory, I develop a set of propositions on the association between 
goodwill write-off manipulation and auditor size, fees, change, tenure and expertise. 
I show how these characteristics can encourage auditors to deliver lenient audits on 
goodwill write-offs. Also, an inclination towards delivering a lenient audit can be 
aligned with managers’ interest to use goodwill write-offs for earnings management 
purposes.  
This part of the thesis, although does not have empirical analysis, contributes to the 
literature and may have policy implications. To the best of my knowledge, there are 
not yet studies discussing how auditors’ characteristics relate to the audit of goodwill 
write-offs. Future research can test as hypotheses the proposed set of propositions. 
This paragraph suggests that leniently audited discretional fair value estimates are 
likely to compromise the role of auditing (and of financial reporting) as an external 
control mechanism. Overall, the observations proposed might contribute to the recent 
debate on the re-introduction of goodwill amortisation. 
Indeed, recently regulating authorities have expressed concerns about the use of 
subjective fair value estimates, such as goodwill write-offs, and about their audits. 
The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) issued a report 
criticizing goodwill write-offs’ excessive subjectivity and advocating more research 
on firms’ behaviour and on how to audit write-offs (European Financial Reporting 
Advisory Group, 2014). The EFRAG also launched a public consultation on the re-
introduction of mandatory goodwill amortisation (European Commission, 2014). The 
US PCAOB called for more research on managers’ and the auditors’ behaviour when 
there are goodwill write-offs (Bratten et al., 2013).  
Auditing goodwill write-offs is a challenging task that requires independence, 
competence and experience, as well as proper knowledge of the firm and of its 
industry (Chambers and Finger, 2011; KPMG, 2014). As already said in prior 
paragraphs under the IAS/IFRS and the US GAAP, goodwill is not amortised and is 
subject to a yearly impairment test. The impairment procedure requires managers to 
undertake write-offs when they believe that the current goodwill book value is higher 
than its fair value, which is measured as the net present value of the future cash 
flows. Given the discretion bestowed on managers, external audits are essential to 
avoid inflated goodwill values and write-offs, which are untimely and/or of 
inadequate amounts (Bratten et al., 2013). The auditors are required to assess 
whether business plans, assumptions about the possible scenarios, forecasts about 
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future cash flows, applied discount rates and sensitivity analyses are sound, 
reasonable and coherent with the firm’s underlying economics, as well as with the 
industry and macro-economic trends. The auditors are of paramount importance 
especially in the goodwill context where the following statement by Turner (2001) 
fits very well: «The lack of meaningful valuation standards coupled with auditors 
that are not challenging the underlying assumptions and resulting conclusions is a 
recipe for disaster». 
In this part of the thesis, I firstly conduct a conceptual investigation of whether and 
how some key attributes of auditors might affect the reported goodwill write-offs’ 
reliability. Henceforth, I review the literature on auditors’ attributes and financial 
reporting quality (Stolowy and Breton, 2004; Dechow et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2012). 
I identify some auditor attributes that might affect the audit activity’s effectiveness in 
goodwill write-offs: size, fees, auditor change, tenure and expertise. Building on 
agency theory, I discuss how these characteristics shape auditors’ incentives when 
reviewing goodwill write-offs. I develop a set of propositions on how the external 
auditors’ attributes can or cannot contribute to more reliable goodwill write-offs.  
 
3.3.1. Auditors’(attributes(and(financial(reporting(quality(
 
In literature, there is not a unique definition for audit quality; the concept is multi-
faceted and complex. However, there are various attributes that can lead to an audit 
of high or low quality. By “audit quality” I refer to the fairness and reliability assured 
by professional auditors who ground their “neutral” opinion on high-quality audit 
principles. A quality audit is likely to result, firstly, from a well-weighted 
combination of auditor requisites, amongst which we can find: objectivity, 
independence, competence and experience. Notwithstanding, both literature and 
profession have not yet reached a consensus on the delineation of these features. At 
present, there are strong national and international regulations for auditors’ 
qualifications and independence. With reference to the independence issue, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes the audit committees (instead of the management) to 
appoint auditors and to decide about their pay. In the USA setting e.g. Rule 2-01 of 
Regulation S-X addresses a set of restrictions to safeguard auditor independence both 
in mind-set and for the compliance with generally accepted standards and processes 
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(SEC, 2002).  The Rule determines constraints to any financial and business relation 
between the auditor and the audited firm and identifies certain non-audit services as 
risky for auditors’ independence, i.e. bookkeeping, appraisal or valuation services, 
management functions or human resources and so on. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
requires than that all services (other than minor exceptions) have to be approved in 
advance by the audit committee and that such approvals are disclosed to investors 
periodically in public reports. In accordance with the Statements on Auditing 
Standards, the independent auditor then should be professionally qualified with the 
education and experience sufficient to ensure that material misstatements are 
detected and that his/her opinion is based upon reasonable procedures and in 
accordance with GAAS (American Institute of CPAs, 1972). Nonetheless, individual 
characteristics are not sufficient to obtain a quality audit (Knechel et al., 2013). A 
quality audit is affected also by the audit processes’ characteristics, that is by the 
implementation and effectiveness of audit procedures carried out by the personnel 
(O'Donnell and Schultz, 2003; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; López and Peters, 
2012) as well as by the auditor incentives (e.g. abnormal audit fees, audit tenure) 
(Carey and Simnett 2006; Hribar et al., 2014).  
Francis (2011) maintains that audit quality is simultaneously affected by six units of 
analysis: audit inputs, audit processes, accounting firms, audit industry and audit 
markets, institutions, economic consequences of audit outcomes. Moving from this 
comprehensive understanding, Knechel et al. (2013) propose a “balanced scorecard” 
to view the different aspect affecting audit quality. The main problem linked with the 
research on audit quality is that it cannot be measured directly. As a consequence, 
audit quality cannot be measured neither ex-ante nor in-itinere, but only after the 
occurrence of any problems we might be able to judge the audit as of low quality, 
and even ex-post, it is likely that the judgement is based upon indirect indicators of 
“non-quality”.  
To wrap up, the concept of audit quality is the result of the interactions amongst 
contextual factors, audit process and auditor attributes; in Illustration 3.2 I 
summarise this concept, concentrating in detail on auditors attributes (e.g. 
independence, competence, experience, etc.). 
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Since audit quality can be inferred only ex-post, many researchers studied the 
opposite phenomenon that is when an audit is not highly performed (Francis, 2004). 
Amongst the proxies for a low audit we can find: restatements (Abbott et al., 2004), 
SEC investigations or enforcement against the auditor (Dechow et al., 2011), number 
of some kind of litigation (Palmrose, 1988), client business failure (Lennox, 1999; 
Geiger et al., 2005). Although, these studies do not consider that the data on the 
above mentioned “non-quality” proxies might be misleading; in fact, some audit 
failure might remain undetected or might be resolved with unrevealed penalties 
(Francis, 2004). Thus, in this study I include only the quality’s and its attributes’ 
indirect indicators and abiding by prior literature I consider explicative the following 
four drivers: the auditor size, the tenure, the expertise and the percentage of non-
audit-fees. 
One of the major doubts that arise using these proxies is that audit quality should not 
be viewed as dichotomous, either “high” or “low”, but as underlined by several 
authors, quality is a property that swings on a continuum (Ronen, 2010; Francis, 
2011).  
AUDIT&QUALITY&
AUDITOR&
ATTRIBUTES&
CONTEXTUAL&
FACTORS&AUDIT&PROCESS&
Integrity Neutrality 
Incentives 
Professional 
Skepticism 
Transparency 
Knowledge Training 
Effort 
Within-Firm 
Pressures 
Confidentiality 
Ethical values 
Skills 
Motivation    Objectivity Independence 
Competence Experience 
Qualification 
Illustration 3.2: Audit quality and auditor attributes 
Source: own elaboration 
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The research on external audit as determinant of the financial reporting quality is 
motivated by the following assumption: higher audit quality constrains earnings 
management and provides greater credibility to the financial statements (Dechow et 
al., 2010). Yet, there is no consensus in the literature on: 1) a commonly accepted 
definition of audit quality, 2) which features of the auditors contribute to higher or 
lower audit quality (Firth et al., 2012).  
Rather than being directly observed, the audit quality is often measured looking at 
the outcomes of the “non-audit quality”: abnormal accruals (Carey & Simnett, 2006), 
modified opinions (Lennox, 2005), restatements (Abbott et al., 2004), SEC 
investigations and financial frauds (Dechow et al., 2011), client bankruptcy (Geiger 
et al., 2005). Since most of the proxies for audit quality can also be measures of the 
financial reporting quality158, in some studies the concept of audit quality and 
financial reporting quality becomes almost interchangeable (Monroe, 2011; Firth et 
al., 2012).  
In the thesis I focus on four key attributes: size, fees, tenure, and expertise. Previous 
literature uses being a Big-X as a proxy for the auditors’ size. Several studies find 
that firms audited by Big-X auditors have lower discretionary accruals than firms 
audited by non-Big-X auditors (Francis & Krishnan, 1999; Kim et al., 2003). Other 
studies find that firms involved in frauds are less likely to have Big-X audit firms 
(Farber, 2005). Teoh and Wong (1993) find that the Earnings Response Coefficient 
(ERC) of Big-X clients is higher than that of non-Big-X clients. These findings are 
consistent with the Big-X auditors’ interest in effective monitoring to foster their 
reputational capital and protect their market position. Some studies find that Big-X 
auditors provide more effective audit on income-increasing accruals management 
and more lenient audit on income-decreasing accruals management (Kim et al., 
2003). Such asymmetric monitoring is motivated by the Big-X auditors preference 
for accruals management leading to more conservative financial statements. More 
conservative financial statements reduce reputation and litigation risks, to which Big-
X auditors are more sensitive than non-Big-X auditors due to their size. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 Dechow et al. (2010) defines higher financial reporting quality as financial reporting which 
provides “more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a 
specific decision made by a specific decision-maker” (Dechow et al., 2010: 344). Hence, financial 
reporting has a high quality when is conducive of an informative representation of the firm 
performance relevant for the external decision-makers. 
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The evidence on the relationship between audit fees and financial reporting quality is 
mixed and dependent on the type of audit fees. Several studies find a positive 
association between discretionary accruals and audit fees (Frankel et al., 2002; 
Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). These findings are consistent 
with the notion that auditors charge higher fees to client firms more prone to earnings 
management, due to increased audit risk. Recent research finds that the auditors 
charge lower fees to more conservative client firms, due to reduced reputation and 
litigation risks (DeFond et al., 2012). 
The non-audit fees are believed to influence the degree of auditors’ independence 
and thus their monitoring effectiveness (Dechow et al., 2010). Consistently, Francis 
and Ke (2006) find that non-audit fees are negatively related to ERCs. Using a 
sample of U.K. firms, Ferguson et al. (2004) find a positive association between non-
audit fees and restatements.  
The auditor’s tenure can have a twofold effect on financial reporting quality. On the 
one hand, longer tenures are likely to be associated to an in-depth firm knowledge of 
the firm and of its industry. Proper knowledge of the firm and of its industry can lead 
to more effective audit. Consistently, several studies document a positive association 
between tenure and lower earnings management (Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007; 
Stanley and DeZoort, 2007; Gul et al., 2009). On the other hand, auditors with long 
tenure are more likely to develop personal ties with the management and lose 
independence. Some studies find that long tenures are associated to increased 
earnings management and lower propensity to issue going concern opinions (Chi and 
Huang, 2005; Davis et al., 2009). 
The auditor expertise is key to deliver better monitoring (Krishnan, 2003). Specialist 
auditors have both the expertise to detect earnings management and the incentives to 
mitigate it, to protect their reputation as industry-experts (Krishnan, 2005). Prior 
literature finds that auditors’ experience in specific industry is associated with: better 
ability in identifying errors (Solomon et al., 1999; Owhoso et al., 2002), reduced 
likelihood of financial fraud (Carcello and Nagy, 2004), more internal control 
weaknesses reporting (Rose-Green et al., 2011), better audit risk measurement 
(Hammersley, 2006), greater compliance with auditing standards (O'Keefe et al., 
1994). An experimental study examines the quality of auditors’ judgement across 
different levels of expertise and finds that participants possessing higher auditing 
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experience (audit managers) made sounder quality technical judgements (Martinov-
Bennie, 2008).   
 
3.3.2. Auditors’(attributes(and(goodwill(writeLoffs(
 
Big X auditors are often considered a guarantee of an effective audit, as they have 
more resources to invest in training and in the creation of industry expertise (Francis 
and Krishnan, 1999). Big X auditors have incentives to deliver high quality audits 
because they have a good reputation to uphold. Big X auditors also have higher 
litigation costs than non-Big X auditors. In case of wrong opinions or failure to 
discover breaches, Big X auditors suffer significant damages to their brand 
reputation and high litigation costs if sued (DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al., 1998). 
Several studies have found that firms audited by Big X auditors have lower 
discretionary accruals than firms audited by non-Big X auditors (DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Ding and Jia, 2012). Other studies have found 
that firms involved in fraud are less likely to use Big X audit firms (Farber, 2005) 
and that the Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) of Big X clients are higher than 
that of non-Big X clients (Teoh and Wong, 1993). These findings are consistent with 
Big X auditors’ motivation to foster their reputational capital, protect their market 
position and avoid risks. 
Recent studies have argued that, compared to non-Big X auditors, Big X auditors are 
effective in constraining the income-increasing accruals, but are less interested in 
constraining the income-decreasing accruals (Kim et al., 2003). Income-decreasing 
accruals result in conservative accounting and decrease reputation and litigation 
risks, for which Big X auditors have less appetite than non-Big X auditors. Big X 
auditors could be more lenient toward overstating write-offs, which commonly occur 
when managers want to smooth the income or take big baths or when there are CEO 
changes (Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006). Overstated write-offs result in 
reduced income, more conservative goodwill value in the balance sheet and more 
prudent disclosure about the firm’s future perspective. Overstated write-offs reduce 
Big X auditors’ reputation and litigation risks and, at the same time, allow the 
management to achieve its earnings management objectives. The write-off 
understatement can benefit managers in multiple ways, for example, with regard to 
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their target earnings-based bonus compensation, their own share value and/or their 
reputation. Big X auditors usually steer clear of understated write-offs, as it increases 
the litigation and reputation risks related to late large goodwill write-offs. Late 
unexpected write-offs have multiple financial consequences, including a drop in 
stock prices and increased scrutiny by investors and lenders regarding the firm’s 
financial position. 
Given the above suggestions from prior literature I conclude that Big X auditors have 
incentives to monitor goodwill write-offs asymmetrically.  I thus posit the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: Ceteris paribus, Big X auditors are more effective than non-Big 
X auditors in preventing goodwill write-off understatements but avoid 
preventing goodwill write-off overstatements.  
Auditors charge companies that engage more actively in earnings management 
higher audit fees, due to increased audit risks (Frankel et al., 2002; Hogan and 
Wilkins, 2008). While the audit risk model can predict that audit firms charge 
companies more prone to goodwill write-off manipulation higher audit fees, 
auditors’ behaviour can change according to the direction of the goodwill write-off 
manipulation. If auditors charge more conservative and less risky clients lower fees, 
they will be more lenient toward opportunistically overstated write-offs (DeFond et 
al., 2012). In contrast, auditors charge firms that understate their goodwill write-offs 
higher audit fees, due to the increased risk related to the issuance of financial reports 
with inflated goodwill values. Inflated goodwill values obscure firms’ future 
perspectives, harming their investors’ forecast capabilities. Inflated goodwill values 
are more likely to result in late, unexpectedly large write-offs. Late large goodwill 
write-offs increase investors’ and lenders’ scrutiny of the firm’s assets and financial 
reporting reliability and threaten the auditors’ reputation. I posit the following 
propositions relating the audit fees to the goodwill write-off manipulation: 
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, audit fees are negatively associated with 
goodwill write-off overstatements. 
Proposition 3: Ceteris paribus, audit fees are positively associated with 
goodwill write-off understatements. 
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Non-audit fees can impair auditors’ independence and monitoring effectiveness 
(Abdel-khalik, 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Ronen, 2010). Non-audit fees can convert 
the auditor’s role from an external independent reviewer to an inside advisor 
(Francis, 2006). Empirical research has failed to find the “smoking gun” evidence 
that the provision of non-audit services is associated with audit failures or with 
higher levels of earnings management (Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Ashbaugh et al., 
2003; Asare et al., 2005; Cahan et al., 2008). On an Italian sample in 2007, Ianniello 
(2012) did not find a statistically significant association between auditor opinion and 
non-audit fees. Despite the lack of evidence, the provision of non-audit services is 
still a controversial topic and one that regulators view with scepticism. If the non-
audit fees impair auditors’ independent monitoring, they should be positively related 
to goodwill write-off manipulations, regardless of the manipulation’s direction 
(Francis, 2006).  
An alternative “benevolent” view is that the non-audit fees compensate for auditors’ 
expert advice on complex issues, such as goodwill write-offs (KPMG, 2014). Hence, 
non-audit services include advice on business plans and forecasts used in the write-
off measurement. The additional advice can lead to more accurate and less 
manipulated goodwill write-offs. I advance two alternative propositions on the 
association between non-audit fees and write-off manipulations. 
Proposition 4a: Ceteris paribus, non-audit fees are positively associated with 
write-off manipulations.  
Proposition 4b: Ceteris paribus, non-audit fees are negatively associated with 
write-off manipulations.  
Auditors’ tenure can be either beneficial or detrimental to the goodwill write-off 
reliability. A long tenure increases the client-specific knowledge of the auditor 
(Johnson et al., 2002; Beck and Wu, 2006; Chen et al., 2008). An in-depth 
knowledge of the firm can be very useful in auditing goodwill write-offs in several 
ways. In-depth knowledge of the firm can help auditors understand when the benefits 
of acquisitions do not materialize, triggering a write-off. Longitudinal firm-specific 
knowledge can help auditors understand when the benefits of the goodwill are 
exhausted, allowing for timely write-offs. Once a loss in the goodwill value is 
detected, firm-specific knowledge can help auditors measure the write-off with 
adequate projections, extrapolated from the firm’s past performance. Overall, long 
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tenures develop other relevant client-specific knowledge potentially influencing the 
impairment procedure, such as changes in management or key directorship, as well 
as changes in strategy and market positioning. The strategic changes also affect the 
composition of the cash-generating units and a different goodwill allocation and 
valuation. A proper firm knowledge can help auditors assess the optimal allocation 
of goodwill among the cash-generating units. 
A long tenure allows auditors to gather wide-ranging information from different 
client firm offices. A large information basis allows auditors to create a sort of 
“control panel” for, for example, litigation risks and costs, operations trends, credit 
access and various financial situations. 
Long tenures can be detrimental to auditors’ monitoring effectiveness, as they can 
imply an “excessive familiarity” with the client (Chi and Huang, 2005; Davis et al., 
2009). The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the International 
Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (International Ethics Standards Board for 
Accountants, 2014) defines familiarity threat to independence as professional 
accountants’ risk of becoming too sympathetic towards clients’ or employers’ 
interests or too accommodating due to a long or close relationship with a client or 
employer. The Code of Professional Conduct issued by the American Institute of 
CPAs gives a similar definition of the familiarity threat (American Istitute of CPAs, 
2014). The academic literature suggests that such familiarity impairs auditors’ 
independence and impartiality (Chi and Huang, 2005). Familiar auditors are more 
prone to comply with a well-known client, for which they have made investments in 
various technologies and personnel over years. The familiar auditor is interested in 
maintaining the client harmony and turning a blind eye to earnings management 
(Wang and Tuttle, 2009). A very familiar auditor-client relationship thus makes 
auditors more prone to accept the client firm measurements and to abandon their 
professional scepticism. 
I posit two alternative propositions on the association between auditor tenure and 
write-off manipulations. On the one hand, a long-lasting firm-specific audit 
experience can lead to more reliable goodwill write-offs, owing to the auditor’s 
expert advice. On the other hand, the familiarity and the subsequent loss of 
independence lead to mild audits and to the acceptance of the management’s 
goodwill write-off manipulation. 
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Proposition 5a: Ceteris paribus, auditors’ tenure is negatively associated with 
write-off manipulations.  
Proposition 5b: Ceteris paribus, auditors’ tenure is positively associated with 
write-off manipulations.  
Auditors’ industry expertise can constrain the goodwill write-off use as an earnings 
management device (Krishnan, 2003). Assessing the reliability of the management 
estimates used in the goodwill impairment test is a complex issue that differs 
significantly from industry to industry (Benston, 2008). Industry expert auditors 
might add knowledge and help the client firm provide more accurate goodwill write-
offs (Stanley and DeZoort, 2007). Industry-expert auditors provide proficient advice 
on, for example, industry and market trends, changes in the competitive 
environments, changes in the industry’s political or regulatory environment, as well 
as the average cost of debt and the cost of capital. Such knowledge is helpful in 
identifying the goodwill write-offs triggering events (Smith-Lacroix et al., 2012). 
Industry expert auditors have incentives to foster an industry proficient reputation 
and to consolidate their position in the audit market (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004). For 
this reason, expert auditors ensure that their personnel is properly trained and 
updated with specific knowledge (Bratten et al., 2013). I suggest that expert auditors’ 
incentives to maintain a good reputation and protect their market position lead to 
more accurate goodwill write-offs and increase their capability to resist the 
managerial pressure to manipulate write-offs. I thus posit the following proposition: 
Proposition 6: Ceteris paribus, auditor expertise is negatively associated with 
write-off manipulations.  
 
3.3.3. Discussions(
 
To the best of my knowledge, the above propositions are the first attempt to 
thoroughly investigate how auditors’ attributes can contribute to reliable goodwill 
write-off accounting.  This part of the thesis contributes to the literature in several 
ways. Firstly, it provides a set of propositions that future empirical studies can test as 
hypotheses. Secondly, it suggests that the use of fair value, inherently subjective 
estimates, combined with auditors’ potential incentives to provide a lenient audit, is 
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likely to compromise the role of financial reporting and of the external audit as 
external control mechanisms. I argue that auditors deliver an unbiased and effective 
audit on goodwill write-offs only when they have incentives to do so. In this respect, 
this study may sound an alarm bell on the potential malfunctioning of goodwill 
write-offs under the current accounting standards and audit practices. A malfunction 
arises when both managers and auditors have incentives to respectively misreport 
and “mis-”audit the goodwill write-offs.  
This part of thesis has also interesting policy implications. It provides arguments 
supporting the re-introduction of the amortisation of goodwill, currently being 
discussed in the European Union. The amortisation of goodwill limits the audit effort 
to the initial recognition and measurement of goodwill, avoiding yearly impairment 
tests. Amortising goodwill significantly reduces managerial discretion and the use of 
goodwill write-offs as an earnings management tool. It may suggest the use of 
industry-expert auditors to audit goodwill write-offs. Regulatory agencies could set 
specific requirements about the skills and competences auditors need to have to audit 
fair value estimates, such as goodwill write-offs. 
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3.4. Impairment and analysts’ estimates !
While the problem of earnings management is not 
new, it has swelled in a market that is unforgiving of 
companies that miss their estimates. I recently read 
of one major U.S. company that failed to meet its so-
called "numbers" by one penny and lost more than 
six percent of its stock value in one day.  
(…) This is the pattern earnings management 
creates: Companies try to meet or beat Wall Street 
earnings projections in order to grow market 
capitalization and increase the value of stock 
options. Their ability to do this depends on 
achieving the earnings expectations of analysts. And 
analysts seek constant guidance from companies to 
frame those expectations.  
Levitt, 1998 !!
One of the primary roles attributed to financial analysts is to mitigate the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Brennan and Hughes, 1991). This is why 
a huge body of the literature investigate the stock market reactions to analysts 
forecasts revisions (Barry and Jennings, 1992; Abarbanell et al., 1995; Barron et al., 
1998; Kothari, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Francis et al., 2004; Bagnoli et al., 
2005; Arya and Mittendorf, 2007). The analysts’ coverage then was found to be 
negatively associated with the information asymmetry (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 
1995; Louis and Robinson, 2005; Houston et al., 2010) and that institutional 
investors do prefer to invest in firm with higher analysts’ coverage (O’Brien and 
Bhushan, 1990). Analysts forecasts are mainly on the future firm’s earnings and any 
earnings management practices could increase the forecasts’ error because when 
income-boosting earnings management are not considered by the analysts they may 
provide pessimistic earnings forecasts; equally, when the analysts overlook to 
income-decreasing earnings management practices they produce optimistic earnings 
forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003).  
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An extended body of literature provide evidence that firms manage earnings in order 
to meet or beat the analysts’ earnings forecasts to satisfy the market expectations  
(Bannister and Newman, 1996; Bange and De-Bondt, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; 
Matsumoto, 2002; Moehrle, 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Louis, 2004; 
McVay, 2006; Brown et al., 2006; Barua et al. 2006). 
 
3.4.1. Earnings(estimates(and(discretionary(use(of(goodwill(writeLoffs(!
Considering the whole discussion of this thesis, the subjectivity allowed by the 
technicalities of the impairment procedures may be exploited to meet or beat the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Li et al. (2011) explored the differences in the market reaction following an 
impairment of goodwill under three distinct reporting regimes: SFAS 121, transition 
period and SFAS 142. On a sample of firms that announced goodwill impairment 
over a period of time between 1996-2006, they found that on average, in all the three 
regimes above-mentioned, the market adjusts the expectations downward after the 
impairment announcement and basically, these adjustments are linked with the 
impairment magnitude. The market reaction results to be largely attributed to 
investors revising their expectations of future sales and operating profits downward 
on the base of the information conveyed by the impairment losses. In the same study 
they also found that as a consequence of the impairment announcement even the 
analysts update the earnings forecasts downward. They found then that the 
association between goodwill and analysts’ forecast revision is stronger with the 
adoption of SFAS 142, suggesting that the subjectivity exploited by managers is 
declarative.   
Jarva (2012) examined the consequences of SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs according 
to three different points of view. The first one explores whether the write-offs 
generate positive “abnormal” returns in the year following the impairment of 
goodwill, as investors tend to fixate on earnings. The second perspective investigates 
the association between goodwill write-offs and analyst-forecast accuracy as regards 
future earnings. The last tested hypothesis refers to audit pricing and it asserts that 
firms recording goodwill write-offs pay higher audit fees than non-write-offs firms. 
Consistently with the basics of market efficiency, analyst-forecast rationality and 
efficient audit pricing, the author concluded that investors and analysts are able to 
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incorporate the information related to goodwill write-offs and the auditors charge 
higher fees to balance the greater effort required. 
Lawrence et al. (2013) attempt at modelling mandatory asset impairments in order to 
discern it from discretionary conservatism. With their model they address the 
likelihood to reach wrong inferences when testing for discretionary conservatism if 
the researcher doesn’t control for mandatorily conservative accounting. They found 
that there is a negative and nonlinear relation between beginning of period book-to-
market (BTM) ratios and asset impairments. Furthermore they found evidence that 
mandatorily conservative accounting is stronger for firms with BTM ratios greater 
than one, with a poor recent operating performance and with a higher proportion of 
intangibles. Kim et al. (2013) tested whether the adoption of SFAS 142 has improved 
or decreased the ability of accounting earnings to reflect economic earnings. 
Consistently with Watts (2003), they demonstrate an increase in conservatism in the 
post-SFAS 142 regime, but they found that the accounting earnings for firms with 
purchased goodwill become less conservative. André et al. (2013) examined the level 
of conditional conservatism in the pre- and post-IFRS adoption on an European 
sample with a time span 2002-2007. They further investigate the role played by 
impairment tests in the change of degree of conditional conservatism. The European 
sample confirmed the results obtained by Kim et al. (2013) on the US sample, that is, 
the firms with intangibles and goodwill become less conditionally conservative after 
the IFRS adoption, while firms without intangibles neither goodwill are unaffected 
by any change. In addition they provide evidence that impairment test for intangibles 
and goodwill after 2005 is more prone to be handled by the management. This brief 
empirical evidence may arise the following research question: Does management use 
discretionary write-offs to beat analyst forecasts? Specifically, this research question 
might be split down in the following two propositions: 
Proposition 1: Ceteris paribus, the goodwill write-offs understatements are 
positively associated with optimistic financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, the goodwill write-offs overstatements are 
positively associated with pessimistic financial analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
Future studies might explore this research question relation the discretionary use of 
goodwill write-offs and analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
  
 
  
Chapter(4.(
(
Conclusions.(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
TABLE&OF&CONTENTS:&
(
4.1. Discussion of the thesis concepts and results 
4.2. The contribution of the study to the field of knowledge  
4.3. Limitations  
4.4. Future research 
174 
(
4. Conclusions 
4.1. Discussion of the thesis concepts and results !
The conclusion we can draw basing above all on the first chapter is that the goodwill 
notion has changed over the time. However, the definition and treatment of goodwill 
still today are thorny matters and a definite agreement seems hard to be reached. 
Moving to the empirical researches I find that the ownership structures and the 
governance mechanisms affect the unexpected discretionary portion of the 
impairment losses (see Appendix A for the results). The international comparison 
reveals the complexity of such effect. Insider ownership is positively associated to 
discretionary assets write-off suggesting a uniform behaviour regardless of the 
ownership level, in UK and Italy, while this result is not confirmed for the German 
sample. Further, I find that in the UK and in the German samples, institutional 
investors ownership is associated to lower discretionary asset write-offs. This result 
is consistent with the expectation that institutional investors devote a greater 
attention to the financial reporting quality exercising a stronger control over the 
financial information. Nonetheless, this finding is not significant in the Italian 
sample. I suggest that in Italy the high ownership concentration, risks of wealth 
expropriation and lack of board independence, limit the institutional investors in 
influencing the decision-making process. Consistently with the political theory, state 
ownership is associated to increased discretionary impairment losses in the Italian 
sample. Either driven by the politicians’ interests or by “common good objectives”, 
state owned companies have incentives to manipulate assets write-offs.  This result is 
not confirmed in the German sample where the supervisory board not only monitors 
the management, but also reconcile the interests of different stakeholders in the 
discussion of key managerial decisions. The German two-tier system may be 
efficient for the monitoring activity exerted by institutional investors. This could 
explain why institutional investors ownership is a significant variable affecting 
discretionary impairment losses unlike the other ownership variables considered.  
Overall, the European comparison indicates possible relations among ownership 
structures and corporate governance in influencing the accounting decisions. The 
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governance system and environment lead to a diverse influence of ownership 
structures on the accounting decision-making process.  
I then questioned the CFOs their perceptions on the impairment of goodwill; their 
responses might be useful for standard setters, regulators, practitioners and 
academics (see Appendix B3 for the survey results). For example, about 54% of the 
respondent CFOs believes that the prohibition of goodwill write-offs reversals 
increases the likelihood of untimely and/or underestimated write-offs, hence, 
standard setter might consider the possibility of accounting for goodwill as the other 
intangibles with indefinite useful lives or allowing the reversals under determined 
conditions. With reference to the ownership structures CFOs perceive higher risks 
when managerial, concentrated or state ownership are prevalent. CFOs perceptions 
also may intimate when the financial reporting reliability is weakened and hence 
where substitute corporate governance mechanisms should play a relevant role in 
constraining the use of discretionary accounting choices. Another interesting point of 
view is on the external auditor role. From the CFOs responses I got the reply of the 
significance of auditor expertise in both the industry and in the task of assessing the 
write-offs, as a consequence, regulators might require certain skills/expertise from 
auditor in order to better perform their assessments. Also, CFOs perceive as 
significantly important in constraining the write-off manipulation the mandatory 
auditor rotation.  
More than half of the participants to the survey reveal that alternative way to account 
for goodwill could provide more valuable information and 47% of the respondents 
indicate also the importance of requiring additional disclosure, this result should be 
considered examining also the importance of voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure.  
The final question on the CFOs preference between the impairment test and the 
amortization of goodwill directly answers to the EFRAG recent debate on the 
possible reintroduction of the goodwill amortization. Although the difficulties 
underlined to implement the test, the 66% of the respondents overall prefer the 
impairment of goodwill. However, it should not be undervalued that the remaining 
34% still prefer the amortization process. 
After the empirical research on the internal corporate governance influences on the 
impairment decisions I discuss how certain auditor characteristics can encourage 
auditors to deliver lenient (“friendly”) audits on goodwill write-offs. Indeed, an 
inclination towards delivering a lenient audit can be aligned with managers’ interest 
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to use goodwill write-offs for earnings management purposes. Finally, I briefly 
examine how the financial analysts’ estimates could adversely affect the impairment 
decision process driving the management to satisfy the market earnings expectations.  
To sum up the above relations in Table 4.1 I link the earnings management policies 
with differing incentives related to differing corporate governance subjects. 
Specifically, in the course of this dissertation I explored the association between 
overestimated and underestimated impairment losses and the incentives that are 
associated to these earnings management practices. To outline a final discussion, I 
enclose amongst the incentives to report underestimated goodwill write-offs the 
following incentives: big bath, income smoothing, CEO changes, auditor 
conservatism and pessimistic analysts earnings forecasts in the previous year. 
Amongst the incentives to report underestimated goodwill write-off I mention the 
following: debt covenants, bonus-based remuneration scheme, insider ownership, 
state ownership and institutional ownership, inexpert or inexperienced auditor, non-
independent auditor, optimistic earnings forecasts in the year prior to the impairment 
loss. In certain circumstances, the impairment losses actually reflect the underlying 
economics of the firm. It might happen that managers’ incentives are not 
preponderant, the auditor is neutral and independent and discover the breach 
constraining the manipulation and the analysts’ earnings forecasts are sufficiently 
accurate that do not create incentive to beat. Also, certain ownership structures (e.g. 
institutional and state ownership) might control the financial reporting process and 
exert pressure for reliable estimates. 
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Table 4.1: Discretionary use of goodwill write-offs and corporate governance subjects: earnings 
effects 
 
 EARNINGS EFFECT 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
SUBJECTS 
OVERESTIMATED 
WRITE-OFFS 
“FAIR” 
WRITE-OFFS 
UNDERESTIMATE
D WRITE-OFFS 
MANAGERS 
• Big Bath 
• Income Smoothing 
• CEO Changes 
• No managers 
incentives 
• Debt covenants 
• Bonus based 
remuneration 
OWNERSHIP 
TYPES 
 • State ownership 
• Institutional 
ownership 
• Insider ownership 
• State ownership 
• Institutional 
ownership 
EXTERNAL 
AUDITOR 
• Auditor 
conservatism 
• Neutral auditor • Inexpert, 
inexperienced or 
not-independent 
auditor 
FINANCIAL 
ANALYSTS 
• Pessimistic 
earnings forecasts 
in t-1 
Earnings forecasts 
error tend to zero 
• Optimistic earnings 
forecasts in t-1 
 
 
4.2. The contribution of the study to the field of knowledge !
Carnegie and Napier (2012) stress the unifying power of history among past, present 
and future and the importance of appreciating the contemporary accounting practices 
through retrospective lens. In this sense, I attempt to contribute to the accounting 
history studies by providing an historical analysis of the goodwill and impairment 
test concepts as conceived by several prominent Italian scholars. I also attempt to 
essentially delineate some similarities and differences that the same concepts 
assumed among International scholars. Hence, recent discussions over the value of 
the long-lived assets and over the concept of recoverable amount through their use 
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(value in use) or their sale (fair value) might be better informed if accountants, 
regulators and more generally market participants were conscious of the past debates 
on the issue. 
The empirical researches carried out can contribute to prior literature in several 
ways. Firstly, it is provided evidence that ownership types and corporate governance 
are intervening variables in the accounting decision-making process leading to assets 
impairment. Secondly, the findings show possible interdependencies among 
ownership structures and corporate governance in influencing the accounting 
choices. On the one hand, the ownership types influence on discretionary assets 
write-offs appear to be facilitated or constrained by the legal and the governance 
environment; on the other hand, ownership structures can prevent effective 
monitoring by governance mechanisms.  
This study contributes to the literature by providing the CFOs perceptions on the 
impairment of goodwill as far as I know till today no prior studies investigated this 
perspective. Also, the results may be significant for practitioners and academics. The 
responses indicate that also from a practitioner point of view the impairment of 
goodwill vs. the amortization is a thorny issue.  
The results may be of interest to market participants, policy makers and audit firms, 
interested in researches about the financial reporting reliability. The findings may 
contribute to the ongoing debate concerning financial reporting transparency and 
reliability before and after the economic crisis.   !
4.3. Limitations !
The first limitation of this study concerns with the first chapter where I do not 
contemplate the perspective of the practitioners and of professional bodies regarding 
the notion and treatment of goodwill. Nonetheless, this limitation only in part and 
with reference to the present is attenuated by the empirical results presented in the 
third chapter. For example, I find that overall nowadays CFOs believes that the 
impairment test, with all its difficulties and drawbacks, is preferable to the 
amortization of goodwill. 
Then, as already anticipated in the first chapter, the historical excursus on the 
concept of goodwill should not be considered all-embracing as many other renowned 
Authors pronounced on the topic and as it is mainly Italian based.  
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Some limitations have been already presented within the empirical researches.  
With reference to the research carried out on the relationship between ownership 
structures, corporate governance and discretionary impairment of goodwill I have to 
admit some limitations. The study assumption is that incentives are held constant 
during the sample period. This assumption may not be valid. For example, is the 
influence of insider ownership or corporate governance constant across non-crisis 
and crisis periods? 
The goodwill recognized and measured from the 2008 on may be based on more 
prudential estimates from those of the pre-crisis period. This means that such 
goodwill could require less impairment in the subsequent years. However, one could 
argue that most goodwill impaired in the period have been probably acquired before 
the 2008 crisis and not after.   
Concerning the empirical research conducted by means of the survey methods I have 
to acknowledge some latent pitfalls. The surveyed CFOs may not represent the 
population. Also, using the LinkedIn social network I was not able to avoid an auto-
selection bias, as I could send the invitation to participate to the survey only to those 
CFOs who previously accepted my connection request. Then, CFOs responses and 
thoughts may not converge with their actual action. They also may have responded 
merely replicating what they studied in business schools, masters degree and training 
courses on the impairment of goodwill. 
The whole study is mainly built basing on the agency theory’s individual 
perspective. However there is a strong call for accounting and corporate governance 
to be analysed from different perspectives, which further may explain my overall 
research question. Hence, in the following paragraph on the suggestion for future 
research avenues I recommend also the use differing lens from which investigate my 
main research question.  
 
4.4. Future research !
Most of the limitations described in the above paragraph (§ 4.3.) may be considered 
also as avenues for future research. First, future studies might explore whether in the 
past the practitioners’ thought on the treatment of goodwill was forestalling the 
academicians thought or on the contrary the practice followed the academic 
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literature. For example, this kind of historical study might be based on the 
comparison between the articles published in the accounting field journals presenting 
the practitioner perspectives (e.g. The CPA Journal) and other academic accounting 
peer-reviewed journals (e.g. The Accounting Review). Another possible research 
outcome may derive from the analysis of the historical evolution in the accounting 
standards concerning the goodwill and its accounting treatment in terms of 
definition, recognition, measurement and exhaustion. This vertical exploration 
through the years might be complemented also by an International comparative 
accounting analysis, as different contexts would likely result in different professional 
body approaches through the time. For example, Nobes (1992) identifying several 
interested parties in the political process of standard setting (managers, auditors, 
users, governments, etc.) expected a cyclical pattern of standard setting in the UK 
and with reference to the goodwill treatment the study predicted the issuance of a 
standard allowing flexibility. More recently Ding et al. (2008) studied the evolution 
of accounting for goodwill in the USA, Great Britain, Germany and France finding 
e.g. that the USA was the first to move from the goodwill expensing or charging to 
reserves model to the amortization first and then to the impairment testing. 
Then, the historical exploration presented in the first chapter may be integrated with 
the introduction of other Authors who contributed to debate on accounting for 
goodwill both on the National and International scenarios, including in primis a more 
in-depth investigation of the Anglo-Saxon literature. 
Another interesting avenue for future research could be to explore whether 
accounting for other assets or liabilities provides the same challenges of goodwill 
(e.g. research and development expenses). 
Future research could also investigate the US and emerging economies, as well as 
investigate the relationship between discretionary impairment losses and 
management’s compensation policies. Future research could then explore whether 
the financial market is able to detect the discretionary impairment losses and/or if 
there is a difference in the stock market reaction for companies more prone to assets 
write-off manipulations. 
 The responses received from the CFOs may constitute a starting point for future 
research to enrich existing theories or on which ground potentially new, accounting 
theories.  
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In this study I contemplate several corporate governance subjects, however the 
corporate governance puzzle is still incomplete. For example, future studies might 
complement the analysis by studying whether high quality internal audit may detect 
the opportunistic use of discretionary write-offs and biased managerial judgments 
(Prawitt et al., 2009). 
As suggested above I investigated the research question relying only on the agency 
theory. 
A major criticism of the agency theory is its entrenchment in the neoclassical 
assumption of rational behaviour, which maximises the principal and agent’s 
different utilities without considering the social and institutional contexts (Wiseman 
et al., 2012). The corporate governance literature based on the agency theory 
undervalues an aspect epitomised by the Latin phrase: “quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes?” (Who will guard the guards themselves?). Monitors are agents too and 
those who should be monitored generally elect them (Armstrong, 1991). Further, 
corporate governance should not be abstracted from the social, economic and cultural 
environments in which the companies operate (Carruthers, 1995). Following Cuevas-
Rodríguez et al.’s (2012) exhortation to expand agency theory with a theoretical 
framework that includes social and contextual interactions, future research might 
shift the perspective to institutional theory.  
The recent corporate governance movements and enforced mechanisms and the 
tougher auditor, board, management and CFOs competency requirements are key 
determinants for companies to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the communities 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987; 
Scott, 2001). Thus, institutional theory could complement my analysis, since it is not 
centred on individual rational behaviour, but on an organisation’s determination to 
achieve legitimacy in compliance with the external expectations. In this sense, 
corporate governance is a device formally established within an organisation in 
response to institutional pressures to formalise the expected control over the entire 
firm practices and specifically over the financial reporting.  
The structures and procedures carried out within similar organisations have become 
isomorphic (Eisenhardt, 1988). Consequently, I suggest that the institutional 
isomorphism can explain the differences between firms engaging in earnings 
management practices and non-earnings management firms. The institutional 
isomorphism concept fits the current context and competitive environment in which 
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companies currently operate, as companies tend to standardise their behaviour and to 
homogenise their practices to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders. In 
turn, companies’ need to be eligible for public or private grants and to adapt to norms 
motivates their desire to fit into administrative categories and to resemble their 
comparable companies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1982; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Scott, 2001). In public companies than legitimisation is 
multifaceted (e.g. policy makers, national stock exchanges, financial market 
supervising authorities, investors, governments, external auditors, public opinion, 
etc.) and the implementation of high-level corporate governance practices may 
increase the internal and external approval, thus potentially enhancing a firm’s 
reputation. Generally accepted national and international accounting and auditing 
standards are incorporated into and institutionalised in a formal structure 
representing a manifest expression of myth and ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Carruthers, 1995). Besides, conforming to socially established procedures and 
techniques allows companies to free themselves from being considered accountable 
or negligent when any kind of failure or scandal occurs.  
Finally, one can interpret the results in the light of a contingency-based framework 
(Adams, 2002). Three contextual dimensions – corporate characteristics, general 
contextual factors and internal contextual factors – may influence companies’ 
corporate governance system. The accounting field has already studied firms’ 
contextual specificities, with reference to their reporting practices and disclosure 
(Adams, 2002; Ekanayake et al., 2009). Some of the main contextual influences on 
companies’ governance system are the financial industry’s characteristics, the level 
of regulation, the dynamic and complex environment, the professionalization of 
accounting and auditing and the consideration of multiple interest groups.  Structural 
contingency theory is widely used in organisation studies, while it is uncommon in 
the accounting or auditing fields; future studies might adapt the contingency 
literature on internal control systems to the overall corporate governance system 
(Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980; Donaldson, 1982, 1996, 2001; Van de 
Ven et al., 2013). A company’s characteristics strongly influence the extent of its 
internal control system. The contingency framework is consistent with several 
internal control regulations maintaining that the scope of the internal control may 
vary due to the different corporate characteristics (e.g. COSO). This implies that 
each company establishes and manages the most appropriate corporate governance 
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mechanisms, taking its contingency characteristics into consideration (Birnberg et 
al., 1983; Fisher, 1995, 1998; Chapman, 1997; Chenhall, 2003; Jokipii, 2009). From 
the contingency theory perspective, companies’ corporate governance system is 
affected on three different levels: the internal organisation, the organisational 
interface and the external interface. The internal organisation context refers to the 
firm’s specific characteristics, such as its size, industry, business model and 
performance. The organisational interface relates to contingencies, such as the 
financial markets, regulatory bodies, governmental agencies, professional 
organisations, etc. Finally, the external interface refers to all the effects of the 
political, social, economic and international influences (Ekanayake et al., 2009).  
The company size, which is one of the most studied contingency characteristics, 
seems to suit my analysis on the use of discretionary impairment of goodwill. This is 
relevant given the underlying contingency studies’ supposition that increasing size 
implies an increasing structural complexity (Gupta et al., 1994). Merchant (1981, 
1984) emphasises that the bigger the organisation, the higher the inclination to use 
formal controls and standardised information flows. As the organisation’s size 
increases, repetitive operations and decisions increase, resulting in formalised, 
specialised and standardised activities, which might correspond to a higher 
“operating space” for the management to use discretionary impairment losses. 
However, larger organisations can and should invest more resources in sophisticated 
control activities (Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1995; 
Ezzamel, 1990; Jokipii, 2009), which lead to conclude exactly the opposite, that is 
they provide more reliable financial information. Some studies have found evidence 
that environmental uncertainty increases the likelihood of more sophisticated internal 
controls in order to adapt rapidly to external changes, such as regulation, 
technologies, competition, etc. (Gordon and Miller, 1976; Chenhall, 2003). Owing to 
diverse level of complexity in the industry in which each firm operates, the related 
efforts to control and measure the earnings management risk changes, hence, the 
uncertainty concept is applicable in order to constitute diverse governance 
mechanisms (Morgan, 2002; Jin et al., 2013). Although institutional theory is based 
on the interpretive paradigm and the agency and contingency theories are based on 
the functionalist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), I believe that approaches that 
can bridge various paradigms may contribute to the overall understanding of the 
mosaic forming the corporate governance system (Gioia and Pitre, 1990).  Both 
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agency and contingency theories stem from the sociology of regulation and approach 
accounting and corporate governance from an objectivist point of view. Thus, these 
two theories do not create paradigm inconsistency. Moreover, moving from the 
functionalist paradigm to the interpretative paradigm of new institutionalism does not 
create inconsistency. Future research can cross these paradigms by exploiting their 
unspecified boundaries. Functionalist and interpretive paradigms share a common set 
of features in terms of their stability (the sociology of regulation), creating a grey 
area (or transition zone) for mutual integration and combination. Prior literature has 
exploited structuration theory as the link between the interpretive paradigm’s human 
actions and the functionalist paradigm’s established organisational structures (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Willmott, 1993; Weaver and Gioia, 1994).  
Although some of the literature defends different paradigms’ incommensurability 
(Kuhn, 1962; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Jackson and Carter, 1991, 1993), I support 
the converse of this broad debate, namely that paradigms can have alternatives 
patterns (Hassard, 1988, 1991; Willmott, 1993; Weaver and Gioia, 1994; Donaldson, 
1998). Structuration provides an opportunity to fix the objective functionalist 
perspective and the subjective interpretive perspective on a continuum. Through their 
rules and resources, structures are the outcome and medium of interactions; they 
exist because they are built in social systems and are necessary to successfully 
interact in social systems (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984, 1991; Ranson et al., 1980; 
Riley, 1983; Barley, 1986; Weaver and Gioia, 1994). Giddens and Dallmayr (1982) 
introduced structure’s duality, stressing the interrelations between purposeful-
objectivist human action and the concurrent subjective side of human action, which 
prevailing social structures affect. Put differently, the agent purposely and 
intentionally acts in the social system and, simultaneously, the same social system 
determines its action (Giddens and Dallmayr, 1982; Dillard and Yuthas, 2002). 
Hence, the functionalist-agency or contingency theories and the interpretive-
institutional theory are on the same footing, both useful to explicate organisational 
phenomena and, specifically, the use of corporate governance as a mitigating device 
for earnings management. 
Several authors who alternatively embrace contingency or institutional approaches to 
organisations acknowledge the connections between the two theories (Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985; Scott, 1987; Gresov, 1989; Gupta et al., 1994). Drazin and Van 
de Ven (1985), for instance, maintain that most organisations are constrained to an 
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isomorphic relationship between their macro and micro levels in order to survive. 
The macro level tends to require uniformities and prescriptions on the micro level 
(departments, sub-units and work groups). In this regard, Scott’s (1987) suggestion 
that institutional arguments should be considered complementing and contextualising 
efficiency arguments is significant because it implicitly supports a multi-paradigm 
approach. Illustration 4.1 graphically summarises a possible future multi-paradigm 
approach to explain the corporate governance role in constraining earnings 
management. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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RADICAL HUMANISM 
 
RADICAL STRUCTURALIST 
 
FUNCTIONALIST 
Corporate governance is a control tool to 
enhance firms’ financial reporting reliability. 
• Agency theory: In the firms esist as many 
agency problems as many contracts are 
stipulated, originating many agent-principal 
relationship. 
• Contingency theory: Complex business 
environments (size, intangibles, receivables, 
financial assets, leverage, regulation, IT, 
multi-interest groups, etc.) are more likely to 
develop tougher corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
INTERPRETIVIST 
 
Corporate governance is a control tool 
institutionalised to achieve legitimacy and 
reinforce compliance with accounting 
standards and regulations. 
 
• Institutional theory: Firms are affected by 
coercive (e.g. political influences), mimetic (in 
order to control risks) and normative (e.g. 
investors and enterpreneurship associations) 
isomorphisms. 
 
Structuration Theory 
 
Established organisational 
structures 
Procedures, methods, tools, etc. 
used by the top-management, the 
supervisory systems  and the 
corporate governance subjects. 
 
Human action 
 
 
Management, Investors, External 
auditors, Analysts, CFOs 
 
 
Radical 
Change 
Subjective Objective!
Regulation 
Illustration 4.1: A multi-paradigm approach to the use of corporate governance to constrain earnings management 
 
Adapted from (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Lewis and Grimes, 1999) 
 
“Duality of 
structures” 
 
187 
Appendices(
Appendix(A.(Findings(of(§(3.1(Impairment,(earnings(management,(
ownership(structures(and(corporate(governance.(
 
 
Table 3 Assets impairment per Country setting 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics per Country setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number UK 
Relative 
amount 
UK 
Number 
Italy 
Relative 
amount 
Italy 
 
Number 
Germany 
Relative 
amount 
Germany 
2006 29 0,009 37 0,002 61 0,005 
2007 27 0,005 47 0,004 64 0,003 
2008 47 0,016 50 0,004 64 0,007 
2009 47 0,011 53 0,006 71 0,012 
2010 41 0,009 55 0,003 63 0,005 
Total impairment 
obs / Average 191 0,011 242 0,004 323 0,006 
 Panel A UK (n=480) Panel B Italy (n=470) Panel C Germany (n=470) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
IMPAIR 0,389 0,490 0,518 0,500 0,687 0,464 
WO% 0,011 0,019 0,004 0,014 0,006  0,020 
ΔROA 0,010 0,042 0,006 0,035 0,008 0,056 
ΔOCF 0,001 0,118 -0,007 0,123 0,003  0,146 
GROWTH 2,61 1,568 1,849 1,449 2,18 1,649 
ΔINDROA 0,008 0,012 0,005 0,014 0,007 0,015 
ΔINDGROWTH 1,962 0,913 1,523 0,712 1,848 0,874 
ΔGDP 0,537 3,243 -0,200 2,917 1,323  3,765 
LOSS 0,099 0,364 0,079 0,270 0,067 0,254 
SIZE (in bn/€) 185,467 541,429 36,868 12,222 96,889 395,972 
INSIDE 0,025 0,088 0,210 0,279 0,076  0,147 
INST 0,212 0,142 0,038 0,045 0,227  0,256 
STATE 0,007 0,006 0,058 0,151 0,029  0,105 
CORPGOV -0,012 0,776 -0,053 0,649 -0,028 0,629 
OWNCONC 0,136 0,135 0,447 0,203 0,246  0,196 
BATH -0,011 0,035 -0,007 0,038 -0,05  0,043 
SMOOTH 0,013 0,034 0,009 0,023 0,011  0,056 
LEV 0,244 0,153 0,310 0,185 0,289 0,165 
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Table 5 Discretionary assets write-off estimation, Heckman two-stage MLE of Model 2  
Dependent variable: WO% (selection variable: IMPAIR) 
 Panel A UK (n=480) Panel B Italy (n=470) Panel C Germany (n=470) 
 Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat 
ΔROA -0,004*** -3,18 -0,081** -2,38 -0,049**  -2,61 
ΔOCF -0,000* -1,79 -0,016 -1,07 -0,008  0,74 
GROWTH -0,014** -2,37 -0,003*** -3,42 -0,004**  -2,19 
ΔINDROA 0,021 0,84 0,0238 0,30 0,003  0,47 
ΔINDGROWTH 0,000 0,25 -0,000 -0,13 -0,001  -0,18  
ΔGDP -0,009 -1,28 -0,000 -0,23 -0,009 -0,98 
LOSS 0,029*** 4,25 0,011*** 3,20 0,031***  3,64 
SIZE 0,001 1,03 0,000* 1,68 0,000**  2,21 
MILLS 0,009*** 15,69 0,015*** 18,44 0,007***  19,84 
const 0,002** 2,13 0,000 0,20 0,000 0,48 
       
Log-likelihood 436,72  408,52  419,91  
Max VIF 2,092  1,871  1,922  
All p- values are two-tailed; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) ** 
Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Variables definition: WO% = firm’s i reported write-offs in long-lived assets for period t, divided 
by total assets at the end of period t – 1; ΔROAit = firm’s i change in return on assets from period t 
to t-1; ΔOCFit = firm’s i change in operating cash flows from period t to t-1; GROWTHit= growth 
options, proxied by the firm’s i market-to-book value at time t; ΔINDROAit = the median change in 
the firm i industry return on assets from period t to t-1; INDGROWTHit = the median market-to-
book ratio in firm i industry at time t; ΔGDPit = change in the national gross domestic product at 
time t; LOSSit = dummy variable, 1 if the firm reported a loss at time t; SIZEit = firm’ size, proxied 
by the total assets at time t; MILLSit = inverse Mills ratios of the first stage probit regression. !!
Table 6 Ownership structures, corporate governance and discretionary asset write-offs, Tobit 
regression of Model 3 
Dependent variable: DWO 
  Panel A UK (n=480)  Panel B Italy (n=470)  Panel C Germany (n=470)  
  Coef.  z-stat  Coef.  z-stat  Coef.  z-stat  
INSIDE  0,0071**  2,39  0,0089***  4,57  0,0004  1,33  
STATE  -0,0006  -0,22  0,0169***  6,14  0,0021  0,98  
INST  -0,0007**  2,11  0,0134  1,63  -0,0063**  2,46  
CORPGOV  -0,0032***  3,58  0,0005  0,55  -0,0005**  2,07  
OWNCONC  0,0098  0,21  0,0005  0,17  0,0056  1,47  
BA TH  -0,008**  -2,22  -0,0815  -1,37  0,0012  0,81  
SMOOTH  0,0012  0,68  0,0468***  3,14  0,0092**  2,35  
LEV  0,0671*  1,77  0,0225**  2,57  0,0036**  2,28  
SIZE  -0,0050*  1,73  -0,0000***  -5,11  -0,0009  -1,12  
const  0,003  0,87  -0,002  -1,11  0,0038**  2,12  
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Log-likelihood  929,267   975,005   886,166   
Chi-square  151,59    158,29    149,62    
Chi-Square sig.  <0000    <0,000    <0,000    
Max VIF  1,89    1,55    2,01    
All p-values are two-tailed; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) ** 
Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level 
(two-tailed) Variables definition: DWOit = discretionary impairment losses (see above); INSIDEit 
= insider ownership, percentage of ordinary shares held by directors for firm i; STATEit = state 
ownership, percentage of ordinary shares held by the national or local governments or their 
agencies for firm i; INST = institutional investors ownership, percentage of ordinary shares, it held 
by institutional investors form firm i; CORPGOV = composite measure of the strength of corporate 
governance it mechanisms; OWNCONCit = percentage of ordinary share owned by the largest 
shareholder; BATHit = big bath, equal to the change in the firm’s pre-write-off earnings from 
period t to t-1 divided by the total assets at the end of period t -1 when below the median of nonzero 
negative values, 0 otherwise; SMOOTHit = income smoothing, equal to the change in the firm’s 
pre-write-off earnings from period t to t-1 divided by the total assets at the end of period t -1 when 
above the median of nonzero positive values, 0 otherwise; LEVit = leverage, measured by the 
firm’s total debt at time t, divided by the total assets; SIZEit = firm’ size, proxied by the total assets 
at time t. !!!
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Appendix(B1.(Facsimile(of(the(email(sent(to(connected(CFOs.(!
Dear Mr Name Surname, 
 
I thank you for accepting my connection request. 
 
I am Silvia Ferramosca a Ph.D. Student at the University of Pisa (Italy) and I am doing a research on 
accounting standards, in particular those relating to the impairment test of goodwill (IAS 36 and 
SFAS 142). 
In this phase of the research I investigate the perception that CFOs have on the goodwill impairment 
test. 
To this end, it would be very important for me, if you could contribute to my academic research. 
 
Please could you spare a few minutes of your time to complete my survey. 
To participate please click the link below or copy it into your web browser. 
 
https://eSurv.org?s=LMENON_5970c0d4 
 
The questionnaire responses are anonymous and will be used only for aggregate data analysis. 
 
The results of the research will be published in a report and shared on LinkedIn or sent on the direct 
request of participants. 
 
I am at your disposal for any clarification, 
Thank you for your time! 
Best regards, 
 
Silvia Ferramosca
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Appendix(B2.(CFO’s(survey:(the(questionnaire
Do CFOs perceive that managers discretionally use the goodwill 
write-off under IFRS/US-GAAP?  
 
Dear CFO (Chief Financial Officer), 
I thank you to adhere to this research project entitled “Do CFOs perceive that 
managers discretionally use the goodwill write-off under IFRS/US-GAAP?”, realised 
for my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Pisa, Italy. 
 
The aim of this research is to analyse whether the CFOs or people working in similar 
positions perceive that goodwill write-offs may be used discretionally. Indeed, both 
under IAS/IFRS and US GAAP managers may exploit the flexibility of the 
accounting standards because they have incentives to do so or, conversely, because 
they signal to investors the company future perspectives. 
 
The findings of the present study will be object of my Ph.D. thesis and of an 
international publication. It is my care to share the results with you at your request 
and by posting a summary report on LinkedIn. 
 
The responses of the questionnaire (made up by 4 sections and 30 questions) will be 
used anonymously for aggregate data analysis. No individual information will be 
revealed in research reports, publications, etc. 
  
I thank you in advance for your collaboration 
Best regards, 
The research responsible 
Silvia Ferramosca 
Ph.D. Student 
Department of Economics and Management 
University of Pisa, Italy 
s.ferramosca@ec.unipi.it 
skype: silviafskype 
 
 
1. The organization for which you work adopts:   
! IAS/IFRS 
! US GAAP 
! Neither the IAS/IFRS nor the US GAAP 
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SECTION 1- Personal/Background Information 
 
2. Your position in the organization   
! Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
! Chief Audit Executive (CAE)/Top Audit Position 
! Controller/Financial manager 
! Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
! Other (please specify) 
 
3. Do you seat on the board as director?   
! Yes 
! No 
 
4. Your gender   
! Female 
! Male 
 
5. Your age   
! 35 years old or younger 
! 36-50 years old 
! 51 years old or older 
 
6. Your highest level of formal education completed   
! Secondary/high school education 
! Undergraduate diploma or associate degree 
! Bachelors 
! Masters 
! Doctoral degree (Ph.D. or higher) 
 
7. Your academics major(s) 
(Please, mark all that apply)   
! Accounting 
! Finance 
! Internal auditing 
! External auditing 
! General business/management 
! Economics 
! Law 
! Computer science or information systems 
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! Mathematics/statistics 
! Engineering 
! Other science or technical field (e.g. physics, chemistry, geology, biology) 
! Arts or humanities (e.g. languages, literature, history, psychology) 
! Other 
! No degree 
 
8. How many total years have you been CFO or similar positions at your current 
organization and previous organizations you have worked for?   
! 3 years or less 
! 4-9 years 
! 10 years or more 
 
9. Where do you administratively report in your organization 
(Please, mark all that apply)   
! Chief Executive Director (CEO) 
! Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
! Chief Operating Officer (COO) 
! Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or equivalent 
! Chief Audit Executive (CAE)/Top Audit Position 
! Controller/financial manager 
! Chairman/Board of Directors 
! Audit Committee 
! Other (please specify) 
 
 
SECTION 2- Your Organization 
 
10. Location (head office) of the organization for which you work:   
! Argentina 
! Australia 
! Austria 
! Belgium 
! Brazil 
! Canada 
! Chile 
! Denmark 
! Finland 
! France 
! Germany 
! Greece 
! Hong Kong 
! Italy 
! Japan 
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! Mexico 
! Netherlands 
! New Zealand 
! Norway 
! Poland 
! Portugal 
! Spain 
! Sweden 
! Switzerland 
! Taiwan 
! United Kingdom & Ireland 
! United States 
! Other (please specify) (………………………………………………………..) 
  
11. The type of organization for which you work:   
! Privately held (non-listed) company 
! Publicly-traded (listed) company 
! Public sector/government 
! Not-for-profit organization 
! Other 
 
12. The broad industry classification of the organization for which you work:   
! Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
! Mining 
! Construction 
! Manufacturing 
! Transportation and public utilities 
! Wholesale Trade 
! Retail Trade 
! Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
! Services 
! Public Administration 
! Other 
 
13. Size of the organization for which you work in terms of: Total employees   
! 1-50 
! 51-250 
! 251-1000 
! 1001 or more 
 
14. Size of the organization for which you work in terms of: Total Assets in US 
dollars   
! $500M or less 
! $500M-$5B 
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! $6B-$25B 
! $26B or more 
 
15. Size of the organization for which you work in terms of: Total Revenue   
! $500M or less 
! $501M-$5B 
! $6B-$25B 
! $26B or more 
 
16. Is the organization for which you work:   
! Local 
! National 
! International/multinational 
 
17. The ownership of the organization for which you work is mainly:   
3. Dispersed 
4. Familiar 
5. Managerial 
6. Governmental 
 
18. Who is the external auditor in the organization for which you work?   
! PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
! Ernst & Young (E&Y) 
! Deloitte 
! KPMG 
! Other 
 
19. Magnitude of Goodwill: measured as goodwill in percent of total assets 
! 0% 
! 0.1% - 0.9% 
! 1% - 1.5% 
! 1.6% - 5% 
! 5.1% - 9% 
! > 9.1% 
 
20. In the organization for which you work impairment tests are carried out by:   
! Internal expert(s) 
! Audit firm 
! External expert(s) (e.g. Financial advisory; Consulting firm; Chartered 
Accountant) 
! Cooperation between internal and external experts 
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SECTION 3 - Goodwill Accounting 
 
Goodwill accounting standards set the requirements for the recognition and 
measurement of goodwill. 
I aim at investigating whether the accounting standards related to goodwill write-offs 
(i.e. IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other intangible 
assets) increase the perception of financial reporting discretion. 
 
Both under IAS 36 and SFAS 142 goodwill is no longer amortised but the 
management has to test its value at least once a year. When the carrying amount of a 
cash-generating unit (reporting unit) to which the goodwill is allocated exceeds the 
recoverable amount of that unit, the management has to recognise an impairment loss 
(write-off). 
The determination of the recoverable amount implies the use of several management 
estimates (e.g. cash flow projections, discount rate, etc.). 
 
In the following sentences the abbreviation GWO stands for "goodwill write-off". 
 
21. Please, rate the following statements, where 
1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Partially Disagree), 4 (Neutral), 5 (Partially Agree), 6 (Agree), 7 (Strongly 
Agree)  
 RATE 
The impairment test provides a more faithful representation than the 
amortization process 
 
The elimination of goodwill amortization has introduced greater 
subjectivity  
 
Valuation based on estimated future cash flows in financial reporting is 
adequate/useful  
 
Management exploits the flexibility/discretion allowed by IAS 36 (SFAS 
142)  
 
Management does not recognize a GWO even if it is impaired   
GWO reflects the macroeconomic conditions in which the organization 
operates (e.g. industry, interest rates) 
 
GWO reflects the microeconomic conditions in which the organization 
operates (e.g. profitability, market to book value, sales)  
 
Management discretionally uses GWO because has incentives to do so   
Management discretionally uses GWO to send credible signals to the 
outside  
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22. Please, rate the following statements indicating why management might 
discretionally use GWO, where 
1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Partially Disagree), 4 (Neutral), 5 (Partially Agree), 6 (Agree), 7 (Strongly 
Agree) 
 RATE 
In organization with more liquid shares (higher volume of trading) 
management is more likely to recognize GWO 
 
Prohibiting GWO reversals delays the recognition of GWO or leads to 
underestimated GWO 
 
Management discretionally uses GWO to meet analysts earnings 
forecasts  
 
The organization leverage (i.e. subjection to stricter covenants) induces 
management to underestimate the GWO 
 
Management discretionary use of GWO depends on their compensation 
schemes (e.g. bonus tied to earnings)  
 
CEOs do not recognize GWO because of reputation concerns (e.g. 
mismanagement, acquisition price too high) 
 
The new CEO overestimates GWO to blame prior CEO and saving 
earnings for future periods  
 
Management exploits crisis periods to take large GWO saving future 
earnings  
 
Management over/underestimates GWO to smooth the earnings and send 
to investors a solid image of the organization results  
 
 
23. Please, rate the following statements indicating whether different ownership 
structures affect the GWO, where 
1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Partially Disagree), 4 (Neutral), 5 (Partially Agree), 6 (Agree), 7 (Strongly 
Agree) 
 RATE 
Managerial ownership implies a delay or an underestimation of GWO  
Concentrated ownership increases the use of discretionary GWO  
State ownership increases the use of discretionary GWO  
Institutional investors constrain the use of discretionary GWO  
Family ownership constrains the use of discretionary GWO  
 
24. Please, rate the following statements indicating whether external auditor features 
detect the discretionary use of GWO, where 
1 (Strongly Disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Partially Disagree), 4 (Neutral), 5 (Partially Agree), 6 (Agree), 7 (Strongly 
Agree) 
 RATE 
External audit constrains managerial discretion in GWO  
A Big-4 auditor* better constrains managerial discretion in GWO 
*Big-4 auditors are: PwC, E&Y, Deloitte and KPMG 
 
Higher audit fees indicate higher audit risk and thus delayed or 
undervalued GWO 
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Higher non-audit-fees (service related fees) reduces auditors 
independence increasing the likelihood of discretionary GWO 
 
External auditor expertise in the industry in which the organization 
operates better constrains managerial discretion in GWO 
 
External auditor expertise in the task of assessing GWO better constrains 
managerial discretion in GWO 
 
A long-tenured external auditor better constrains managerial discretion 
in GWO 
 
External auditor mandatory rotation helps in detecting the manager-
auditor implicit agreements on  
discretionary GWO 
 
 
 
SECTION 4 – Goodwill Accounting Difficulties and Suggestions to Increase 
Financial Reporting Reliability 
 
25. Please, rate the following questions, where 
1 (Very difficult), 2 (Difficult), 3 (Partially Difficult), 4(Neutral), 5(Partially Easy), 6 (Easy), 7 (Very Easy) 
 RATE 
How difficult is it for external auditors to audit management estimates 
underlying goodwill impairment test? 
 
How difficult is it for you to assess management estimates underlying 
goodwill impairment test? 
 
 
26. Do you use specific measures/procedures to evaluate the overall reliability of 
goodwill impairment test? 
(Please, mark all that apply)   
! Whether the impairment test has been delegated to third parties (consultants, 
valuation professionals…) 
! Whether the organizations’ financial reporting has been audited 
! The organization’s risks 
! The organization’s corporate governance system 
! Economic or financial ratios (EPS, EBITDA, CFO, MTB…) 
! The disclosure and explanations that are provided for the impairment test 
procedure 
! No, I do not 
! Other (please specify) 
 (………………………………………………………………..) 
  
27. Do you compare your evaluation with other evaluation(s) of subjects in other 
positions? 
(Please, mark all that apply)   
! Compliance officer 
! Controller 
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! Internal audit 
! Process owner(s) 
! Risk managers 
! No, I do not 
! Other (please specify) 
(………………………………………………………………………) 
  
28. Do you think that exist other ways to account for goodwill that may provide more 
useful information for users?   
! Yes 
! No 
 
29. Which of the following would you suggest to enforce the reliability of goodwill 
accounting? 
(Please, mark all that apply)   
! The reintroduction of goodwill amortisation and eventually review it for 
impairment 
! The requirement of additional disclosure 
! To expense goodwill on business combination (resolving the difference between 
internally generated goodwill and purchased goodwill) 
! To offset goodwill against equity 
! To account for goodwill as other intangible assets (with definite useful life) are 
accounted 
! The recognition of internally generated goodwill, permitting the offsetting 
between purchased and internally generated goodwill 
! To determine the value of goodwill as the difference between the book value of 
the equity (of the entire company) and the (long-term) market value of equity 
(capitalisation) 
! Other (please specify) 
 (………………………………………………………………………) 
  
30. Overall, do you prefer the impairment test than prior amortization process for 
goodwill?   
! Yes 
! No 
 
31. Please, indicate eventual suggestions or recommendations for this research. 
(Not-mandatory field) 
(………………………………………………………………………) 
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Appendix(B3.(Survey(results !!
Table 7 Survey responses 
The organization for which you work adopts: 
 N % N 
Initial sample, of which 441 100.0 
IAS/IFRS 301 68.3 
US GAAP 65 14.7 
Neither the IAS/IFRS nor the US GAAP 75 17.0 
Less neither the IAS/IFRS nor the US GAAP -75  
Less not-completed survey - 191  
Final sample, of which:  175 100.00 
IAS/IFRS 141 80.6 
US GAAP 34 19.4 
 
Table 8 Demographics for CFOs’ personal/background information 
You seat on the board as director N % N 
No 97 55.4 
Yes 78 44.6 
Your gender   
Female 7 4.0 
Male 168 96.0 
Your age   
35 years old or younger 27 15.4 
36-50 years old 105 60.0 
51 years old or older 43 24.6 
Your highest level of formal education completed   
Secondary/high school education 6 3.4 
Undergraduate diploma or associate degree 3 1.7 
Bachelors 50 28.6 
Masters 98 56.0 
Doctoral degree (Ph.D. or higher) 18 10.3 
Your academics majors (multiple answer allowed)   
Finance 124 70.9 
Accounting 107 61.1 
General business/management 84 48.0 
Economics 75 42.9 
Mathematics/statistics 26 14.9 
Law 24 13.7 
Internal auditing 23 13.1 
External auditing 20 11.4 
Computer science or information systems 12 6.9 
Arts or humanities (e.g. languages, literature, history, psychology) 8 4.6 
Other 7 4.0 
Engineering 6 3.4 
Other science or technical field (e.g. physics, chemistry, geology, biology) 4 2.3 
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No degree 3 1.7 
CFO (similar positions) at current and previous organizations tenure   
3 years or less 26 14.9 
4-9 years 66 37.7 
10 years or more 83 47.4 
Where do you administratively report in your organization (multiple 
answer allowed) 
  
Chief Executive Director (CEO) 130 74.3 
Chairman/Board of Directors 33 18.9 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 29 16.6 
Audit Committee 10 5.7 
Other 9 5.1 
Controller/financial manager 8 4.6 
Chief Audit Executive (CAE)/Top Audit Position 3 1.7 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) 3 1.7 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or equivalent 1 .6 
 
Table 9 Demographics of the organization 
Type of organization  N %N 
Privately held (non-listed) company 96 54.9 
Publicly-traded (listed) company 75 42.9 
Public sector/government 2 1.1 
Other 2 1.1 
Broad industry classification of the organization    
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4 2.3 
Construction 12 6.9 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 17 9.7 
Manufacturing 60 34.3 
Mining 8 4.6 
Other 27 15.4 
Retail Trade 12 6.9 
Services 19 10.9 
Transportation and public utilities 5 2.9 
Wholesale Trade 11 6.3 
Size of the organization in terms of Total employees   
1-50 16 9.1 
51-250 32 18.3 
251-1000 34 19.4 
1001 or more 93 53.1 
Size of the organization in terms of Total Assets in US dollars   
$500M or less 91 52.0 
$500M-$5B 43 24.6 
$6B-$25B 21 12.0 
$26B or more 20 11.4 
Size of the organization in terms of Total Revenues   
$500M or less 95 54.3 
$501M-$5B 51 29.1 
$6B-$25B 16 9.1 
$26B or more 13 7.4 
The organization is   
International/multinational 129 73.7 
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National 29 16.6 
Local 17 9.7 
The ownership of the organization is mainly   
Familiar 72 41.1 
Dispersed 54 30.9 
Managerial 45 25.7 
Governmental 4 2.3 
The external auditor in the organization for which you work is   
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 43 24.6 
KPMG 38 21.7 
Ernst & Young (E&Y) 34 19.4 
Deloitte 23 13.1 
Other 37 21.1 
Magnitude of Goodwill measured as goodwill in percent of total assets   
0% 48 27.4 
0.1% - 0.9% 26 14.9 
1.6% - 5% 34 19.4 
1% - 1.5% 15 8.6 
5.1% - 9% 17 9.7 
> 9.1% 35 20.0 
In the organization impairment tests are carried out by   
Internal expert(s) 78 44.6 
Cooperation between internal and external experts 58 33.1 
External expert(s) (e.g. Financial advisory; Consulting firm; CPA) 20 11.4 
Audit firm 19 10.9 !
Table 10 CFOs’ perceptions on the goodwill accounting discretionality 
 Rate  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Group 1         
The impairment test provides a more faithful 
representation than the amortization process 
N 5 9 14 23 43 57 24 
%N 2.9 5.1 8.0 13.1 24.6 32.6 13.7 
The elimination of goodwill amortization has 
introduced greater subjectivity 
N 8 18 19 28 41 41 20 
%N 4.6 10.3 10.9 16.0 23.4 23.4 11.4 
Valuation based on estimated future cash flows in 
financial reporting is adequate/useful 
N 3 4 17 35 45 46 25 
%N 1.7 2.3 9.7 20.0 25.7 26.3 14.3 
Management exploits the flexibility discretion 
allowed by IAS 36 (SFAS 142) 
N 5 14 15 59 39 31 12 
%N 2.9 8.0 8.6 33.7 22.3 17.7 6.9 
Management does not recognize a GWO even if it 
is impaired 
N 28 34 24 40 25 19 5 
%N 16.0 19.4 13.7 22.9 14.3 10.9 2.9 
GWO reflects the macroeconomic conditions in 
which the organization operates 
N 5 9 15 36 60 38 12 
%N 2.9 5.1 8.6 20.6 34.3 21.7 6.9 
GWO reflects the microeconomic conditions in 
which the organization operates 
N 6 6 19 29 52 51 12 
%N 3.4 3.4 10.9 16.6 29.7 29.1 6.9 
Management discretionally uses GWO because has 
incentives to do so 
N 32 28 29 36 23 19 8 
%N 18.3 16.0 16.6 20.6 13.1 10.9 4.6 
Management discretionally uses GWO to send 
credible signals to the outside 
N 28 22 25 40 33 21 6 
%N 16.0 12.6 14.3 22.9 18.9 12.0 3.4 
Group 2         
In organization with more liquid shares 
management is more likely to recognize GWO 
N 10 19 17 66 31 28 4 
%N 5.7 10.9 9.7 37.7 17.7 16.0 2.3 
Prohibiting GWO reversals delays the recognition 
of GWO or leads to underestimated GWO 
N 6 12 15 47 49 34 12 
%N 3.4 6.9 8.6 26.9 28.0 19.4 6.9 
203 
Management discretionally uses GWO to meet 
analysts earnings forecasts 
N 28 26 15 37 38 25 6 
%N 16.0 14.9 8.6 21.1 21.7 14.3 3.4 
The organization leverage induces management to 
underestimate the GWO 
N 19 22 19 44 44 22 5 
%N 10.9 12.6 10.9 25.1 25.1 12.6 2.9 
Management discretionary use of GWO depends on 
their compensation schemes  
N 25 22 21 37 38 22 10 
%N 14.3 12.6 12.0 21.1 21.7 12.6 5.7 
CEOs do not recognize GWO because of reputation 
concerns  
N 16 21 16 42 36 31 13 
%N 9.1 12.0 9.1 24.0 20.6 17.7 7.4 
The new CEO overestimates GWO to blame prior 
CEO and saving earnings for future periods 
N 24 17 19 41 29 27 18 
%N 13.7 9.7 10.9 23.4 16.6 15.4 10.3 
Management exploits crisis periods to take large 
GWO saving future earnings 
N 14 17 21 38 44 25 16 
%N 8.0 9.7 12.0 21.7 25.1 14.3 9.1 
Management over/underestimates GWO to smooth 
the earnings and send to investors a solid image  
N 15 25 18 49 31 27 10 
%N 8.6 14.3 10.3 28.0 17.7 15.4 5.7 
Group 3         
Managerial ownership implies a delay or an 
underestimation of GW 
N 17 18 20 50 31 27 12 
%N 9.7 10.3 11.4 28.6 17.7 15.4 6.9 
Concentrated ownership increases the use of 
discretionary GWO 
N 13 16 22 52 32 26 14 
%N 7.4 9.1 12.6 29.7 18.3 14.9 8.0 
State ownership increases the use of discretionary 
GWO 
N 19 23 24 55 30 14 10 
%N 10.9 13.1 13.7 31.4 17.1 8.0 5.7 
Institutional investors constrain the use of 
discretionary GWO 
N 14 16 16 44 38 36 11 
%N 8.0 9.1 9.1 25.1 21.7 20.6 6.3 
Family ownership constrains the use of 
discretionary GWO 
N 17 19 16 59 22 31 11 
%N 9.7 10.9 9.1 33.7 12.6 17.7 6.3 
Group 4         
External audit constrains managerial discretion in 
GWO 
N 7 13 12 34 39 48 22 
%N 4.0 7.4 6.9 19.4 22.3 27.4 12.6 
A Big-4 auditor better constrains managerial 
discretion in GWO 
N 10 12 13 31 43 38 28 
%N 5.7 6.9 7.4 17.7 24.6 21.7 16.0 
Higher audit fees indicate higher audit risk and thus 
delayed or undervalued GWO 
N 29 43 23 37 29 11 3 
%N 16.6 24.6 13.1 21.1 16.6 6.3 1.7 
Higher non-audit-fees (service-related-fees) reduces 
auditors independence increasing the likelihood of 
discretionary GWO 
N 15 37 18 49 25 21 10 
%N 8.6 21.1 10.3 28.0 14.3 12.0 5.7 
External auditor expertise in the industry constrains 
managerial discretion in GWO 
N 6 5 13 38 56 43 14 
%N 3.4 2.9 7.4 21.7 32.0 24.6 8.0 
External auditor expertise in the task of assessing 
GWO constrains managerial discretion in GWO 
N 6 6 10 42 54 45 12 
%N 3.4 3.4 5.7 24.0 30.9 25.7 6.9 
A long tenured external auditor better constrains 
managerial discretion in GWO 
N 9 14 26 57 38 22 9 
%N 5.1 8.0 14.9 32.6 21.7 12.6 5.1 
External auditor mandatory rotation helps in 
detecting the discretionary use of GWO 
N 7 9 6 47 44 40 22 
%N 4.0 5.1 3.4 26.9 25.1 22.9 12.6 
The statements rate corresponds to the following level of agreement: 1, strongly disagree; 2, disagree; 3, 
partially disagree; 4, neutral; 5, partially agree; 6, agree and 7, strongly disagree !!!!!!
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Table 11 How difficult is assessing the estimates underlying the impairment test 
Rate   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How difficult is it for external auditors to audit 
management estimates underlying goodwill 
impairment test? 
N 6 31 49 34 29 20 6 
%N 3.4 17.7 28.0 19.4 16.6 11.4 3.4 
How difficult is it for you to assess management 
estimates underlying goodwill impairment test? 
N 2 17 34 43 34 35 10 
%N 1.1 9.7 19.4 24.6 19.4 20.0 5.7 
The statements rate corresponds to the following level of agreement: 1, very difficult; 2, difficult; 3, partially 
difficult; 4, neutral; 5, partially easy; 6, easy and 7, very easy. !!!!!
Table 12 Goodwill accounting suggestions to increase financial reporting reliability 
Do you use specific measures/procedures to evaluate the overall reliability of 
goodwill impairment test (multiple answer allowed) 
N % N 
Whether the impairment test has been delegated to third parties  51 29.1 
Whether the organizations’ financial reporting has been audited 71 40.6 
The organization’s risks 78 44.6 
The organization’s corporate governance system 47 26.9 
Economic or financial ratios (EPS, EBITDA, CFO, MTB…) 91 52.0 
The disclosure and explanations that are provided for the impairment test procedure 64 36.6 
No, I do not 28 16.0 
Other (please specify) 4 2.3 
Do you compare your evaluation with other evaluation(s) of subjects in other 
positions (multiple answer allowed) 
    
Compliance officer 22 12.6 
Controller 55 31.4 
Internal audit 33 18.9 
Process owner(s) 29 16.6 
Risk managers 26 14.9 
No, I do not 77 44.0 
Other (please specify) 2 1.1 
Do you think that exist other ways to account for goodwill that may provide more 
useful information for users 
    
No 81 46.3 
Yes 94 53.7 
Which of the following would you suggest to enforce the reliability of goodwill 
accounting 
    
The reintroduction of goodwill amortisation and eventually review it for impairment 65 37.1 
The requirement of additional disclosure 83 47.4 
To expense goodwill on business combination (resolving the difference between 
internally generated goodwill and purchased goodwill) 
40 22.9 
To offset goodwill against equity 46 26.3 
To account for goodwill as other intangibles (with definite useful life) are accounted 48 27.4 
The recognition of internally generated goodwill, permitting the offsetting between 
purchased and internally generated goodwill 
24 13.7 
To determine the value of goodwill as the difference between the book value of the 
equity (of the entire company) and the (long-term) market value of equity 
(capitalisation) 
40 22.9 
Other (please specify) 6 3.4 
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Overall, do you prefer the impairment test than prior amortization process for 
goodwill? 
    
No 60 34.3 
Yes 115 65.7 !
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